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CHAPTER I 
THE SCHOOL PRD~CIPAISHIP 
An Evolving Role 
If there ever was a generally agreed to role of the school princi-
pal, it is equally true that many factors have led observers to believe 
1 that it is now evolving into some new form. Many of the factors causing 
this evolution have been analyzed in the literature. It may even be sug-
gested that more consensus occurs in the profession on what is changing 
the principal's role than what it will be. 2 
()nc. mn ~nT' f"nT'r"O +.h~+. hnC" '!:'H''\n ,....,.; 11 ~r..-.+..; V\'t't~ 
'--
+n "~~-"· ~~- __ ,_ -~ 
'- &' - ··-·-
the principal is the shifting pattern of decision-making power. This 
shift seems to be the result of societal changes that includes teacher 
collective action, minority group aspirations, the youth movement, the 
technological explosion, and educational muchraking. Each of these fac-
tors has contributed to the increasing pressure borne by all public ad-
ministrators, including school principals. 
Collective action by teacher groups may be one of the most well 
known developments in education during the last ten years. That teachers 
\:J1en L. Hanks, "The I<uture of the Elementary School Principal-
ship," The National Elementar~ Princieal, XLVIII (Sept.cmber, 1968), p. 8. 
2 Raloy E. Brmm, "Humanizing the Role of the Elementary School 
Principal, 11 The National Elementary Prins.!J)al, XLIV (April, 1970), p. 25. 
l 
t;,·.:a becon::; c·rganized and able to wield power is now a moot point. 
u ••• 'I'eachars are determined to hnve a voice about the conditions 
in t;hic:h they work. They expect a more equitable share in this 
afl'lueni' society >'<hich their services have signi.ficant.ly helped 
t.o e;r,,;at.e •••• I think, hmwver, that teachers are militan~; 
that i:1, ready to fight for public recognition and respect." 
Dealing with problems in a collective manner is an American 
n:othcd. Labor has pointed out by example that group power far exceeds 
t:1e sui'll of individual attempts at changing working conditions. It is 
interesting to note that it took teachers much longer to arrive at this 
conclusion t.han many other employee groups. In any event the .teachers 
have followed what may be called a pattern in American social develop-
ment:. and are now represented as a collective group with power at all 
levels of go~ernment. 
This has altered roles within the school. 
".'\~ T.t;!:!C.t1nrr.: ~PI;!!<" 't.hA r1~h't. 't.n rl::>VAln:' ~·11 nn'li~:i'?f: h:il_'C\t-.~.,.eJJ~,.; 
the new policies cnn, and often do, preclude former administra~ 
tive prerogatives." . . 
\·men negotiations are completed the principal has all too often found 
t.hat he was responsible for implementing a policy that was in conflict 
either with his philosophy or with the best interests of the children 
2 
or both~ The principal discovered that his prerogatives had been limited 
but his responsibility remained the same. 
The use of collect~ve negotiations by teachers has not on~ af-
fected principal prerogatives, security, and authority but has serious~ 
3 James C. King, 11New Directions for Collective Ne~otiation," 
!!_le .. E~!~al Elementary Princ~al, XLVII (September, 1967), p. 47. 
4 ~., p. 45. 
3 
altered profes::.::i.•>nz~l dimon~;ion of his rolo. If im:t.ructionul leader-
tJhip is a rrajor part of the principal's role and if collective bareain-
ing cont:Lr:';;es to ignore the principal, then it would have been concluded 
th3 t th:u:; r;~>pect of his role will be chaneed. And, the principal is ig-
no red W(HO?n teachers bargain: 
"And yet the net result of all this is that elementary school princi-
pals are, in too fm.r instances, hardly involved at all in professiornl 
negotiations activities--ei·t~wr directly in the negotiat.ing grocess 
or in the advisory capacity to either party to the proccss. 11> 
One observer is positive that teacher militancy and the resulting 
collective negotiations have reduced the principal's role: 
"To subt,ract from the principal's position the dimension of responsi-
bili.ty for instructional leadership is to diminish significantly the 
professional component of his role and to reduce it to a managerial 
and foreman type. This is where the school principalship is undoubt-
edly headed unless by professional commitm9nt and conscious profes-
sional effort such a trend is redirected." 0 
to alter the role of the principal. 
But what of minority group aspirations? Do blacks want to change 
the role of the principal or will their aspirations do the same thing 
indirectly? The latter may be the result. One black observer states th3 
reason most clearly: 
11 But the suspicion is universal that this school system practices a 
kind of covert racism of which it is sometimes unaware and which it 
consistently refuses to face. Have you ever wondered, for instance, 
why there are so few black teachers j_n these schools--and no black 
principals or assistant principals?"7 
c 
::>John D. McGill, 111'be Middle or the Muddle; Three Rm-Ts to Hoe 
But One way to Go, II !~linois P!:~n,c;_ipal (May, 1971), p. 7. 
6 ~., p. 7. 
7c. Shelby Rooks, 11The Rebirth of Hope, 11 The National El~me~ta!Z 
Principal, XLVIII (September, 1968), p. 47. 
Ameri.wn society ha:s been racis't and sUll is according to some minority 
group leaders. The schools reflect our society most directly and the 
principal reflect:;: the school. Principals, among other white Americans, 
8 have failed to take black aspirations seriously. As vJhitney Young has 
stated: 
nour educational institutions, like most. American institutions, have 
for the most part been concerned with perpetuating 'IJt;at is and for 
serving those people who tiere useful to the system. ?hey have not 
been prepared to educate poor • • • black Americans. 11 
Blacks are now prepared and have begun to see that this is 
changed. In so doing one can assume tbat ·i:;hey will affect every part of 
the school system, generally, and the role of the principal, specifically~ 
Blacks feel that the public school s.ystem has failed them and would like 
to see a cow~etitor for it.10 The methods they employ for this change 
and the results obtained are far beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
be reflected in some way in the role of the school principal. 
The youth movement, a nebulous term at best, characterizes a 
third part of this analysis. Student protest and/or militancy is one of 
the dramatic aspects of recent societal developments. Once a form of be-
havior cow~on to foreign universities, student protest has sifted down 
throug~ the American school system urJtil even the elementary school prin-
cipal can't be sure that his clients will not organize and publicly dis-
sent with some position he has taken. Why has this happened? 
8Ibid., P• 48 .. 
9rfuit.ney M. Young, Jr., "Order or Chaos in Our Schools," The 
~ation~lementary Principal, XLLX: (January, 1970), p. 26. 
10 ~., p. 27. 
5 
''E";cnuoo J.n the past decade our schools and univerEiit:.Les have bccc:<e 
a batt,le;rround for social ch<tnGo and often t.hc cente1· for protest, 
the chilrl m::ay quite naturally begin to vim.r the school as the encr:::;r 
and thest~ feelings ui111rxtend t~o the teachor and prir1cipal as er:"t-ployecs of the school. 11 
There 1 s no question that st;udcnt.s are becoming more militant in 
their search for change. 
uNot onJ..y are students becoming more militant, but they are increas-
, ingly turping to the courts to enforce what they cons:i.der as their 
rights. 1112 
The change in and elimination of dress codes is but one example of the 
success that students have had in removing the prerogatives that once ba:i 
been tdthin the realm of the administrator. There was a time when the 
principal could point with pride to his student council as an example of 
bow democracy was at work in his school. Students did discuss their 
problems, parties, and other less than significant projects. They did 
textbooks, and teacher evaluation. 
11 Today, however, in a number of school systems students are being 
asked for their opinions in areas that reserved by the administration--
the evaluation of teachers, ~1at should be included in the curriculum, 
what textbooks will be used, ~hat students will be allowed to wear, 
the design of a new school. nl . 
9an the principal play a role of instructional leader under these new 
conditions? Can the principal play an authoritative role With a group 
of organized students who have access to, for example, national SI:6 
leadership? Can the principal lead children when the atmosphere of the 
1\Jerald De rlitt, 11A Deterrent to Student Unrest, II The National 
Elementary Principal, XLIX (January, 1970), p. 41. 
12 
"What the Courts Are Saying About Student Rights, 11 NEA Research 
BulleM.n, Vol. 3'1, No. 3 (October, 1969), p. 86. 
13
nstudents Talk, Administra'l1ors Listen, 11 NEA Rese.::_~~lletin, 
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Harch, 1971), p. 13. 
6 
school is charged l~ith tension because the positions he takes differ rad:! ~ 
call.y fro;n those of the student body? Although definitive answcrD to such 
questions would be difficult to obtain, it may be suegested that the fact 
that they are even asked shows hou students have and lvill continue to af-
feet the role of the principal. 
The last factor that has and will continue to affect the pattern 
of decision-making power is the technological revolution. 'l.'his factor is 
the result of newly generated information and the resulting complexity. 
The fact that more scientific information has been amassed since World 
rrar II than in the previous history of man no\v borders on being a cliche. 
Our society has acquired data on a geometric progression. We know more 
facts about more things, yet have found that as our total amount of in-
formation increases we develop even more possibilities for additional 
This acquisition of inforl1l"ltion has led to a level of compla"'Ci.ty 
in our daily lives that borders on science fiction. When Henry Ford de-
veloped and produced the Model T it was conceivable that he made every 
:i,mportant decision based on his mm knowledge and experience. At least 
one observer of our society suggests that the information we have acquired 
makes this form of decision-making power an anachronism: 
" • • * that in modern industry a large number of decisions, and 
•all' that are importarlt, draw on information possessed by more than 
one man. TYpically they draw on the specialized scientific and tech-
nical knowledge, the accumulated information or experience and the 
artistic or intuitive sense of many persons. And this is guided by 
further information which is assembled, analyzedlflnd interpreted by 
professionals using highly technical equipment .. " 
14John K. Balbraith, The New Industrial State {Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1971), p. 62. 
7 
Thus, information has crea·ted a ne-v1 form of deci~Jion-·m.aking. And 
th:i.s form is not necessarily related to the lines of authority found on 
the organizational chart: 
HGroup decisi.on-making extends deeply into the businesc; enterprh;e. 
Effective pnrticipation is not cl,osely related to rank in the f'orrr;;:l 
hierarchy of the organi.za tion. n 15 
This circumvention of the traditional lines of aut;hority is a 
direct result . of the polo~er of information. Since every decision requires 
information and assuming that one person can no longer acquire ::111 that 
is nece~sary for independent action, then it follows that the group will 
exercise this power. 
·~-rnen pot•:"er is exerci.sed by a group not only does it pass into the 
organization, but it passes irrevocably • • e • If the decision re-
quired the combined information of a group, it cannot be safely re-
versed by an individual. He will ba ve to get the judgment of other 16 
specialists. This returns the pmrer once more to the organization. 11 
:Uu~ u1abt>i ve acauisition ci' :infnrm:nann h.t1~ nn't. hr>t=on l ~ m; +ot'l +.r. 
the economic and industrial areas. Education, the learning process, and 
human development have likewise become areas of much complex knowledge. 
The young adult does not complete sixteen years of schooling and then 
understand or even experience the rnultitude of ideas, situations, and/or 
methods that may co~tribute to human development. Thus, even in schools 
a variety of specialists come together to make decisions about learners. 
The school principal is only one of these and his knowledge may or may 
not contribute to a particular decision. This leads to the obvious: how 
could the role of principal not but be changed by the information explo-
aion of our time? 
lS'Ibid., p. 65. 
16Ibid., p .. 67. 
8 
These four factors (i.e., 'te'lcher militancy, minority group as-
piraUons, student ac·tivism, and the technological revolution) have corr.c 
tor;ot•her to shift the patterns of decision-making power. These societ:J.l 
changes have tended to pull the vortex of power away from many authority 
figures. The school principal is one sttch example .. 
When !i!::i" JohnnY: CB:.!!.'t Read became a best-seller .. it marked the 
open:i.og of tho battle bet~rcen a loosely knit group of critics and the 
educational establishment. This battle appears to be continuing and 
growing in significance if one considers the number of critics the school 
has been able to attract during the last fifteen yearso 
This paper is too limited to analyze the forces that have produc~d 
these critical observers. However, it w~~ld be worthy to note that many 
of these critics are crying for change in what has been commonly called 
,, rr-~·-J... .- ...... JJ 
'""J- ................ • 
''We live increasingly, then, in a system in which little direct 
at.tention is paid to the object, the function, the program, the task, 
the need; but immense attention to the 1role 1 (author's italics) pro-
cedure, prestige, and profit. • Natural~ the system is inef-
ficient; the over-head is high; the task is rarely done witb love, 
style, and excitement, for such beauties emerge only from absorption 
in real objects; sometimes the task is not done at al?; and those who 
could do it best become either cynical or resigned. nl · 
Since the appearance of Grm~ing Ue Ab_surd, educators have been deluged 
with Yolume after \rolume that cry for a change in the system, generally, 
and in t.he schools, specifically. Crisis in the Clr1.ssroom, Edueation an~ 
~~st.as~, HoH· Children Fail, Schools \vithout Failure, and Teaching as a 
Subversiv·e Act all promote the thesis that something is rotten in the 
state of the schools. 
p. 13. 
17Paul Goodman, GrcMi._!?;g Up li.b~~ (New York: Random House, 1956), 
9 
"The r:G[:t recent. cr:l..ticisrn of the cd·acc~~Pcr is that. he is incf:fcct.ivc. 
Harsh<:11 HcLuh:-m asserts t!:.:r{; public education i1:; irrelEo\'ant~ Norbert 
lviencr contend:.:: that it sh:.i cJ.ds students from rea:Iit.y. John Gardner 
saY~> Unt the {;c:hool eduentos for obsGleaccnce.. Jerome Bruner i.mr:-lies 
th;t educntion i.B based on fe.lr. John Holt. asm11ncs that educat.io~ 
avoids the promotion of s:ienif:i.cant learnings, Pau.l Goodman claims 
that; educat;ors p1mish creativity and independence& Edgar Frieng::mberg 
indi.cates that educators arc not doing '1-.'hat needs to be done."1 
How could this avalanche of criticism not but affect the role of the 
school principal? 
And it has. This is best illustrated by the Nat:i.onal Associatioo 
of Elementary School Prjncipals 1 O".Vt:l series of nrti~les ent~tled, 11Humaniz-
ing the :taementary School11 • 19 By 1970 the princit)als collectively recog-
nized that their schools had to change. Not only that the schools had to 
change -but that they, the principals, had to be the change agents. The 
principal was the man in the middle and there b.Y choice, because: 
111-Jhat happens in the middle will determine not only the shape but 
<.ilov :..~:., i.,txi.,u.t.·l:l v.l t:uu..:atiunal oonorT.nn:Lri Pt; t'n'l" r-hi -,,.,,.,., ... , l'f'hc, 
m:1..dd.lc is \\iilere educational policy is translated i..nto programs. The 
middle_ is tihere parents and teachers meet, where the community and 
the school are harmonized, and t•lhere cultural imperatives and child-
ren's needs are reconciled. In short, the middle is where thi.ngs come 
together and the principal is t9e bearing which translates potential 
friction into useful momentum.u2U 
By proclaiming the need for change and their responsibility as leaders 
in this movement the. principals have contributed to the evolution of 
their role. 
The rroceding represents only some of the societal changes that 
have influenced the role of the school principal. As the financial 
strength of school districts has deteriorated, coupled with the negative 
18 George A. Antonelli, "The Educator and Accountability," 
!f.l:i.nois Principal (December, 1971), p. 10. 
19Paul L. Houts, "Humanism and Mr. Hotes, 11 The N'at.ional Elementary 
~,!'incipal, XLIX (January, 1970), p. 3. 
2Q.rlilliam L. Pharis, "The Han in the f1iddle Strikr:;s Back, 11 The 
~tional El.~l!;en,tary _Principal (April, 1970), p. 2. 
10 
v:i.eW cJ~pressed publicly about; school pc0ple and their work, a De'l'l trend 
is emerging for t;hc seventies that has the potential to not only change 
the role of the principal but even elimlnate it. Tho trend is, of coune, 
account.abili'liy. 
"It is the contention of the present. t,;riter that the fast generating 
na.ttomdde derr,and for accountability i~ :Lnitia'ting the nomin<1tion of 
the American cd:u.cators as t~1? most likely candidate for the sacri-
ficial lamb of the 1970 1 s.nLl 
Institutions are evolving. Roles are changing. The school p!'in-
cipal is only one of many who has found that the nomothetic dimension of 
his professional life faces alterat;ion. One more f.ad;or that will affect 
this clmnge is administration collective bargaining. 
nt..,,.......,. ............ .¢...., -"'h-!"'o1 'L......,~-4 
---·-'""·&- _,. .. --· ... --- __ ........ - l... -._.... 'l~ . .-. ,......., • .~u ..... -v..,;.•• 
the advent of collective bargaining as a means to establish working con-
ditions. TI1is different way of achieving agreement, as op~osed to uni-
lateral action by management, is now part of the public school environ-
ment. 
"Negotiation is or will be, very much a part of almost every school 
administrator 1s life, like flu shots or the school lunch program •• 
Sooner or la·ter, a colleague or an au"t~hor in some professional maga-
zine such as this will wave h:Ls finger at him and observe that 
1 willy~·nilly', we are all in t~~s together and sooner or later the 
times vTill catch up with him~" 
Considering collective bargaining in the public schools, the 
question emerges: what dimension does this form of communication add to 
2~eorge A. Antonelli, oe~ cit., p. 11. 
22 James c. King, IINew Directions for Collective Negotiation, 11 The 
National~lemcntar:v Princie~~' XLVII (September, 1967), p. 45. 
. . 
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As do nc•.my procedurCLl changes, the 
question suggests both posit.i\."o and negative possibilities. From the nf)(:',·"i-
tivc poi.nt of vimi, <:~.B may be tho case in 'the pcrcept.icns of board mem-
bers a.nd ad:ninistr0.tors, the qU.(3Stion of authority becomes most import.ant: 
"'I'he charge tlw.t, the effect· of labor ur:.:i.ons and their program of col-
lcci:,iirc bargaining· is to usurp manaeeri.:1.l authority is an cld o~~~ 
It is virtually coincident ui.th the rise cf unions themselves.~~ . .J 
The question of m:magement 1 s discretionary authority has always become 
• J. • h 24 predow.:wan ~ us unJ.on pc~rer as gra-wm e The assumption seems to have 
been that the scope of a collective bargaining agreement would be :in-
versely proportional to management's freedom in decision-making. 25 'l'his 
assumption is based on a premise of a unilateral decision-mrlking process. 
When, hmvever, one considers decision-rraking as a bilaternl pro-
cess, then collective bargaining becomes less of a threat to management 
have gained the right to be involved with decisions t.hat once had been 
entirely within the realm of school board authority. No~1 teachers and 
boards work jointly to seek outcomes to questions and situations that may 
have origjnated as opposing points of vievT, In this type of situation, 
collective bargaining becomes a method for acc:ommodat:ion by and for both 
sideso As this process becomes more common in the schools, the so-called 
traditional mothod of one-way decision-making is altered. 
23Neil l'!. Ch: ,-:,)erlain, "Organized Labor and Management Ccntrol, 11 
'I'he .AnnalG of the Ar.:c::clcan Academy of Political and Soc:1;.!l Science, 
VOl":271i-{Tiarcn,-1:951T;-p:-r>z: ~ ·- --- -- -· 
2~lbid., p. 153. 
25~., p. 15'3. 
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Unfortunat.ely, from the pd.ncipal 1 s Gidc cf the table, the alter::~.-
l oft him out of the entire process. ticn The principal has realized t. rJs. 
One national principal's association pubJJ_cation stated the problem cc:n-
plotely in these terms: 
"· • • In too rr.any cases the princ1pal hr!.s found himself in the 1.L"'l-
fortunato role of the 'forgotten third party'. Principals are and 
should be concerned abrut necc:mary involvement in the total process 
of educational policy developmsnt~ These concerns relating to educa-
tional decision-making contint.\e to intensify as more and more em,.nbyce 
groups orgap~ze to negotiate school district policy with boards of' 
education. u&: 
Perhaps, this 11left-out" feeling, based all too frequently on 
what had happened, explains tfhy principals have felt the need to employ 
collective bargaining for themselves. As early as 1968 this idea was 
suggested in the "National Elementar-.r Principal": 
11In some negotiation sH.uations the principal is considered to be 
-rrith the administrat:i.on; in others, he is with the teachers; and in 
~_T"t:)ot""- ...-.+.~"ia .. !"'c- ho ~-~ -i_n +-J ... a ln.0 ~~n~lc:; 1~:n""irl! ~n ~ohr~c.n Ur.r:r rlno'-i ~ 
principal have to operate in order to be represented? For purposes 
of this discussion, the principal will be CR9sidered as an employee 
desirous of being heard along with others., 112 
Dr. Louis N. D 1Ascoli, Chairman of the Administratj.ve Negotia-
tions Committee, NISASSA, uas equally frank in pointing out the growing 
at,z-areness among administrative groups for representation: 
"A greater number of principals and other administrators have failed 
to organize despite t.h53
8
need to organize that is being i'elt at 'JVer;,r 
administrative level. rr2 
26
owen B. Kierman, !:!~ent 9ris~s: A !3olution (National Associ-
ation of Secondary School Pr~nc~pafs, vr.iSE~ng£on, D:G~971), p. 5. 
27Robert ll. Asnard, 11 Directions in Negotiation," The National 
Elemel!~ary Princ:i.pa~, XLViii (September, 1968), p. 22. 
28Louis N. D'Ascoli, Sum.%:1ry of Provisions of Contracts Between 
Associations of Admird..str.:1tor~~ and '[Jo;J:.i;ls of'1~I~ic""&'tion intneslate of 
N'ewYork, 1970-='lr{li.IEany, New York: NCWYorlcStctte AssoC.Tat.J:on or-
Eie'menG:cy and Secondary School Princ:i.pals, 1971), p. 3. 
lJ 
It must be assumed that; U1e princ:ipal, as an en.cployea of' the 
board \rhose status is higher than that of the teacher in the nomothetic 
dimsnoicn of role, ic vitally com~erned wit.h the policies and actions of 
the bc::::rd$ Collective bargaini.ng seems to have been adopted by principals 
because: 
"· •• negotiations is a process of involvement of interested parties 
in dcci::si.on-w.akjng relative to matters l•ihj_ch affect him. The end 29 product. is rules, policies, regulations, guarantees and the lj.ke. 11 
Assuming the principal is concerned Hith the conditions under 
which he serves professionally, it is not unreasonabl€.1 to expect that he 
would look to the bargaining process as a means of gaining some control 
over his working environment. 
The use of collective bargaining by principals has yet another 
reason for its inclusion in school business procedures. TM.s reason is 
the institution. Neil W. Chamberlain outlines the rationale in tho fol-
lowing manner: 
11It looks upon decision-making as a continuing process '1-.'bich includes 
not only those who initiate and verbalize the course of action but 
also those who effectuate it~ For if those charged wi.th carrying 
out a specified action fail to understand the intent or inadequately 
conform to the planning (less by insubordination than inattention, 
unconcern, and short-cutting), they have, in .fact, modified the de-
cision as effectively as if they had been influential at the con-
ference table or in the supervisor 1 s office llhere the action uas 
planned. For decisions are actually made at all levels in a com,~ 
pany, t-tith varying degrees of dj.scretion, and with respect to a par-
ticular outcome or result it makes sense to treat the decision-mn.king 
process as the chain of steps wh~ch link together all those in a 
position to affect the outcome .u 0 
29
wa;yne A. Stoneking, "Principals' Problems in Negotiations," 
llii.nois Pr:il1;_s;ieal (May, 1971), p. 3. 
30NeH. W~ Chamberlain, .£2~ cit., p. 155. 
i. 
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Principals, perbr::ps more than any othor group, can affect the out-
corne of school board decL•ions in 11 s ienif'icant manner. If deciston-
mki.ng is such a chain-like process, it is l'Oasonable to understand lcthy 
principals have employed collective bargaining as a means of remaining 
as an ir...formed, contributing link in that cbaino 
The need for this study is based on the fact that l:i.ttle attention 
· has been paid to administrator collective bargaining and the resultant. 
contrncts. State public employee collective bargaining legislation, the 
dtsintegration of educational associations, and the administrator's his-
torical reluctance to act in a collective manner are some of the factors 
that may account for this lack of attention. 
1~ow, nowever, tne s~t.uat.ion is quite different. As recently as 
February, 1971, school administrators representing a number of large 
city districts became a national organizing cow~ittee of the AFL-ciO. The 
School Administrators and Supervisors Organizing Com~ttee (SASOC) is, 
in fact, a national union of administrators who number nearly 6,000 
members. Considering the short histo~ of this group and the rate at 
whichne'.f locals are being' formed throughout the nation, it·scems reason-
able to crn1clude that coll~ctive bargaining is becoming an important tool 
for adrninistrators.31 Walter Degnan, President of SASOC, has no doubts 
about this and is certain that this procedure will even~ually reach ever,y 
school district. 32 
3lAn interview wi.th Walter Degnan, Prestdent of the School Admiui-
st.rators and Supervisors Organizing Committee, AFL....CIO, on .Harch 9, 1972, 
in New York at the National Headquarters. 
32Ibid. 
/ 
The qn::w'tion t'bat. collective bargaining might affect institut.:i.:..1nal 
role~> is rhetorical. Ar.1 editorial in a recent edition o.f the ASCD Jo>l:o&.l, 
'T:d.vcational Leadership, 11 ·uas more d·dinite: 
"Surely negotiated contracts for teachers and other school persont)'2l 
have had profound effects upon the trmrk lives of nearly all profesu 
sional ed~cat,ors. In this reor·ganized t~orJ.d, old rules and roles do 
not \rork as they once did. • • .. :J:n this p~1\icr struggle a neutral 
position is nearly a futile hope. 11 J3 
Collective bargaining has affected roles, including that of the principal. 
Although this effect is receiving national attention, there re-
mains an obvious need for information about administrator contracts. 
nA Summary of Provisions of Contracts Between Associations of the Adm:ini-
strators and Boards of Education" is one of the few publications available 
that could sat:l.sfy this need. This study is limited to reporting the con-
tents of a series of contracts in only one state. 
tion about the contents but will allou for analysis. Upon what areas 
do the provisions touch? Hol-r are relationships between the agreeing 
parties defined? What specific rights does each party have? wbat is not 
included? How <bes language usage affect interpretation of the contract'? 
What job descriptions are included in the bargaining units? ~~at effects 
has state law played on the contract? These types of questions outline 
a need for information about administrator contracts and it is to this 
objective that this study is directed. 
A second need that evolves from fulfillment of the first is an at-
tempt to trace the implications of contract provisions. 
33 J. Harlan Shores, 11Changing Conceptions of Professional Identi-
liies, 11 ~cational Leadership, Vol. 29, Noe 6 (March, 1972), p. 489. 
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t!J\ baf:Jic tenet in eduC'o.tional adm:Lt,J.st.:ration h:$ been that t.he bu.:!..B-
j p,-, pd ncir,ul is the in:.:t .. ructional lender for t,he orir.:ary unit of 
c~i~r:i.culum' eh~nge~ Hany princip;)l:-;, and othr·rs in. the .:tdr.li.nistra.t~ve 
line and ;;b.ff ~·feel that, at heart. they are teachers. Yet their pc-
sit.i.on in tho ad.minist.rati:ire strnetu.rc are real or in~:1gi.ned sus-
picions rec:arding their lo~~~lties and motives make functional leadc.::'-
ship e::rlrow;J.y difficult. 11 --'4 . 
This paragraph implies serious ch<mges in education. It follorrs 
that the contract prov·isions will somcho't-1 affect the administrator's 
role. 'l'he collective bargaining agreement definea, in part, the relation-
ship between the board~ teachers, public, and administration. The impli-
catic::·w of this defining process are significant when considering the 
nomothetic dimension of role. Therefore, a second need fer this study 
revolves around n listing and consideration of possible implications. 
Collective bargaining is commonplace in America. Public employee 
bargaining has the support of law in a majority of the states. Teacher 
research has been directed toh~rd administrator bargaining, yet such 
action has been taken in a significarrt number of localities •. · And, 
finally, the role of the principal is evolving: 
11Withou.t question the role of the principal has become one of the 
most difficult roles in education. He is plagued day and night with 
the words relevancy, sensitivity, and accountability. The students 
n~N question him, the teachers defy him, and the parents protest 
against him. Even the Board of Educat.ion minimizes his Us!?f.ulness 
and the superintendent fails to give the deserved credit~tr3::> 
All of these factors suggest that administrator collective bargaining be 
examined in some way. This study is an attempt to fulfill, in part this 
need. 
34~., p. 489. 
· J.5Michael F. Stramaglia, "The Ch::mging Role of the Principal, 11 
Illinois Prjncipal (March, 1972), p. 4. 
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'l'he pur:pose of this stu<"..y has lx'len to determine thrcu:;ll com.paris:::.n 
and analysis t,h0 cha.nging role of the prlncipal as reflected by a series 
of ccnt.racts bot~~een associations of adrninistrat.orf; and board of educa-
tion. ~'he data. obtained have been used for a number of comparisons in-
volvi.ng trends affecting the role of the principal. These co:nparisons 
have st:tggested a number of tentative conclusions· that are presented as a 
posnible st~cture to predict the role of the principal as it will exist 
in t.ho near future. 
A secondary purpose of this study revolved around the frequency 
with whi.ch various provisions relating to r;orldng conditions and rerr:u.nera~ 
tion appear in the contracts. This minor purpose is informational in 
character but may suggest in a subtle manner certain trends that are be-
found that a w.ajority of contracts made provision for handling parent 
complaints this appeared to suggest that this was a concern of the ad-
ministrat;.ors. 
Procedure for th2..§tudy 
This study is based on four hypotheses that were derived from an 
examination of twenty-four contracts between associations of adminlstra-
tors and boards of education, a number of recent doctoral dissertations 
dealing with the role of the principal, and the writings of members of 
both the NAESP and the NASSP. All the hypotheses relate to the power, 
authority, and/or influence the building adm:inistrator has to carry out 
the nomothetic dim~nsion of his role. In tbis study t.he term 11 organiz~d 
I 
I, 
barga{n:; \:rit.h tho local board of educat.:Lc~l and obl::.1:ins u · contr::!.ct for 
its IiH':rr.bera * 
HvnotheGes ~."';t.,.k:..:.:.,.----..,._ 
I. Organized principals h3.ve the pm;er to shap~ ·the~:.r 
o-vm profet.;::don~.l dcstin:Les. 
II. Organized principals hove the po;;;t~r to direci.i rmd 
evaluat-e personnel within their attendance centers. 
IJL Organized principals haV<') tho power to play a n"-ljor 
role in the education<:il programs of their bui.ldings. 
IV. Organized principals hGve the palier to contribute 
to school district policy developm-<mt. 
12 
The phrase 11 shape their own professional dest.inies 11 was selected 
from the positioc paper of the Michigan Jl.r:>sociation of School Princi-
pals. 3
6 
It· refers to the latitude available to the principal and/or his 
administrator. The problems of ambiguous position, of contradictory re- · 
sponsibilitios and authority, and lack of avenues to contribute to policy 
development are co~~on to many school principals. 37 The h~~othesis deal-
ing lh'i.th the principal's professional destiny was designed to see i.f 
through the collective bargaining agreement the principal can arrive at 
a set o.f conditions that might eliminate much of his current isolation 
and confusion. 
In the broadest sense definition can serve to reduce ambiguity.· 
'This is, of course, not necessarily alt-tays a direct and positive correla-
tion. However, as the administrator bargains tdtb and arrh-es at the 
3~nvid c .. Smith, op. ci~·=-' p4 4. 
37 Ibid.:., p. 4. 
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conditions of his employmeni; with the bo~lr-d of educD.tion, the spc!cif'ic 
provis:Lons of the contract ind:i.cate that h;;:;uo:J have been discus::wd and 
dei'initiotw made. It has been assumed that the provisions cont2.ined. 
within the cont.racts are of equal acceptance to both parties. 
All of the propositions· under Hypvtbesis I relate to either de-
fining the pri.ncipal 1s job description and work effectiveness, or his 
right ·to corr..mu.nicate and contribute to the dev·elopment of policy owi.thin 
the dist;:cict.. Other propositions designed to test the re!l'.aining hypo-
theses are more specific. In Hypothesis I, hmmver, the basic rights . .._. 
to open l:l.nes of cornmunicat.i.on and to contribute to job definition are 
established. If an organized principal has these rights as a part of 
his collective bargaining agreement, it has been concluded. within the 
framework of this study that he c.an 11 shape his professional destinyu., 
TT~,. .. ,• ,t, . .. . .. _., .~. "·. .t ....•• , ""'. 
""'-..l-.J.. ,J..IJ CJ.l_JtH:;:cu., ~ '-IV Ut:; "'o,l,.;..l-at.•....t.._y 
assuxaed by many that the powers referred to are, and have been, vii thin 
the nor!T.al prerogatives of most building principals. Perhaps, this 
tacit assnmption developed because the textbooks on supervision and ad-
m.i.nistration made reference to these act.ivities in terms of what t.he 
principal might do. However, teacher collective bargaining agreements 
have, in many cases, eliminated portions of thi.s authority. 38 
If teachers are assigned to a building by the central office, 
h01i does the principal affect staff selection? If personnel arrive at 
the building vd.th specific grade and/or role designations and assignments, 
h~d does the principal develop the objectives he has for his staff? If 
personnel may transfer from building to building within the district 
38
rntervi.ew with Walter Degnan (footnote #31, p. 14). 
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changed mld/or elimin~tcd from his ::.;t.aff by ~~b::! cr-m~· 
tr.:;.l ad:..:Ln:i.::;tration, hcH· does the pr:i.ncip::::l plan a lor:g ·term prc·e,r.::,;.f! 
propcsi:l;:torw relating to Hypotheses II and TII all are concerned ~>dth 
t,lv:se 'ty1Jes of quesU.ons. Many of the powers that principals supposedly 
ha1rd a::'c., in .fact, iu residence at the central office. lihen the priw:.:i-
p:::.l has no written gi.W.rantee that. he may exercise one or all o.f thoGe 
pc-~iers, hr:;..r C.o·l.O it be assumed that they will not be exerc:tsed 'k"i th or 
ulthout his approval at a central location? In this study it has been 
assumed that the lack of written provisions means a large degree of prin-
dp::;.l authority and autonomy can be, and is, lost to teachers' rights 
and central office authority. Hypotheses n and lli were designed. to 
scok the degree to t<ihich the princ:i.pal can affect his own bn~.lding staff 
'~ .. _, 
QU\..4 
To test the hypotheses a series of propositions were formulated 
that deal r-nth the nomothetic dimension of the principalship. 
!,:~~p~si tio~ 
1. The principal may communicate with the board of educa-
tion without the approval of an intermediary. 
2. The principal contributes to any modification of his 
job description. 
3.. The principal consults with the board of educat.ion on 
procedur'es for the dismissal or promotion of his peers. 
4. The principal has the first opportunity to apply for 
new~ open administrative positions within the district. 
5. The principal may deal with his problems collectiv·ely 
without the approval o.f higher authorities and witr;out 
fear of personal reprisal. 
6. The principal has a grievance procedure agreed to by 
his association and the board of education with ~~ich 
he can solve his professional problems. 
7. The pr:\ru~:'ipal. l:;; pt·nv-idcd Hj:ih lE~gal ccl:_,,::((il ar:d <:;ll 
nr:cc~;:~'H'Y asr.:if;i;a;ic:r..:: rcsul·t~:Ln::; from ch::Tr~c:; of libel. 
slander .• and/or r:c.:Glir;cnc:e inc:-~.trred t~hile perform:i.nc; 
his ad:rdnistrativ"; chlt-ies. 
8. The principal h&.s act:ddlU.c freedom. 
9. T'he princip:1l may u:.;e :>choo1 faci.lities, equipment, and 
time to conduct ~he bu::;iness of ~lis association. 
10. The principal has the right to hGld outside employrr.;::nt; 
that does not intorf8ro -vritl:1 school d1strlct duties. 
ll. The principal is consalted :;;bout evaluat.icn procedures 
concerning his position and effectiveness. 
12. The principal has the r~r;ht to attend conferences, -rmrk-
shops, and other m:::ctings designed to improve his educ;,•.-
tional abilities. 
13. The principal receives all the rights and opportuni~;,ir:D 
given to the teachers throu,zh tbeir contract and these 
are not abridged by his position or bargaining agree-
ment. 
14. The principal interviews arrl approves of peroonnel for 
11i r.; hlli I rii na _ 
15. The principal assigng personnel to specific positions 
within his building. 
16. The principal approvBs of transfers of personnel from 
his building to another in the district. 
17. The principal takes part in the modification or elimina-
tion of any job description of positions within his 
bui~di.ng. 
10. ?.'he principal approves the use of his building 1 s faci.li-
ties by Oiitside groups. 
19. , The prin~ipa1 is consulted about any modifications of 
his building. 
20. The principal contributes to and approves of curriculum 
development within his building. 
2L The principal may innovate within his buildingo 
22. The principal is free to do research in curriculum and 
instructional methods within his building. 
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23. 'il,o p:ri.n.d.r::~:!.l h:::5 acc~c.;:,;: to ~genda ;::.nd m:Lnutcs of board 
t:~ ·' t.i.Dgs, ·~.r<:a:,J.:trer 1 s rceorLs, ccn:;-:.w cbt:1, t-~nd other 
pertinent ci.n.L::1 about t:he ::;cheol di:::;t;rict .• 
24. Tho pri.nc:i.ra1. t,:tkes p3xt in negotiations betwerm s..:~b­
C•:.'dinat~es and the: boD.rd of edt;.caticn. 
25. Tl1o princip~11 t:;;.kcs pad• in the development of the 
school district budgo~. 
26. l'he principal takos part in the development of the 
school calend~;.r. 
27. Tho principal takes part. in the plannint~ and develop-
ment of new school fac:Uities in the district.. 
The propositions relate directly to the hypotheses: Propositions 
1 to 13 relate to Hypothesis I; PropositiDns 1)4 to 19 relate to H;n-w-
thesis II; Propositions 20 to 22 relate to Hypothesis III; Propositions 
23 t.o 27 relate to Hypothesis IV. 
The propositions were derived from two major sources: A Sun:ma:rr 
----::.. 
________ .., _____ .,., __ . __ _ 
1 t . hO :u 100. The two publications have, as a common factor, a listing of 
the kinds of provisions that have been included in recently negotiated 
administrator contracts. · The Nl~SP paper concerns itself with the ad-
ministrative team concept. Using t,he team rationale, it develops the 
need for various kinds of rights or pmTers at the principal level if such 
an organizational pattern is to be effective. 
The New York study is based on a number of existing contracts 
that were dissected by provisions included to determine the degree to 
which similarities occnrred. The study is essentially a reporting docu-
ment, and rr.akes no attempt to draw conclusions from the number and/or types 
39Lou.is U. D1Ascoli, oe_.:_~· 
4°owen B. Kierman, !?.!?..·_~it. 
I 
I 
I i 
agrcctfi8'orltr::~ It Nas assum<.::d t.hat this Kould be a reasonable point fron 
" 
which a series of realistic propositimw could be initiated. 
A secondary source of ihforrr"::t.:J.on used to validate the :i.mporiia:1cn 
.. h1 
of Uw propooltions was f:lc:~~nt~rz-§.?22.~~~1 ~.fl.S:~\~2}~~.!tw~~::,~;oc;::!_:::!. 
This st:n.dy outlines the major problems of a large number of principals .. 
Usittg thBse probJ.cmH as a guide, the propositions "i-rere then applied to 
the problem areas to see if they would serve as 8. partial solution. 
Propositions giv.ing the principal the contractual power to control or 
solve one of these problems l.;ere assumed to have increased validity .. 
A second diMension of the process leading to the finished list 
of propositions involved collecting the opinions of worldng school ad-
a district superintenceot, and four school principals were interviewed.h2 
These intervi~rs consisted of two major areas: a general discussion of 
what rights, pm1ers nnd/or authority the administrat.or felt was needed 
to carry out the principal's role in a manner he ~rould consider to be 
professional, and a direct examination of the propositions to see if 
they, in fact, represented these rights. 
4lxeith Goldhammer and others .• Elementary School Princioals and 
Their Schools: Beacons of hrilJ.iance an'd.-F~11;hoTC8-'o1;-f'est3.Torice-T~e-rie, 
or:eg·on:~--6'enter-:for tfle ACE-ii.ll'Ced""study -o1'"'1:tiucaffinarxdiiUnlstriltion; 1971) .. 
42Refers to interv:i.ews of the following administrators: 
Dr. Donald Klein, Assistant Superintendent, Educational Service Region of 
Cook C ount.y, lll:i11ois; Frank Dagne, Superintendent of Schools, East Haine 
District :;163, Ni.les, Illinois; Dale Zorn, Principal, Indian Trail Junior 
Hi.gh ~khool, District //4, Addison, Ill:inois; Leonore Page, Principal, 
Nelson :Jchool, Ear.t Haine District ~~63; Caesar Ca.ldarelli, Principal, 
Wilson School, F.;u;;t Maine Dlstr:lct #63; Dan Cunnif, Principal, Melzer 
Schuol, East IJmine Distri<!t 1/63. 
Discu.::;sing the ftrot qu.est;ion the administators 1 responses in-
cluclcd statonh:m'ts such as, "I need t.h e power to make final decisions, 11 
u ••• autonomy is nccessary,n·u ••• full participating member of the 
district administrative team, 11 and 11 • • • the pC"wer to make decisions 
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at the building level that tdll not be arbitrarily ch.anged. 11 All of the 
administrators' general statements could be interpreted to mean that they 
needed the delegated board authority to decide and control at the build-
ing level if they were' to be something more than a management clerk in 
their role as principal. 
In review~ng the specific propositions the group agreed that 
each and every one was needed if a principal was to ful~ carry out 
the role of educational leader. Although some of the propositions al-
luded to powers that the reviewing administrators did not have at one 
cause of their choice but, rather, reflected a different point of view 
about the principal's role. 
As is apparent, the propositions selected to test the hypotheses 
have been given equal weight and reflect equal importance. This 
rationale is based on an assumption about a role incumbent's power and/or 
authority within an institution. The assumption is that the power and/or 
authority of a role incumbent is related to the number of alternatives 
available to him for a£f.ecting the outcome of events within the institu-
tion. 
For example, Hypothesis I deals with the power a principal has 
to act in a profeus:i.onal manner. This was defined in a preceding por-
tion of this chapter. Some or the alternatives that will allow the 
principal to act professionally include the right to be consulted about 
25 
it,crr,:c; s,:·,~.'~ .oJ.s hi.s job dcscripticn, d.ismisnal and promotion procedures, 
and evaln:·t.ion prcced:tlrcs. Ot,her propositions include the right to a 
gricv<)J'lC';,:; procedure, board support in legal actions, use of school facili-
ties and tine to act in a collective manner, arid the f'reedom to use his 
private tine as he sees fit. All of these items·represent alternatives 
that m:ry be available to a given principal. The administrator whose con-
. 
tract mah:es provisions for all of these rights ~11 be assumed to have 
greater plf~er in the nomothetic dimension of his role in this study than 
one who has fewer such alternatives. 
If one will not agree that the propositions which support the 
hypotheses are of equal i~ortance, then it becomes necessary to argue 
that some are more important than others. Such a process may tend to 
reflect the biases of the person making the judgments. To say that con-
greater iw~ortance than the right to a grievance procedure seems to be 
an untenable situation because this depends upon many variables which 
change when applied to a given case. Therefore, in this study the 
propositions have been assumed to have equality, with quantity actL~g 
as the significant factor. 
The data for this study have been obtained from eighty-one 
contracts between administrator's associations and boards of education. 
All of these contracts are current or are being renegotiated as of 
June of 1971. The contracts represent school districts in Colorado, 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Copies of ~hese agreements have generously been 
provided by Dr. Robert Jozwiak, Assistant Executive Secretar,y of the 
NAESP. 
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Each agreement has been studied to deterrr.ine what provisions are 
included. After this process was completed the weighting syotem was then 
applied to each contract. The description of the weighting system fol-
lows: 
A Rating o.t:: 
0 = No clause mentions or implies the power or right defined 
in the proposition. 
l = Some clause implies the power or 'right defined in the 
proposition. 
2 = Some clause(s) contains the power or right defined in 
the proposition but is constructed in such a way as to 
, be open to varied interpretation and application. This 
could be based on (a) lack of specificity, (b) nebulous 
or vague wording, (c) contradictory wording, a~d/or 
(d) specific reference to the school board's discretion-
ary_power to deny the right if it so deems. 
3 = Some clause(s) mentions the power or right defined in 
the proposition in a manner that leaves little or no 
.,.."'"'.,., .p,.....,.. ... ,_-.;,....~ .; """'+ -.~., ....... tf..- 4 ..::'""t~ 0 .. .:;.:-h & Cla.'"~~e "'r7V'U..l~ 
__ ._ ..... _--- ·----- -··--·[;""' ......... ""'_""'~··· 
(Jl·vua.o.i..y ut:. r·avuer extens:tve and would consider a number 
of specific incidents so t.hat interpretation and appli-
cation would be consistent and agreed to by both parties. 
The following is an example of one proposition that has been 
weighted. It has been included to serve as a model to demonstrate haw 
the contents of each contract have been weighted. 
Proposition 3: The principal consults with the board of education 
on procedures for the dismissal or prornition of his peers • 
. Suffernz. Ne,.,. York contr~;:!!: No mention or implication of this 
right or power exists in the contract. 
· Rating= 0 
La_ncast~!..z.N.N~ Yo~_2~ntr<!.<:~: This right is implied by Article V. 
This article proVides for month~ meetings of the ad~dnistrative­
supervisor.y staff. Evaluation is one of the series of topics 
outlined in the article. Secondly, the superintendent is di-
rected by the contract to 11discuss 11 with the L.A.s.A. (admini-
strative association) 11 the establishment of any new administra-
tive position". These two references imply that principals will 
.be consulted about procedures for e.valuation and, of course, t.he 
results of such procedures which include dismissal a.nd promotion. 
/ 
Ratin~·= 1 
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Dearborn Heiphts, Michi~an, contract: Article VII of this con-
tract is entitled, 111'ermination of Services". The article pro-
vides for and discusses procedures concerned with such items as 
severance pay, retirement conditions, use of leave-bank days, 
and unsatisfactory work records. The fact that such an article 
is included in the contract indicates that the board of education 
and the administrators have discussed and agreed to dismissal 
procedures. 
Secondly, Article IX provides for the "Evaluation of Administra-
tors". This· article contains the procedure for evaluation and 
the methods by which "administrators shall be disciplined, repri-
manded; reduced in rank or compensation, or deprived of any pro-
fessional advantage". The combination of these two articles is 
the basis for a maximum rating on the proposition. 
Rating= 3 
The objectivity of the weighting system bas been tested in a man-
ner similar to that employed in the constructioo of objective tests. A 
group of disinterested parties, all of whom are members of the education 
profession, have used the system and independently weighted four con-
tracts. It has been assumed that fou~ people rRti~~ the R~me four con-
tracts would provide for consistency if the total weights derived varied 
no more than 10 per cent on each contract. This result was obtained. 
A complete description and result of the validation process are included 
in Appendix A. 
. The four hypotheses overlap. For the purposes.of analyzing the 
contracts an artificial separation of duties, alternatives and powers 
has been created. In reality, however, the powers cannot be so readily 
tragmented. If a principal has the right to contribute to school district 
policy development (Hypothesis IV), then it is probable that he will use 
this authority to gain control over the personnel in his building (Hypo-
thesis II). If a principal bas the right to affect the educational pro-
gram in his building (Hypothesis Ill), then ~e has the opportunity to 
affect his professional destiny (Hypothesis I) or school district policy 
development (Hypothesis IV). Based on this premise it has been assumed 
' ~ . 
. ,·· 
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ttw:t the total we:lghting of each contract wi.ll be the: ~d:~nificant r;um-
bcr. 
If a particular contract was found to contain clauses that repre-
sent the maximum rating on every proposition related t,c Hypothesis I, 
tben it has been concluded that for the group of·organized principals 
represented, collective action has given them increased authority and/or 
power. However, the hypothesis refers to all organized principals so it 
has been necessar,y to determine what percentage of the entire group has 
w.~at powers, weighted at w~at level, to prove or disprove the original 
statement. 
For example, Hypothesis I had been designated to be tested by 
the first thirteen propositions. By weighting, the maxi~~ total a par-
ticular contract could receive is thirty-nine. The minimum is, of course, 
was possible to derive the average weighting for all contrac·ts. This 
figure has been used to suggest to some degree the validity of each 
original hypothesis. 
It was assumed that conclusions drawn about extreme average 
weightings would be obvious. Had it happen~d that the average total 
weight_ing of all propositions related to Hypothesis I were at the maxi-
mum ("thirty-nine) or the minimum (zero), then it would have been unlikely 
that anyone would argue that the conclusion drawn was questionable. 
Ha~ever, the analysis produced average weightings that fell in the 
middle range. This made it impossible to reach an unassailable con-
clusion about aqy of the hypotheses. Rather, it was then necessary to 
' 
discuss the weightings, the number of powers contained, and other perti-
nent factors that suggested a tendency toward proof of the hypothese$. 
.... 
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:~.\ conl:.ract analysis forrn l<ls devised t;o serve as an instrument to 
Ncord t:;s t-re:ighting of each cl;mse, its location in the contract, and 
a·;::t que.:rtion that may have arisen· in assigning a particular weight to a 
cl<:;use (see Appendix D). The form t·ms intended to be used as a means to 
8 tcand.ardizc the a.naly5is. Every contract analyzed has such a fol'ltl i!l-
eluded in its file. 
Finally, it has been assumed that a wri~ten agreement is, 
genorally, more significant than any verbal agreement. This assumption 
ackrwwled.ges the fact that there are any number of relationships where 
verbal guarantees serve the definition process quite effectively. How-
ever, a writt.en contract indicates that some type of dialogue between 
parties has taken place, at the least. The written contract serves as a 
consistent basis for interpretation of the day-to-day kinds of situations 
.~. 
that A-risf> t.,rhP.,..P jnc:ig!"!c:.~'t ~.f the ;?:::oi:-;c!p=.l 1 s ~~~ivliS i;:; ·~h~ pe::r·ti.iuerrc 
question. The written contract tends to inhibit arbitrary action on 
the part of ci ther party. The contract can serve as an added amount of 
ammunition should the principal.be attacked from some quarter.for some 
reason. And finally, a written agreement can help communication to be 
somewhat more consistent than is the case with a verbal understanding. 
For these reasons it is a basic assumption of thia study that the written 
contract generally puts the principal in a.stronger or more powerful 
role position than would. a verbal agreement. 
However, this rationale does not suggest that all written agree-
ments are of equal value to the principa~. This second assumption made 
it necessary to fiod out to what degree the selected contracts did reveal 
power and autonomy in te~ms of how boards of education honored such agree-
ments. To accomplish this fourteen school administrators in Michigan and 
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NoW York '·.rerc intervi,,·Med. A cc:,lplcte repo:rt. of tho:Je j.nterviews can be 
found in Appendi."':: c. Although t;his random sample of administrator 
opinion cannot be employed as th0 basis for at1y definith·e conclusions, 
it has served to comment on the credibility, of contract application. 
< 
An analysis is, by definition, a method of examination that im-
plies separation and a search for essence& Though the essential parts ct 
anything to be analyzed ~ be determined by any number of critiques, it 
does not follow that each will consider the same elements as fundamental. 
That which is essential depends, at least in part, on the point of view 
adopted by the observer. ~.'hen certain factors are judged to ~e elements 
others, then, are necessarily relegated to a secondary position. This 
•:l.tlw.ue:n~•vu .J.l:l p:r:eBent ~n any ana.t.ysJ.s ana. J.s accepted as a part of this 
study. 
A second ~imitation of this study revolves around the use of a 
weighting system. · The weighting system is a closed method of_ analysis 
that has been designed to order the contracts in terms of the autonomy 
and/or authority they appear to give the principal. It is assumed that 
there are any number of alternative methods of analysis that would be 
equallY valid, and yet reflect a somewhat different order. 
·' ' As a predictive device, the ordered contracts have severe limita-
t:Lons. To assume that the negotiation of a contract, similar to one in 
this study that has been given a high rating, will insure an equally high 
degree of autonomy for administrators in some other district may be un-
realistic. The variables of location, socio-economic conditions, per-
sonnel, and time all contribute to the principal's autonomy, as does his 
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cont.ract. For example, should a principal in a low economic level 
ne:ir;hborhood of a large city face the problem of community cont-rol led 
by local residents of energy and determinati~l, it is doubtful that the 
contract uill provide the same pot.;er as it would in a community that, re-
fleets different problems. As a limitation, then; the weighting of the 
contracts only suggests that, all other variables being ~r.p.1al, the agree-
ment with a high rating will give the principal more authority and/or 
autonor~ than will that with a low rating. 
Another limitation of this study becomes apparent when one con-
siders the role of school board policy. In general, written school board 
policies existed before any collective bargain:i.ng agreement appeared. 
In a few cases the bargained agreements do not provide for contradictions 
between policy and clauses in the contracts& In these cases it is quite 
board policy and the clause in question. In this study no attempt has 
been made to explore board policies with the objective of predicting 
I 
where this ~ht happen. Therefore, this missing ingredient is another 
limitation of the stu4y. 
CHAP'l'b'R II 
RELATED S1'UDIES 
As has been previously noted, little investigat,J.on has been fo-
cused on administrator collective bargaining. If the dimension of a com-
parison between the principal's role and his bargaining activities is 
·; added, then the field of related research is reduced to a negligible 
level. This is not to suggest that teacher collective action and its 
effects on the principal's role has not been studied; it. has been, and 
from a number of different points of vietv-. 
In 1968 Donald Lee Bailey investigated. the increased constraints 
·role·or shared responsibility in the urban school system that employs 
collective bargain~ng with the teaching staff. This study discovered 
that some of the increased constraints over the last few years faced by 
princ.ipals could be attributed to the existence of formal collective bar-
gaining. The largest number of these constraints centered around tasks 
dealing with obtaining and developing personnel. In his conclusions he 
recommended that "the buil~ng principal should become knowledgeable con-
. 1 
earning and·seek to become actively involved in collective negotiations." 
As a recommendation, he suggested that "principals should be careful not 
luonald. Lee Balley, "The Secondary Principal and Collective Nego-
tiat.ions, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 29:429A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
State University of New York at Buffalo, 1968), July, 1968. 
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to allow collective negotiations to become a scapegoat fo-r all of his 
perceiv·cd constraints. 112 
JJ 
A basic asstunption of Nicholas F. Vitale's 1968 study of the fir::ri:. 
three UFT agreements with the New York City Board of Education was that 
ncer·tain provisions of the agreements have changed some of the functions 
of the elementary school principal.!!) The hypotheses used in the study 
stated that some of the contractual provisions added administrative 
functions to the principalship while others placed limits on the previ-
ously descretio.nary functions of the elerrentary principal. The study ai.lg-
gested that these changes could be isolated and s~udied to determine the 
areas of greatest change in the role of the principal. 
The analysis of the three agreements indicated that the hypotheses 
were valid. Thirty-two of the contractual provisions added functions to 
the principal's job while fifteen items restricted his ability to w~ke 
decisions as he had done before the agreements. The changes were found 
in the areas of "supervision of teachers and improvement of instruction, 
personnel practices; working conditions, and union relationships."4 
John Armin Thompson's study of collective negotiations focused oo 
the perceptions of members of referent groups concerning the probable ef-
feet of teacher bargaining on the principal's role. The referent groups 
included school board members, superintendents, principals, and teachers. 
2Ibid. 
3Nicholas F. Vitalo, Jr., "The First Three UFT Agreements and the 
Changing Elementary Principalship in New York City," Dissertation Ab-
stracts, 29:430-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Jo~{fsiOnrversity, 
!968}, August, 1968. . 
4rbid. 
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I ,,.,,111r~rs of tbese groun~; <"ave thoir opinions concerning t11w major J.s<:;ues: '1.._..,, ol.d'o.. ,._ ~-_;_, 
u (1) the extent to which respondents anticipated that collectiv-e negot,i-
ations uould result in ·teachers sharj_ng j.n the present prerogatives of 
the school principal, and (2) the role they believed the principal should 
asfi\!.me when bargainint; a.f.fccts his prcfessionnl and economic interests. "5 
The most signif'icant findings dealt t-lith the quest:tons of admini-
strator collective bar~;a:lning where principals were part of management. 
Principals, supported by teacher opinion, favored the establishment of 
their own bargaining units. This opinion was 11 strongly opposed" by 
superintendents and board members. The later question of principals as 
part of management has been used by boards of education "as the reason 
disallowing the fonnation of administrator bargaintng units. 116 In 
Tnompson 1s study the "principals did abandon their management orienta-
+..: --- _, .... .&..\..,_ ..! ... - .......... 
·--"'• ..,..,_.~ W1141."-' ...,. __ ,_,,....,.. 
gaining units. 117 
A similar study designed to examine the effects of negotiations 
i 
on the role of secondary school principals was co~~leted in 1969. Using 
selected Michigan secondary school principals, James Robert Trost em~ 
ployed the intervie~ method with principals and compared their responses 
to a three-dimensional model of the secondary principal's role. The 
model was designed on the basis of a review of the related literature 
that considered the functional, status and rights, and personal relation-
5 John Armin Thompson, 11 ;he Role of the Principal in Collective 
Negotiations," Dissertation Abstracts, 29:788-A (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University o!~~isconsin, I968), November, 1968. 
6rb·' J.a• 
. 
7Ibid. 
.. ·· 
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ships wit-h referent groups as the three dimE.:nsions. 
The results of the investigation have irnplicat,ions for thi.s 
study. Negotiations have not reduced the responsibilities of the prJnci-
pal but have eleiminated 11the absolute authority of principals, -wt1ere 
. 8 
such authority existed." Negotiat.ions are not threatening the existenoo 
of the principalship but are altering the role in the direction of 
«leadership and professionalism and away from routine managerial chores 
and paternalistic att.itudes. 119 Finally, the use of negotiations by 
teachers has moved the principal into a closer professional relation-
ship with his colleagues. These conclusions appear to imply that teacher 
collective action could have been one motivating factor in the formula-
tion of adFodnistrator bargaining groups. 
A second study completed in 1969 that skirts the issue of ad-
Huu.i.~i:.I·ai:.uL' colleci.ive barszaining ciealt wit.t"J the op:i.ninn~ of' 1.53 pl'ir;l}i-
pals in Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. 10 Harr.y H. Bell investigated how 
principals perceived their roles in collective negotiations. Through 
I 
the questionnaire method he determined that principals "desire to be-
come more involved and to be consulted more often during collective . 
negotiations between t.Jachers 'a!ld the school board. 1111 A secondary con-
clusion, however, reported that 11high school principals prefer to unite 
8 James Robert Trosh "The Effects of Negotiations Upon the Role of 
Selected Hichigan Secondary School Principals," Dissertation Abstracts, 
4207-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1909J -
March, 1969. 
9Ibid. 
1~arr.y Hurlburt Bell, 11The Role of the High School Principal in 
Collective Negotiations as Perceived by Principals Whose School Systems 
Have Been Involved in the Process, 11 Dissertation Abst.racts~ 4706-A (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, IndianalUO!versity, !969) September, 1969. 
1~bid. 
separately, or with other ad.rni.Ui.Btrative personnel, to negotiate with the 
school board concerning their mm conditions of employment. n12 This 
second study seems to indicate that at least some principals viewed bar-
gaining b,y and for themselves as a reasonable expectation. 
Another 1969 study by Alvin R. Hooks exarhined the relationship 
between collective negotiations and 'the activities of secondary school 
principals. This investigation used the control~experimental group tech-
nique with principals representing districts that did and did not negoti-
. . ate with teachers. The prirnary objective of the study was a comparison 
of the two groups' activities as principals, and·in these terms, was 
less than conclusive. 
Again, a secondary result indicated that principals who worked 
in a district that used collective bargaining felt they were not able 
to part:i.~ip-"''t.A in thE'> fl.,."~ess to the de;;::-ee t!::~y d.e::ircd.13 
One way to deal with collective bargaining as it relates to 
school administrators is to.exaroine the effects of the process on other 
employees of the school. Teachers, of course, have led the way in 
making this process a normal activity in school operations. Robert J~ 
Thornton conducted a study in 1970 that attempted to review the history 
of concerned teacher activity from its early beginnings, to the present 
and estimate the effectiveness of this action in raising relative, inter-
district salary levels. 
12Ibid. 
l3Alvin Ray Hooks, 11A Study of the Relationship between Collec-
tive Negotiations and the Activities of the Secondary School Principal, 11 
Dissertation Abstracts, 1776~ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1969) January, 1969. 
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The hintorical review portion of this study traced the pre-191+0 
adivities of unions and associations of teachers and culminated in ·t:he 
U?'I' 1961-62 agreement in New York City. "Finally, atten'l~ion lias directed 
to the ensuing development.s concerning AFT and lJEA negotiations, philo~· 
sophies, state legislation, and the ~pread of collective agreements. 11 U+ 
As of 1970 only two studies had examined the actual and/or rela-
tive change in teachers• salaries based on collective action and these 
reported conflicting results. Thornton used a regression model and found 
that "the extent to which collec~ive negotiations have raised relative 
1968 teachers' salar,y levels lies within the range of 0-3.5% with the 
actual_figures .var.ying with the specific salary level examined and the 
sample of districts studied. 11i5 Although the t;~stimated range seems 
rather low, Thornton reported that it was well within the limits of rela-
tive Wage effects Of Unioni?:ation :for t,hP econOT!T'.f ~S a Hhole du.ri~g 
periods of rather rapid inflation. 
For the period of 1966 to 1968 En1est C. White gathered infor-
mation on collective bargaining agreements in the public schools. Using 
the Nesotiation Agreement Provisions, 1966-67 published by the NEA he 
found that the "number of substantive agreements in use increased by 
51.5 per cent in one year, a faster rate of increase than that experi-
. . 16 
enced by procedural agreements." The number of agreements both sub-
~obert James Thornton, "Collective Negotiations for Teachers: 
History and Economic Effects," Dissertation Abstracts, 31:4351-A. (Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-champaign," I910} E'ebruary, 1971. 
l5Ibid. 
1~rnest Cantrell h"hite, "Collective &rgaining Agl"eements in the 
Public Schools, 1966-1968, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 31:4750-A (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, !959), February, 1971. 
/ 
st::nt<i.v·e and procedural increased in all regions during this period. D:r 
t,h,3 e;!d of tho 1967-68 school year 52.1 per cent of all personnel in 
di::dor~l.cts of 1,000 or more in the Un:l.ted States were employed under sor:~e 
typo of collcct.ive bargaining agreement. These agreements tended to b'? 
tr.!.l.Ch more common in large systems of over 25,000.students than in those 
ldt!1 3,000 pupils or less. In terms of bargaining agent exclusivity the 
N"f.A rep.resented h41,140 persons while too AFT spoke for 124,019 persons. 
In considering collective bargaining an examination of attitude3 
of participants is a crucial factor. Two recent investigations aimed at 
comparing and describing the attitudes of school board presidents, teacher 
organization leaders, and superintendents seems to indicate that differing 
attitudes still exist. In 1969 H~len S. Napolitano sought to determine 
and cor~are b,y means of an inventory, the attitudes of the previously 
All parties agreed that 11high priority consideraticn be given salary and· 
fringe benefits--that conducting negotiation meetings in private was ex-
' cellent negotiation procedure--that regarding distinctively different ne-
gotiation units for secondar,y and elementar,y school teachers was poor.n17 
However, "striking, picketing and taking holidays were considered not 
suitable negotiation procedures by board presidents.n18 
A 1970 study by Stanley R. 'kilrster examined the attitudes of 
people in similar posit~ons as those in the Napolitano investigation. 
17Helena Stark Napolitano, "Attitudes of School Board Presidents 
and Teacher Organization Presidents Toward Collective Negotiations in Pub-
lic Education in the United States," Dissertation Abstracts, 12:5204-A 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, I9b9}-."June, 1970. 
18Ibid. 
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Ln ~,.r' J d:imcms:l.on of this research was an effort to determine the 
grcl:) t !:3 0ttitudes tmmrd provisions of a legislative framework that might· 
be :.;::; Lt.<.tble for !'lew 1-iexico. 11The four groups differed significantly i.n 
"'' their· ~~.·i:;titudes on a majority of the statements related to the need for 
. ,·· 
collecUve negotiations provisions, and also on the establishment of 
colls~~tive negotiations provisions through state legislation. 1119 Board 
presi.d.snts and superintendents, as compared to a~sociation presidents 
and tcD.chers, had opposing attitudes on the two issues of teacher tenure 
and st.rjJ(es by public school teachers. A similar polarization of atti-
tudes ~~s evident on the questions ~f establishing collective negotiations 
provisions through state legislation and formal recognition and mandated 
bilateral determination of educational policy., Of the four groups nany 
single gro·up wa.s more inclined to recognize a need for a provision that 
lat . 1120 l.on. 
Determining the effects of state public employee bargaining 
legislation on employer-employee relations was the primar,y objective of 
a study by Mary Ann T. Collins in 1970. Public Law 303 of the New Jersey 
Public Laws of 1968 mandated formal collective negotiations for public 
school te~chers. Through the questionnaire method, respondents' views 
were collected on varied aspects of negotiation procedures, conflict 
areas in negotiation and opinions about selec·i;,ed provisions of Public 
19stanley Richard Wurster, 11An Investigation of the Attitudes of 
School Board Presidents, Superintendents, Teacher Association Presidents, 
and Teachers Regarding Collective Negotiations Provisions ~n New Me.r..ico, 11 
Dissertation Abstracts, 31:3189-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New 
i1e:aco University,. 1970) January, 1971. 
20Ibid. 
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Lal<t 303 and its cont.ributioo:-:> to negotiations. 1"ibere a majority of board 
members felt tha·li "collective negotiations were incongruous to selected 
conditions and activities associated with a profession, the superintend-
"" ents and t.eacher respondents di.d not share this view .u 21 Conflicting 
. ( 
points of view between the same groups evolved on the question of col-
lective negotiations and legal school board powers. 
Other significant conclusions of this research demonstrated that 
"pressure from teacher groups \-.ras the factor most influential in the 
passage of Public Law 303--that passage of the lav did not result in aQy 
' ' 
substantial change with regard to the representation of varied employee 
groups during 1968-69~-that none of the t~enty-six school districts in 
the study utilized the machinery of mediation .or fact-finding during 
22 . . ' 
1967-68. 11 Finally, the teachers and their leaders felt that the law 
rnember and superintendent respondents. 1123 
. The effect of collective bargaining on various aspects of school 
operation has had the attention of many observers. Faculty involvement 
in decision-making was the variable studied by Gordon E. Wendlandt in 
1970, as it was influenced by teacher-board negotiations. The purpose 
.. 
of the stuqy was to determine Whether or not a relationship existed be-
tHeen the nwnber of years school district personnel bargained collectively 
2~1ary Ann T. Collins,· 11An Analysis of Employer-Employee Relations 
Reported in Selected New Jersey School Districts: Impact of Public Law 
303 on Collective Negotiations for Teachers," Dissertation Abstracts, 
31:3198-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1970} 
January, 1971. 
22Ibid., 
-
23Ibid. 
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and the extent of faculty involvement in the decision-r~ing process. 
The study also inv·estigated whether or not a difference existed between 
teachers' and superintendents' perceptions regarding the role of faculty 
me~hers in decision-making. An !nstrument called the Decision Involvement 
-----..-..;;. 
Index was developed to ascertain perceptions of the respondents. 
-
Wendlandt determined that a district's number of years o.f col-
lective bargaining did not effect faculty involV?ment in decision-making. 
He also found that "there appears to be a significant difference bett-reen 
superintendents 1 and teachers 1 perceptions regarding the role . of .faculty 
members in the decision-making process·. n21.J. Apparently, as reported by 
the results of 1iendlandt 1s research, superintendents feel that teachers 
are more involved in decision-making than do the. teachers. In fact, 
"teachers. appear to desire to be involved in decision-making to a greater 
Jonathan P. \'lest sought to assess the extent of differential 
perceptions among school board members, superintendents, and teacher 
organization officials concerning what is negotiable and what should be 
negotiable. As might be expected, "teacher organization o.f£icials icienti-
fied more items which are negotiable and ll}~re items which should be nego-
tiable than either superintendents or board membel"s. 1126 Conversely, 
2%ordon Eugene Wendlandt, "Faculty Involvement in the Decision-
Making Process and Experience in Collective Negotiations, 11 Dissertation 
Abstracts, 31:4439-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University Of WIS-
consin, l970) March, 1971 •. 
2
.5Ibid. 
26 ' Jonathan Page West, "The Scope and Impact ·or Collective Negoti-
ations in Selected Urban and Suburban School Systems: Implications for 
Public Policy, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 31:4524-A (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
ser~ation, Northwestern University, !969) January, 1971. 
. ,·· 
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board members and superintendents had opposing perceptions on the quest:lon 
of nhat is negotiable. In terms of impact on public policy the items 
receiving the highest percentage of renponse from all respondents were 
more closely related to working conditions than~ either personnel policies 
or curriculum and instruction. 
The effect of negotiations on middle management of school dis-
tricts is another area that has received the attention of a recent invest.i-
gation. Thomas J. Kenny used the focused intervietf technique to study 
this question in 1969. He found that as negotiations procedures become 
more formal "the clarity of process will sharpen the distinction between 
27 . 
teachers and administrators." And, ·as might be expected, the extent 
to which middle ~anagement becomes alighed with the board their working 
conditions will not be negotiable. Finally, "if middle management ad-
they will organize as a unit and not by hierarchical levels.u28 
Another opinion-based study involved an attempt to assess the 
anticipated effect 'on the aementary principal's functions of a teacher-
board negotiated set of working conditions. Three groups representing 
teachers, principals, ~nd superintendents were asked to indicate how they 
expected the principal's functions to be affected by the negotiated 
agreement: ver,r detrimentally, somewhat detrimentally, no effect, some-
' 
what salutarily, or very salutarily. Personnel in the Kansas City, Mis-
souri Public Schools were surveyed in this study by William R. Barber~ 
. · 
27 Thomas Joseph Kenny, "Effects of Collective Negotiations on 
Middle Hanagement in Public School Districts," Dissertation Abstracts, 
30:4723-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Colorado state ColTege, ~69) 
June, 1970. 
28Ibid. 
He found that "in general, the negotiated package is not anticipated as 
he.ving any dramatic effect on the principal's functions by any of the 
three rated groups. 1129 A side effect, however, t-ras revealed in the wide 
dispersion of scores by elementary principals on the Staff Personnel 
Management Function question. The fact that prin.cipals in a single school 
district had SQch varied perceptions of their job description seems to be 
a significant comment on role. 
Since this study is concerned w.i.th administrator collective bal'-
gaining and principal role evolvement, it is obvious that perusal of re-
lated studies centered on the principal's role is mandatory. The fol-
·lo~dng group of studies represents research that has been focused on 
various aspects of the principal's role. All of these. investigations 
are related, at least in part, to this one. 
nomothetic dimension is the expectations of varipus referent groups. 
Martin Gray did a role analYsis of the school principalship in which he 
hypothesized that 11 there will be different amounts of consensus on dif-
ferent expectations ~or the principal position within and between three 
sets of role definers- representing teacher, principal and central office 
staff positions.u30 A second theory of this study·suggested that sex 
composition, degree status, level of instruction and position experience 
, 
·' 
29William R. Barber, "A Study of the Anticipated Effect on the 
Function of the Elementary Principal Accompanying Collective Negotiations 
in the Kansas City, Missouri, Public Schools," Dissertation Abstracts, 
·18:3798-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missour~70) 
February, 1971. / 
30Hartin Gray, 11A Role Analysis of the School Prin~·ipalship, 11 
Dissertation Abstracts, 22:1884, Numbers 4-6 (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tions, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1961) 1961-62. 
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of teachers l-muld be determinants in role consensuH. Both hypotheses 
were supported by the data of tho study. 
In terms of this study, Gray's investigation demonstrates the 
potential variability of the principal's role i£ one considers referent 
groups as the pritr.ary definj.ng force. Perhaps, this investigation demon-
strated one reason wny it has been diffic\ilt to def'ine the principal's 
role. 
Another study by Frederick D. Thorin sought to determine the 
accuracy with which principals perceived the role expectations held 
from them by their staff and superintendent. The most significant con-
elusion of this research was that 11the principal does not have an accu-
rate perception of the total role concept held for him by his staff and 
superintendent. 1131 Depending on the degree to which this conclusion can 
a part of the problem principals have had t~th teacher groups. 
Research conducted in 1962 by Billy Jay Ranniger supported the 
major conclusions of the two previously mentioned studies. Ranniger sum-
marized and critically reviewed knowledge about the elementary school 
principal's job responsibilities using doctoral dissertations, publica-
tions of principal's associations, district principal job descriptions, 
and textbooks dealing With school administration. Based on nine doctoral 
dissertations he found that "no con:mon agreement (between principals, 
superintendents,·teachers, and parents) about the relative importaoce·of 
3l:Frederick D. Thorin, "A Study to Determine the Accuracy with 
~~ich Selected Secondarj Principals Perceive the Role Expectations held 
for them by their Staff and Superintendent, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 22: 
480, Numbers 1-3 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, Wayne State Univer-
sity, Detroit, Michigan, 1961) 1961-62. ' 
the principal's duties emerged from a summary of these studies. n32 In 
terms of' administrator bargaining it may be noted that this stud.y indi-
cated that in 31 large city school districts "it appears that the dutieD 
of the elementary school principal are not commonly defined in i¥Titing. 1133 
An inquiry by John Herbert Cro·tts in 1963 compared the analyzed 
concepts of the actual and ideal roles of elementary school principals. 
In the analysis Crotts found that "principals and superintendents unlike 
teachers did not perceive a high degree of relationship between the actual 
and ideal roles of the prlncipals.n34 Though there was a positive rela-
tionship between the referent group's perceptions of actual and ideal 
function or the principal, the correlation was quite low. 
Another st~ similar to Ranniger's was done by Barbara Frey in 
1963. Her focus was on an analYsis of the perceived functions of the 
this work were that "the leadership potential of the role of the elemen-
tary school principal recognized in the original purposes of the Depart-
ment of Elementary School Principals has yet to be realized through a 
. ' I 
continuing professionalization of the position. "35 Changes did occur in 
32Billy Jay Ranniger, "A Surnmacy Study of the Job Responsibilities 
of the Elementary School Principal, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 22:1988, 
Namber 6 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertatlt>n; university of Oregon, Eugene, 
1962) 1962. 
33Ibid. 
34John Herbert Crotts, "A Comparison and an Analysis of the Con-
cepts of the Role of the Elementary School Principal," Dissertation Ab-
stracts, 24:3166, Numbers 7-9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, Univer-
sity of Missouri, Columbia, 1963) 1964. 
35Barbara Ruth Frey, 11An Analysis of the Function~· of the Elemen-
tary School Principal, 1921-1961," Dissertation Abstracts, 24:3170, Num-
bers 7-9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations,-Intiiana University, 1963) 
February 1964. 
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the i'unctirms of the pri.ncipalship ovsr the forty-year period but these 
,..;ere: prirnari1y in the means by which the ends vrere accomplished. ·This 
cba~~sc in t.hrJ pragmatic area seemed to be the result of increasingly 
avc:~ilt:lble knc.;iledge, skill, underskmding, and resources .. 
Chester I~ Barnard's postulate that inter-personal perception~ 
must be simila.r for the efficient functioning of cooperative systems 
served as the rationale for studies by Joseph Fearing in 1963 and Lowell 
Lat:hner in l966s The· Fearing investigation discovered that the inter-
per~onal perceptions among key personnel in a highly regarded school 
diotrict were frequently dissimilar. This led to the ~onclusion that 
"either these schools uere not functioning efficiently or Barnard's 
. - . . ~6 
postulate needs revision. n-' 
Latimer's investigation was broader in that consideration of the 
ing and developing personnel, working ~~th the community, and W4naging 
the school was included. The results u1dicated that with the exception 
of working with the community, ~here were positive correlations between 
the principals' and teachers' evaluations. It was_concluded that 11 the 
elementary school principal needs to communicate his perception of his 
\ 
role to his teachers just as he must also be aware of their perception 
o£ his . role. n37 Latimer concluded that the similar and positive inter-
, 
36Joseph Lea Fearing, '~rincipal Faculty Perceptions of Certain 
Common Observable Role Behaviors of the Elementary School Principal, 11 
Dissertntj_on Abstracts, 25:224, Number l (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
c0Ioractn-s1Sate college, Greeley, 1963) 1964. 
37Lowell Francis Latimer, 11The Role of the Elementary School 
Principal as Perceived by the Faculty and Principal through Selected Role 
Behaviors," Dissertation Abstracts, 27:326-A, Numbers 10-12 (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, 1966) 
1966-67 .. 
p.::;:rsona.l perceptions among personnel indicated that the schools were 
f'tmctioning efficiently and that Barnard's postulate did hold for the 
efficient functioning of cooperative systems. 
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Using the questionnaire procedure Clavin M. Frazier conducted a 
survey of role expectations of referent groups involving teachers, super-
intendents and principals. This study added a dimension not found in tre 
Gray and Thorin studies. The application of identified expectation dif-
ferences between referent groups as a means for locating potential prob-
lem areas for administrators was suggested as a ,management strategy. In 
applying such a strategy Frazier demonstrated that the administrator 
should ''consider the position and situational setting o:f the individual 
/ 
in the referent group."JB Both of these factors appear to be significant 
expectation determinants. 
was done by stanley R. Morgan· in 1965. Using the check list method aod 
considering the expectations of the principalship, as viewed by subordin-
ate, coordinate, and·superordinate positions, Morgan attempted to ascer-
tain the prime r~sponsibilities of the principalship and compared with 
the positions of teacher, superintendent, and other central office per-
sonnel. A second part of the study involved use of an Episode Situation 
~estionoaire that l\?OUld provide for an analysis of the orientation of the 
groups--nompthetic, idi~graphic, or transactional--toward the role of tm 
principalship. 
38calvin Morton Frazier, "Role Expectations of the Elementary 
Principal as Perceived by Superintendents, Principals, and Teachers, 11 
Dissertation Abstracts, 25:5675, Number 10 {unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Unfversity of Oregon, Eugene, 1964) 1965. 
u•rhe instructional leadership role of the principal was challens'3d 
by the findings of this study. "39 Although both subordinate and super-
ordh;a'te groups did not vievr the prlncipa1ship as having prime responsi-
bil:i.ty in this area there apparently had not yet emerged a leadership 
posif,ion that could fill this vacuum. Hov;ever, the role of the princip::l-
ship ~;as recognized as separate and apart from that of the teachers. 
Finally, the studY indicated that different patterns of responsibility 
and authority were present for the principal and the teacher. 
Another challenge to the model of the principal as instructional 
leader was reported in a study by Ivan D. Muse in 1966. Although he 
found that principals and alter groups were in general agreement regard-
ing the assignment of prime responsibility to the principalship, 11 one 
major difference was noted in the curriculum area where principals, 
their assignment of responsibility. 1140 This investigation involved seven 
selected school-related gr~ps and totaled 678 individuals. Using the 
' Responsibility Check List and the Episode Situation Questionnaire Muse 
discovered that principals were somewhat "nomotbetic.ally oriented while 
the alter groups indicated a preference for the principalship position 
to be s~htly idiographically oriented. n.4l 
39stanley Ray Morgan, 11Public School Principalship: Role Expecta-
tions by Relevant Groups," Dissertation Abstracts, 26:4390, Number 8 (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utafi, Salt Lake City, 1965) 
1966. 
40David Ivan Muse, "The Public School Principalship: Role Ex-
pectations by Alter Groups, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 27:2335-A, Numbers 
7-9 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, 
1966) 1967. 
4libid. 
. / 
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Another view of the principalship that relates to this r;t;u..dy was 
mude by Clifford W. Crone in 1968. This investigation was directed toward. 
role behavior and concisted of an analysi:3 of reactions to statements 
termed role expectancies of the elem~ntary principal in terms of intensit;y 
of feeling concerning the statements. Potential rolo conflict in terms 
of the posited expectancies was found then the principal, "(a) encouraged 
teachers to plan and conduct faculty meetings, (b) do demonstration teach-
ing and (c) support the position of the superintendent in a difference 
between teac~ers and the superintendent. rr42 · 
This last area of potential conflict was considered to be one of 
the most important. \Vhen definition of the principal's role is vague or 
nebulous it would seem that the possibility for significant differences 
in perceptions of role expectancies between central office personnel and 
ation where the principal's role was outlined in some written form~ 
Role effectiveness and conflict were similarly the focus of a 
' study by John J. Hood in 1969. Hood defined the c onstructs for ambiguity 
and conflict in role effectiveness as clarity of and discrepancy involving 
role expectations. Rrle effectiveness was defined as leadership in at-
tempting to increase the quality of professional staff performance. Three 
separate variables were used to measure role conflict: "conflict con-
' 
cerning formal work activities--conflict involving personality traits--
42Cli£ford Wayne Crone, "Reactions of Illinois Elementary Princi-
pals, Teachers and Superintendents to Posited Role Expectancies of the 
Elementary Principal, 11 Dissertation Abstracts, 29:430-A (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of coiorado, Boufder, 1968) August, 1968. 
so 
conflict as need for change. 114J A questionnaire nerved as the data-
g3t.her:i.ng device. 
Although there was no conclusive statis·tical relatiorwhip beh:e·:i1 
role conflict and formal work activities, Hood did find that "role con-
flict. variables involving personality traits and need for change are 
positiv·oly related to one another and to role ambig-oJ.ity~ 11)J4 Essentially 
Hood recommended that the principal "establish an environment in which 
he ard the teacher can arbitrate between sets of discrepant role expoc-
tations, change these expectations, or change the principal's rolebe-
haviorc 11 
A final investigation of the principal's role that relates to 
this study was done by Donald Klein in 1969. Considering the perceptions 
of teachers and principals concerning the prime responsibilities for 
,, 
various tasks that are normal in the school, 10Pin found 'th~t 11 -;.:b.~t tha 
principal can do, and will do, is dependent on the degree of latitude 
made available to him by the central office. 1145 His conclusion that 
the role of the principal is being modified from two sources, superordi-
nate and subordinate, has ramifications for this study. If the surge of 
teacher demand for greater involvement in the decision-making process 
does not seem to be consciously directed toward a usurpation of the 
43John Joseph Hood, "Role Effectiveness, Conflict, and Ambiguity 
in the Organizational Setting: An Empirical Study of the School Principal 
Role," Dissertation Abstracts, 29:.368.3-A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University o? Michigan, i\nn Arbor, 1969) March, 1970. 
44Ibid. 
45Donald D. Klein, "Perceived Job Responsibilities of Illinois 
Elementary School Staff Members," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola 
University, Chicago, 1969), p. 91. 
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prir:Gipal r s authority as Klein SU(7,ge~:;ts, it still mu.st be accepted as a 
trer:d that ha5 and is taking place. 
Klein found that i.n certain administrative areas teachers would 
sustain the principalship but in some super·lisory areas the instructional 
group felt that they have a greater concern. Organizational pressures 
emerging from t.he board and superintendent combined with teacher pressure 
leave .few avenues of activities for principals to pursue. In fact, Klein 
suggests that the "dominance of the adwinistrative position affords to 
the individual in this role a degree of availability and flexibility not 
accorded the teacher." This major difference. allows the principal to 
comprehend and evaluate the sequence of all programs at all grade levels 
within a ~~ilding in contrast to the classroom teacher who does not have 
the position to develop similar concepts.46 
m1...---.J:t.--- tF,-.:_ ---~-----A-~ 4-h ........ +\.""""" n._..;...,.,.....;n""t1 t"'t"t'Y.~""' ~~+.Ci.-.(+.;he 
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which may be defined as efforts of a (perceptive) generalist and/or 
(strategic} coordinator. If this conclusion is valid, then it may be 
that the role of the principal will move away from the supervisor,r func-
tions and evolve toward the managerial/administrative model. 
These brief~ described studies relate to this investigation in 
that they analyz either some aspect of the role of the principal or com-
ment on collective bargaining in public schools. Each differs, however, 
in terms of'methodology,· population sampling, and/or the statistical pr~ 
cedures employed. The present investigation has elements that are simi-
lar.but differs in its majDr pur~ose. No study has been designed to 
analyze the contents of current administrator collective ba~gaining agree-
46Ibid., p. 92. 
-
the princ:tpa.l 1 5 role. 
Those stud:!.es thai; <;lJW.mined collective action by toach::;rs revol· .. ·d 
around six general areas: the effect of' ba:rgaj.r1i.ng by teaaber~; on the 
princip~l' s role, function, or latitude of action ( 1:-.ailey, Barber, Hookn, 
Thompson, •.rrost, Vitale), the attitudes of referent groups toward teacher 
bargaining (Napolitano, \<Jest, Wurster), the effect>s of teacher bargain-
ing on school operations (Kenny, Wendlandt), the histo1~ of teacher col-
lective action (Thornton, w~ite), the principal's role in teacher bar-
- .__.' 
gaining (Bell), and. the effects of public employee legislation on teacher 
bargajning (Collins). The major thrust of this study is an analysis of 
contract provisions. No studies have been directed toward this aspect 
of collective bargaining. 
· This study di.ffers from several (Gray, Frazifl:r) i.n that, it co!':!-
centrates on the administrator's negotiated working agreement. It is 
not a review of the literature (Ranniger) or an attempt to relate role 
perceptions to a postulate (Fearing, Latimer). It does relate indirect~ 
to several studies (Klein, Morgan, Muse) in that contractual provisions 
frequent~ make reference to task performance. However, there is no at-
All these related studies do indicate that the role or the prin-
cipal and collective bargaining are interdependent subjects. The 
present study atterr~ts to relate the fruits of administrator negotiation 
to role change in the nomothetic dimension. 
. .-
CHAPTER III 
A SUNHARY OF THE CONTRACTS 
The collective bargaining agreements that serve as the basis for 
this study i'rere similar appearing documents. Most of the provisions con-
tained will fit within a small number of ca1iegorios. The grammatical 
construction of the various clauses tends, frequently, to be similar. 
Some provisions appear in all or a great majority of the contracts. 
The differences that do exist are based upon the frequency with 
which particular clauses appear and the multitude of miscellaneous items. 
•' 
Differences in wordin~ Rre hPS!'l(1 QO synt.~x and/or t'he C::lpth to "t-:hich & 
specific provision defines an area. Provisions relating to state pub-
lie employee bargaining legislation are different from one state to 
another but exactly the same within a given state. 
The six broad categories into which the provisions have been 
. . . 
placed are (1) board rights and responsibilities, (2) administrator 
rights and responsibilities, (J) negotiations provisions, (4) salary 
and fringe benefits, (5} pertaining to state law, and (6) miscellaneous~ 
These catog~ries were selected as the result cf completion of the fol-
lowing tasks: (1) a reading of all contracts, (2) labeling of all pro-
visions based on intent demonstrated, (3) the outline of a draft con-
tract published by the New York State Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development, and (4) the suggested 110utl:i,ne or a Model Ele-
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mentary Principal's Contract. 11 
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An e:xaminat.ion o.t,' those specific provisions that are listed under 
each general category reveals th~~ possibility of differing interpl•eta-
tion. Ambivalent wording makes it difficult to determine if the provision 
is referring to an administrator 1 s right or a board responsibi.lity. 
Since a right is sometimes interpreted as the inverse corollary of a 
responsibility this question may be inherent rmen making such distinctions. 
For example, ~:hen a provision makes the principal responsible fal' 
the total operation of a school, it is implied that he .. has the. right to 
. ~ .. 
make final decisions at the building level to fulfill this responsibili-
ty. Another commonly appearing clause provides ,for the legal defense of 
an administrator if he is sued based on circumstances related to his 
work. Although he has the right to these services, it is equally true 
tion arises: is this an administrator right or a board responsibility? 
In this study such questions have been answered arbitrarily. 
Board Rights and Responsibilities 
This category includes clauses that state the board's legal right 
and responsibility to be the final authority £or all actions and decisions 
that occur within the district. The area of evaluation, promotion, dis-
missal, and disciplinary actions toward administrators is another board 
authority. The board's right to conduct in-service training sessions is 
another right. 
luallO"Jay, Rolland, "Suggested Outline of Model Elomentacy School 
Principal's Contract, 11 The Wisconsin Elementary School Principal, L.7 
(October, 1971), 16-18. 
In terms of quantity it may app~:ar that boards have :few right::: 
comp:1rcd t.o adm1nistrators. This apparent contradiction occurs becaU.3<:l 
of the legal powers boards have that reside within state law. There-
fore, it is not necessary for a board to include all of its powers withj.n 
an agreement. 
~n:~~!;;e.l_!t Rie;ht~ 
State law provides for local school board authority. This 
authority is con~lete and cannot be delegated to any other group. Even 
with this legal status, however, a significant minority of the agreements 
contain a manage~ent rights clause that restates this prerogative. 
In thirty-four per cent of the sample a statement appears that 
specifically describes the local board's final authority in policy 
making. For example, one clause pstated: 
1
''J.:h.e Board. oi Education, under law, has the final responsi-
bility for establishing policies for the district. 11 2 
" Another agre~ment exemplified total board authority in the following rr~n-
ner: 
"It is recognized that the Board retains and will continue to 
retain, whether exercised or not, the sole and unquestioned right, 
responsibility, and prerogative to direct the operation of the ••• 
Schools, in all ita aspects including but not limited to the ac-
quisition, control, and regulation of all property, the employ-
ment and supervision of all employees and the or§anization and 
administration of the program of the ••• Schools." . 
Some management rights clauses state that the contract does modi-
fy board rights to. some extent. · This may have been included to inhibit 
the filing of grievances. One example is: 
2 . 
Rochester, New York, 11Contractual Agreement between the Board of 
Education af the City School District of Rochester, New York, and the Ad-
ministrative Staff, 11 1968. 
3windsor, Connectic.ut, "Agreement between the \vindsor Board of Edu-
cation and the Windsor .School Administrators' Association, 11 1970. 
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11 ••• the pa.rt.ics agree that the Board of Education has the right 
to establish rules for tha direction of and the efficient. operation 
of, the work force. These rules are subject only to the specific 
·t()rms of the Haster Agreement. u4 
Another states: 
fiNo action taken by the Board l<."i.th respect to such rights, re-
sponsibilities, and prerogatives, other than as there are specific 
provisions hereJ1l or elsewhere contained~ shall be subject to the 
grievance provisions of this agreement. 11 .? 
Administrator Evaluation Procedures 
This area was touched upon in twenty-four per cent of the con-
tracts. Definition'of the process generally required two or more para-
graphs. Although-this has been included as a board right, twenty per 
cent of the group made proviSion for administrator involvement in the 
development of the process. 
An example of a less than complex approach to evaluation can be 
...... ~. ~ ... • . . -. 1..~\,;i• ""'i,J. ,.~, l;U"·v.:..'"'d\.."'i 
"The D.S.P.,A. agrees that all Princi.pals readily accept apprais-
al of their performance as determined by the Superintendent or his 
designee. It is further agreed that performance analysis forms 
will be devised by the Office of the Superintendent and will re-
flect recommendat.ions of' the D.S.P.A. 116 
A more complete approach to this area was found in the Youngs-
ton, New York, agreement. This document outlined an evaluation process 
with e~ht different steps and areas. The specifics included items such 
as "a. detailed job descriptd.on and yearly objectives", the citing of 
4warreo, Michigan, "Agreement between Warren Consolidated Schools 
Board of Education and \iarren Administrators• Association," 1970. 
5G·len Cove, New York, 11Contract between Glen Cove City School Dis-
trict and Glen Cove Educational Administrators 1 Association, 11 1972. 
~untington, New York, "Agreement bett'l'eeo the Board of Education, 
Union Free School District No. Three, Town of Huntington, New York and 
District No. Three School Principals' Association, 11 1970. 
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n:;;pccif:l..c incidents", "district-wide responsibilities ass:tened by the 
supcr:i.ntendenV1, and the responsibility of the evaluator to 11 propose de-
tailed sugge::r!:.ionn for the improvement of the weaknesses that have been 
7 
citcd. 11 
Disciplinary Act:Lon Tcr.·rard Administ•rators 
-----~ ... 
Most st.-ate laws allow boards to take disciplinary action toward 
all employees. No contract provided for the elimination of thiw pO"w-er. 
However, the inclusion of such an article in a contract does limit the 
parameters of a board when dealing in this area. In some cases such a 
clause will reduce arbitrary action. 
A statement in a Michigan contract implies this idea: 
"!Jo member of the Bargaining Unit shall be disciplined, repri-
manded, dismissed, reduced in ran!<: or compensat~on, or deprived of 
any professional advantage without just cause. 11 
ln tne io:Uowing example t·rom a ,Mew York contract it seems as 
if an attempt was made to limit board actions, but a careful reading 
shows t.hat the board does, in fact, retain complete control: 
) 
"No administrator shall be reprimanded or reduced in rank or 
compensation without just cause. Any such action asserted by the 
Board or on behalf of the Board may be subject to the grievance 
procedure up to and including Level Three provided that in the case 
of such action against a non-tenure administrator which is based on 
the results of a regular evaluation, the provisions of this section 
shall not apply and provided that all provisions of this section , 
shall comply with the provisions of Section 2573 o:f the Education 
Law.n9 . 
7Youngston, New York, ''Working Agreement between the Lewiston 
Porter Board of Education and the Lewiston-Porter Organization of Edu-
cational Administrat.ors," 1970. 
~arren, Michigan, o2. cit., 1970. 
9Rochester, N~N York, op. cit., 1968. 
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· This subject is mentioned in fourteen per cent of the sample. 
Interpretation of tho articles seer:ts to support the idea that this is a 
board right. For examrle: 
11 Realizing that it is desirable for ndministrators to be cogni-
zarrt of current philosophies, trends, and techniques, the Board may 
provide in-service workshops for administrators in areas deemed 
necessary.nlO 
Michigan contracts that contained this article were constructed in a 
similar "rray leading one to the conclusion that state-wide adVice to 
boards may have played some part in its inclusion in the documents. 
-
Administrator Rights and ResponsibiB. ties 
This summary of the contracts has surfaced more provisions re-
lated to this category than any other. Where provisions relating'to 
be-ard r:i.gi"filti ar,i,.ii.U~t to uttly fou.r :i..ttnns, n:i.neteen topics pertain 'tiO aa.-
ministrator rights. 
A board's authority resides in state law •. The state education 
laws represented by the sample agreements are long, complex, and ~~ny. 
However, in those contracts where board legal power 'is not fully de-
fined this does not mean that the powers have been given away. 
A similar situation exists in terms ·of local board policy. It, 
too, has the status of quasi-law and need not be represented in a con-
~ 
tract to be in effect. These conditions outline a second reason why more 
provisions reflecting administrator rights exist board rights. 
10Pontiac, Michigan, '~aster Agreement between the Pontiac 
Association of School Administrators and the Board of Education - 'l'he 
School District of the City of' Pontiac," 1972. 
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Another contributing factor is based on the assumpt1on that ad-
mini::rtrators have initiated the bargaining process represented by the 
contract:J. If this is correct, then it may be valid to predict that t.lH 
contracts will contain more administrator concerns and issues than board 
rights or powers. 
Finally, the author's bias in assigning provlsions to the variou.s 
categories has played some part in the apparent discrepan~. As has been 
discussed in the beginning of this chapter, such a bias cannot be realis-
tically eliminated. 
Princioal's Responsibility and Authority 
____..---·· --
'~t all times, the primar.y responsibility for the total instruc-
tional program in his school shall be vested in the Building PrincipaL ~~ 11 
This is a sample of the type of statement that appears in eleven per cent 
v: t:~;.; .:. ....... ~,,.\;;~~~~. Ihe claus.;: o·u.tl.l.Ot:lB adm:inistrator responsibility and 
implies authority. 
An agreement from Little Rock, Arkansas, specifies both dimen-
sions. The principal is 11 direct~ responsible for the administration of 
all policies involving a loca~ school building.n12 Inversely, "each· 
principal shall have the authority to exercise his building responsibili-
ties as.set forth below •••• ". This list includes the right to consulta-
tion about all policy changes, closing of school, and final approval on 
custodial heip. 13 
tion 
1~untington, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
12Little Rock, Arkansas, "Agreement between the Board of Educa-
and the Little Rock Administrators' Association," 1971. 
13Ibid. 
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'lhe 1:'hiladolphia con~t <:.~.;t has one of the most complete statements 
on this subject: 
HA principal :Ls t.be ru::pcns:lble chief administrator of his scho~l 
and is charged t;h the Ol'(~:'l.n.bation thereof, with the super vi s:Lon of' 
his staff and pt~pils and 1.rJ:th the goneral mainton;;.nce of order ond 
disd.pline.... The princ:lp:il may establish and enforce such n:fru.la-
tions as may, irJ hit:> opin5_on, be advi:::;2bJ.e for the successful cond·~ct 
of his school. ul.$. 
Principal's Relatiorwhio to Students 
-- .a,;---· ""~·"'- ---·--
Both the hiztorical and legal position of the prL~cipal has been 
as the highest authority within the building who deals with students. 
Recent court decisions seem to have lessened the arbitrary dimension of 
this power. This may be one reason why the topic appears in ten per cent 
of the sample. In those contracts where the subject does not appear, it 
may be assumed that state law, board poliqy, and/or ad~inistrative regu-
lat;ioos already prt"v:ld~?. su.ffit:>ient definitic-n in the local sit~tion. 
The following excerpts show how this topic has been treated: 
. "The overall responsibilit,y for discipline within a school rests 
with the principal, who is concerned with the well-being of both 
tud t d tafA' rr 15 s etl s an s .A. •••• 
In terms of student assignment: 
11The Board of gducation recognizes that it is the responsibility 
of the building principal to det~rmine the best assignments for 
pupils within his building •••• nlo 
In terms of action: 
J.l;,hiladelphia, Pe.nnsylvania, "Agreement between the Board of Edu-
cation of the School District of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Prio-
'cipals 1 Association, 11 1970. 
l.5Cleveland, Ohio, · "Agreement between the Board of Education of 
the Cleveland School District and the Cleveland Federation of Principals 
and Supervisors, Local 1.5.54, AFL-cro, 11 1970. 
19warren, Michigan, op. cit., 1970. 
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"·.:h:Ue on school property, or in discharge of hi.s duty, a.n ad-
min:istrcrtor may ur:;e such force ae;ainat a student as is necessary and 
rec:BW::lble to p:Cc?•tect hjmscli againsi1 attack or to prevent injury to 
anothor person, ;d.( 
~.S~f-~1 1 s .. ~21a~2!2E~~_l3p}~~i!;Lt! .. C:.~.S~! 
Defj.nition of the principal's relat,ionship with building employees 
is a part of some contracts. Provisions have been made for selection, 
ass;ienment, evaluation, and transfer of teachers outlining various kinds 
of principal involvement. Consultation agreement with central staff, 
and final approval all oce\ir in one part or another of the articles. Ap-
proximately t'<~enty per cent of the agreements touch upon one or more of 
these areas. There does not seem to be, hmrf'ver, a consistent set of 
responsibilities and/or authorities within the sample. 
Excerpts from these articles follow. In terms of staff assign-
"Teachers shall be assigned to a school with the agreement of 
the Building Principal involved and the Superintendent. ultl 
In terms of dismissal and disciplinary actions: 
"The Building Principal shall have primary responsibility for 
recommending to the Superintendent the hiring, dismissal, and dis-
ciplinary actions regarding all certified personnel in his build-
ing. nl9 
In terms of general authority over building personnel: 
17 . 
Baldwin, New York, ''Agreement between the Board of Educat.ion 
and the Baldwin Administrators • Association, n 1969. 
18Huntington, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
l9Brentwood, New York, "Contractual Agreement between the Brent-
wood Public Schools, Union Free School Distri.ct No .. Twelve and the· 
Brentwood Principals' and SUpervisors' Organization," 1972. 
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!lfiJ.l personnel assigned to a school bnild.ing are subject to the 
Jurincti..ction and Authority t>f the Hoad l·fast;er or Pri.ncipal i'l)r all 
general school purposos.u<:O 
policy For;•-rJ.lation 
. ~-..... -.... .....,-.,111::&--
vlithin any institution, policy development is an important act,iv-
ity.. Although the right to make final policy decisions rests by law "int.h 
a board of education, it is valuable for, and to, various groups to have 
input channels available. More than forty per cent of the agreements 
provided for administrator input on district poliqy forraulation. 
The style in l!.'hich this option is expressed varies considerably. 
For example, "educational administrators are qualified to assist in sug- · 
t • d d 1 • 1' • • . , II i th d 21 ges ~g an eve op~ng po ~c~es ana programso••• s one me o • 
Another states that 11 the C.FPS shall be represented on all committees 
formulating policies •••• "22 A final example suggests that 11upon its 
L"t;<{..:..~ail, i;.i&e Assoe;ita;l..iuu ;:;[.tctl..L oe given reasonable opportunity to con-
sult with the Board of Education or its representatives on major re-
visions of educational policy or construction programs which are pro-
posed or under consideration. 1123 In a portion of the sample the con-
sultation article limits the administrator's input role to specific 
areas such as other employee negotiations, teacher evaluation, building 
usage, .and/or school calendar development. 
20 . Boston; Massachusetts, "Agreement between the School Committee 
of the City of Boston and the Association of Head Masters and Principals 
of the Boston Public Schools," 1969. 
2L · ~ontiac, Michigan, oe. cit., 1972. 
22 Cleveland, Ohio, op. cit., 1970. 
23Baldwin, New York, op. cit., 1969. 
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Input;; channels and notification about changes in t.he building in 
which he \-Wrks was provided for tn t~mlve per cent of the agreements. In 
some cases these decislons, rendered at a higher level, include mcdifica-
tion and/or use plans. 
One board and association agreed that 11 every effort should be 
made to appris€! the Principal of all deci-sions that affect the operation 
of the building, rendered at a sup~n~ior level in advance of their takir:g 
effect. n 24 A broader statement may be found in the Little Rock, Arkans3.s, 
contract: 
11The principal shall be recognized as the educational leader in 
his/her building and shall be involved in all decisions affecting 
the various phases of operation of the school. u25 
Assaults on Adm.inistrators 
in the case of an assault on an administrator. These articles general-
ly contain the method by which an incident is to be reported, board pro-
visions for legal and medical aid, additional leave time, and/or compen-
satioo for damages. 
Complaints against Administrators 
In the public's view, as they most certainly are, administrators 
are opeo t~ various ch~rges and/or complaints from a variety of groups. 
In some cases these accusations have resulted in the loss of a position. 
24spring Valley, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Edu-
cation of the Ramapo Central School District 62 and the Ramapo Central 
School District Principals' Association, 11 1970. 
25Little Rock, Arkansas, oe. ci~., 1971. 
secondly, it is reasonable to ass'<.J>";";o that not, all of tho charges 11Ul.de 
agair:u1t administrators are valid. Sometim'"'S the complalnts are initi-
atcd to serve ::>ome less obvious purpose. 
Of the agreements represented, nearly tuc:lnty-four per cent acld:c;-;s 
themselves to this area. In Cleveland the ref:ult of barg.:!ining on t,h:Ls 
issue ~vas: 
11The administrator or supervisor imr;)l'!ed and the president of 
the C.l<,PS shall be given full information an to the nature of serious 
complaints or charges made by parents, students, or any special 
interest groups which appear to be organized, and be given every 
opportunity, resource, and help to answer or cope with SUGh com-
plaints or harrassment* u26 . 
The Jefferson County, Colorado, contract has a more complex sec-
tion on this issue. An entire article of the document is devoted to the 
complaint procedure. The procedure contains definitions of parties, 
charges, and nine steps that are directed toward a final resolution of 
ti•<.:: ciici.i."ge. It sugge&\:.b -t.llctlj every attempt w~i..l be made to protect the 
administrator in question. 27 
Legal Services for Adminis~ators 
Directly related to assaults and complaints are the potential 
situations administrators face that may lead to legal action against 
them. Twenty-nine per cent of the contracts provide for the costs of 
legal defense for the administrator should such a need arise. The fol-
lowing stat~ment exempli~ies the manner in which this has been accomp-
lished:. 
.· 
26 Cleveland, Ohio, op. cit., 1970. 
27 Jefferson County, Colorado, "Agreement between Jefferson 
County School District No. R-1 and the Jefferson County Administrators' 
Association,u 1972. 
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~~'Ih-~ Board agrees to S<Wc barrnless and protect adrd.nistrators 
from f:lcmlGial h;,<:;s and w:i.ll provid<~ for t;l:.eir defo:::n:.;e arising o~t 
of any claim, d.c~tr.and, suit, or jUd[~ment by reanon of nlleged nogli-
eonco or other act rusultinr~ in "wcidontn};.(Jbodily injury to any per-
son lJlthin or about the school building. 11 ':..o 
Im most of the provisions the all8gation of a::.;sault by an administrator 
in cormect1on with employment is likewise the basis for a request of le-
gal counseL 
Tran ~:f'ers, Vacancies s and Pror.mtions 
_..-...---
Nearly one-h'lU of the bargaining-agreements show that the sub-
ject of transfers and vacancies has been considered by the negotiating 
parties. Representative of little involvement and no control is a con-
tract that sir~Js· states that the association will be notified when a 
transfer is planned. 29 No consideration of voluntar,r or involuntary 
moves appears and no appeal mechanism is listed. Another agreement that 
represents -vhe opposi.te ena. or the cont.inuum provides that the member 
being transferred be notified thirty days in advance, that 11a specific 
assignment and outline of the rationale for the transfer" be included, 
the right of appeal, no loss in tenure, and uno change in this policy 
without negotiations and agreement with local associ.ation. 1130 
Procedures for filling vacancies also range from ver.y simple to 
multiple steps. Generally, the articles appearing in this area provide 
for publication of the vacancy within the district's buildings,. the pro-
2\rest Babylon, New York, 11Agreement between the Board of Educa-
tion of the Union Free School District No. Two, Town of Babylon, County 
of SUffolk and the West Babylon School Administrators' Association," 1970. 
29cedarhurst, New York, "Agreement between the Cedarhurst Board 
of. Education and the Cedarhurst Adm:lniotrators 1 Association, tt 1970. 
JOBrentwood, New York, op. cit., 1972. 
ccdure an applicant is to follow, tho right oi' afJsociat:!.on members to 
first considoration, ~cknowledgmcrrt, of application, and notification of' 
the d:Lsposi.tion of an application. 
Hocl:i.fication of Job Description 
_,_..._,..,... _ __, .. __ . __ ... ~--
Approximately one-third of the sample provides for association 
input, at the least, on the subject of' change in job description and/or 
working conditions. Commonly,· the agreements call for association rBpr•:J-
sent,ation en committees dealing with job descriptions and working con-
ditions. In ~~ny cases no mange can be made in a specific job descrip-
tion without.consultation with the association. 
Ooen Personnel File 
_..~·~~~ ~~~o~,~ 
The right of free access to the contents of one's personnel file 
1-ras a part of tt;.;cnty~~ina par ce:nt vf tht:~ agreements. In some cases 
this was li.mited to "review of the contents of any evaluation reports 
originated in this sJ~temwhich are contained in their personnel files 
as maintained by the Central Administrative Office. 1131 In .other con-
tracts the matter was'handled by allowing administrators 11 to have ac-
cess to their personnel files to review aQy document which is not privi-
. 32 leged or confidential." In the Houston, Texas, agreement the article 
describing this right contained the same elements with the additions of 
identification of the sources of material in the file and the right to be 
3lwindsor, ponnecticut, op. cit., 1970. 
32Lansing, Michigan, "Master Agreement between Lansing Associa-
tion of School Administrators .and. Lansing School District Board of Edu-
cation," 1971. 
] d . t' i "133 legal counst" . ur1.ng .te rev evt.' 
Provision .for academic fr<' :dom appoa:r J in alrrn::;f.:, seven p~r ci..;nt; 
of the sample. However, this gro1:? t.ras exch':~~:i:.rely from New York. All 
the clauses liere written the same as or sirdlar to the frllowing: 
''Acaderrrl.c freedom shall be encouraged .for members, and no speci;:,l 
limitat:i.ons shall bo placed upcn study, invest.igatinn_. presentiDg 
and interpreting facts and idGa3 concernir;g rr .. ::o, humc.1.n society, the 
physical and biological e-mrld and ot.her branches of learning, sub-
ject only4to accepted standard~ of professional educational responsi-bility.n3J 
Prop..£._sals by other Bar~aininl" Unj.ts 
·When employee bargaining beco.'l'les the normal method of establish-
ing management-ernployee relationships, the poStsibility of conflict be-
tween various employee group proposals will em~rge. In the school 
where the principal seems to have some of the characteristics of both 
management and labor this question is most significant. If, for example, 
the teachers' association gains a particular right through bargaining 
that ha.d been within the province of the principal, then a conflict 
arises. In areas where teacher bargaining power occurred before adminis-
trative collective action maQy such cases at this type did take place.35 
· 3-1i~ston, Texas, ''Houston Independent School District Adminis-
trators' Consultation Agreement," 1970. 
34Long Beach, New York, 11Agree~ent between the Board of Education 
.of tbe Ci.ty School District of the City of Long Beach and the Long Beach 
Administrative, Supervisory, and Pupil Personnel Group, 11 1969. 
JSEpstain, Benjamin, What is .Ne~?otiable? The National Associa-
tion of Secondary School Principals, 'wa·~nington, D.c., 1969, p. 13. 
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son:e 1~ol•::l ln the ccmsideratir,n of propo::als by othor bnrgainine u;,its. 
The follG;.;ing claU.S!:J is one ex~mple of the manner in <k:lch this concer!l 
"All items agreed to by the Board N:i.t.h all other recognized ne-
gotird:ing representatives Hhich affect the working conditions of the 
adminj_strntors co\•ered by this Agreun:ent shall be cggsidered open to 
negotiation bct'i'l'ccn the Board and the Association. tt3 
Commonly, the administrators serve in an advisory capacity to 
the board during negotiations. A New Jersey contract provides for this 
expectation in the following m~nner: 
11During the course of teacher negotiations representath"B adminis-
trator(s) agreed upon by the Superintendent and Administrators shall 
be present and shall advise the Board of Education on administrative 
implicQ~ions of negotiated language under consideration for agree-
ment.11-'7 
As leader of the school, it would seem that the principal would 
be roncerned wi-th curriculum. This concern has been provided for in 
thirty-four per cent of the contracts. These articles define the princi-
pal's role in terms of curriculum change, as a supervisor, and the lati-
tude of decision-making power possessed by various sub-groups within the 
school. In terms of the line-staff organization the example below sh~ 
that: 
"A recommendation for curriculum change or innovation by teachers 
or departments may be submitted to either the principal or the Board. 
In either case the Board (Central Administration) and the Principal 
39rlest Babylon, New York, oe. cit., 1970. 
3'7verona, New Jersey, "Agreement between the Verona Administra-
tors I Association and the Board of Education or Verona, Essex County' II 
1970. 
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C(;,:;,;;\l_tt.'.:e t>.ri11 meet for :fucther study and recorrmendation. .Final 
r(:cc:mr.wrd.at.ion for curriculum change or innovation will b<~ ronde by 38 ths :superintendent or h:i.s rc:;;present.ative to the Board for adoption. 11 
.Another e:xzmple provides for curriculum involvement at the bul.lding level: 
llThe principal shall ba involved in discussions relative to all 
instructional programs that arc contemplated for llis school. 'fhe 
principal may recommend t<Thatever books, inst.ructional matcr:tals, and 
equipment he believes necessary and desirable for his instructional 
r)l'O•""'""''ITI. nJ9 0 .,...,.-f,., "*' 
_!nv~l vo~~J.n Bu~;;:et 
It has been said that after money everything else is just con-
·· versation. Clauses relating to the budget of either the school or the 
district were found in only eleven per cent of the agreements. Some 
articles seemed insignificant defining only the procedure to change bud-
get recon~~ndations originating with the principal.40 Others told the 
manner in which teacher and department head requests would be handled.~1 
ing but retained spproval of expenditures at the level of assistant 
superintendent.42 One New York contract stated that, '~lhenever the board 
is considering a proposed budget, it will give the council'the opportunity 
38
noseville, Michigan, "Collective Bargaining Agreement between 
the Board of Education of the School District of the City of :Roseville 
and the Rosev·ille Principals' Association," 1969 • 
. · 
39Plainview, New York, "Agreement between the Board. of Education, 
Central School District No- 4, Plainview, New York, and the Administrators' 
Association of the Central School District, No .. 4," 1970. 
40ibid. 
4l:r.ancanter, New York, ''Professional Agreement between the !,an-
caster Central School District, No. 1, and the Lancaster Administrative 
and Supervisory Association," 1969. 1 
42st. Clair Shores, Michigan, "Collective Bargaining Agreement 
between the Board of Education, Lake Shore Public Schools, and the Lake 
Shore Association of School Administrators," 1971. 
; 
'10 
t.o r;:r:o"t; and discuss 1•he proposed btldg2t items as they pert.a:l.11 to the pro-
virc':Lons of the Aercement.n1+3 finally, a Ne-rt York contract stated 11 th:rL 
prir~cipals plcy a key role in the preparation of the annual budget. a4h 
Yearly Calendar 
--..,.~..-~ ..... -...-_......._,,_,_ 
The right to be involved in establishment of the school cnlencbr 
is provided for in ten per cent of the sample. General:.ly speaking, the 
principal serves as one of many group representati\Tes who are directly 
affected by the adoption of a specific calendar. A representation of 
the form this takes in contractual writing is below:·· 
"Central Adrninistration shall establish a procedure for develop-
ment of the school calendar which provides for H.A.~~? presentation (as 
appointed by thq Executive Board) on any comrnittee established for 
this purpose. uL~5 
Attendance at Meetin~~L Conferences; Expenses 
.naseti on the frequency with wh~ch it appears in the contracts, 
it seems as if the right to attend conventions, meetings, and other pro-
fessional gatherings is important to administrators. Fifty-four per 
cent of the sample provided for this. As a corollary to this right, 
forty-three per cent of the contracts stated that the board would pro-
vide expenses incurred during such meetings. 
4~iagara Falls, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Educa-
tion of the School District of the City of Niagara Falls, New York, and 
the Administrative and Supervisory Council of the Public Schools," 1970. 
4bpiscataway, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education 
and the Piscataway Administrators 1 Association, 11 1970. 
4SHauppauge, New York, •'Professional Negotiations Agreement be-
tween the Hauppauge Association of Administrative Personnel and the Board 
ai' Education, Union Free &phool District No. 6," 1970. 
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One irnportant practical r:i.ght of any school employee assoc:laticn 
is t.h e usa of the d.i strict 1 s rr.ail service, bu.ilding s, and time durinG the 
b1.wines;:; day. Withou·c these riehts conducting the business of the associ-
ation becomes extrem0ly difficult4 Eleven per cent of the districts al-
lowed for the use of the di~:rtrict !l".ail service~ Approximately nineteen 
per cent gran:ted tim·3 during the business dc1.y for members to carry on 
association business. In large city school districts such as Philadel-
phi'e select.ive adm:i.rd.strators are released from all school duties to con-
duct association b'\lsiness while on full salary. The association's rieht 
to use school buildings i~ provided for in ~1enty per cent of the sample. 
Dues Ch8~~ff, Other Deductions 
t"l·ovi.si.on l:or ueducting the association • s ClUes from members 1 
payroll checks is contained in thirty-six per cent of the agreements. 
Within the total labor movement this is gt'imerally called a dues checkoff. 
Again, this provision has value in terms of the association's ability 
to function at its potential. 
Other deductions made included annuities, medical, and/or income 
protection charges. These seem to have been granted as a service to 
association members. 
Negotiations Provisions 
Nearly all of the contracts outline the method by which the par-
ties arrive at agreement. The questions of recognition, implementation, 
change of agreement, grievance, and exchange of information are answered 
in the negotiations provisions. Scope of negotiations is considered in 
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vi:::ions. Only a mi.nor:tty of the group contains all possible negotiations 
provld.ons. 
Recognition clauses include the elemen-ts of exclusive barga:i.n:Lng 
B[(Emt, reference to state public employee bargaining le.gislation, defini-
tion of the jobs contained within the bargaining· unit, definitions of 
terrr£, and the length of recognition. Other elements noted in wme of 
the agreements were the scope of negotiations, the right of an individual 
to present any matter to the board, the association's responsibility to 
represent equally all members of the bargaining unit, no-strike pledges, 
and the association's responsibility to admit all administrators to.mem-
bersh:tp without. qualification. It must be noted, however, that. not all 
o~ i:it•t: agl't:tll<t:Ui..l::l u1 "U:le sarnpl.e contained all of these element,s. 
More than ninety per cent of the sample had a recognition clause. 
A Connecticut example: 
11The Board recognizes the Association as the exc}.usive repre-
sentative as defined in Chapter 166, Section 10-153 of the Connecti-
cut General Statutes as amended, for the entire group of certified 
professional employees of the Board including elementary school 
principals, secondary school principals, and vice-principals, the 
Supervisor of Special Education ••• for the pux·pgses of negotiating 
salaries and other conditions of employment. 11 4 
Preamble 
Sixty-nine per cent of the sample included a preamble. This type 
of clause serves to outline the basis on which the board and association 
enter into an agreement. Statements such as 11we have an over-riding 
mutuality of interest in the desire to achieve the finest possible educa-
46windsor, Connecticut, oe• cit., 1970. 
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t,i(\n fo~ the chilc1.rt_:m ••• u47 and 11 it :i.s tm.;ard this end, with mutual rc-
:::;pcct fen• the rights, responsibiliti.es and duties of each other, that tho 
Bo;;;.rd and the Associa.tion enter into this agreement0 4S exemplify the 
ecneral nature of a preamble. 
'l'he term, Hzipper clause11 , refers to a contractual provision tha.t 
eliminates the possibility of any future negotiation once the agreement 
is signed by both parties. _ Seventeen per cent of the contracts have such 
a provision. An example of such a clause is: 
"This Agreement incorporates the entire understanding of the 
parties on all isB1.2es which have been the subject of negotiations. 
During the term of this contract neither party shall be required to 
negotiate on any matter exceptwherein the contract specifically 
provides .for the reopening of items for negotiation .u49 
Where one minority group of contracts is constructed so that no 
change,is possible during the agreement's stated legal life, another 
group of twenty-five per cent makes provision for change •. In many of 
these documents the process b,y which the agreement may be modified is 
defined simply: " ••• any provision of this agreement may be discussed or 
renegotiated at any time with the nru.tual consent of both par~ies.u50 
4? Jericho, New York, "Jericho Educational Administrators' Associ-
ation - Nogot.iat:ing Agreement, 11 1970. 
48Poughkeepsie, New York, 11Collective Bargaining Agreement by and 
between Central School District No. 1 of theTcrwns of Wappinger, Pough-
keepsie, Fishkill, East Fishkill, and LaGrange, Dutchess County, Kent and 
Phillipstown, Putnam County, New York, and the Wappingers Administrators' 
Association," 1969. 
49Pontiac, Michigan, oe. ci~., 1972. 
5<\unthrop, Maine, "Negotiations Agreement. between the Winthrop 
School Committee and the Winthrop School Principals," 1970. 
of bot.h parties with l;I'i t,ten evidenc:e of said consent being present~r::d by 
each party to the oth~r.a5l 
!.icvt:)tiation~~ Procedure 
'<" _.,..,.•{_,_.........._ __ ....... ~ ........ ~ .......... ·--~
As its label :tmrlies, the negotiation!> procedure article of a 
ccntract out.lines the met-hod by which the board and the aElsociation arE~ 
to work toward a final agreement. Nearly sixty per cent of the sample 
m3.kes refereDce to this process. Elements included in a negotiations 
procedure article are the dates when meet.ings take place, the legal sta-
tus of previm.J..r;ly agreed to times, the make-up of the negotiat~ing teams, 
·the method by w"hich public statements may be made, how ratification is 
achieved, a zipper clauDe, and impasse'proceduros. Again, the depth to 
which a particular contra.ct reflects these elements seems to be tied to 
:..~.0 J..oc:al cc.r.Jditivnd. 1~0 o~;,ner pattern to explain these dii'1'erences has 
been noted. 
In any collective bargaining contract the scope clause is a most 
important section. In this part the participating parties agree to 
those items about which they will negotiate. The important distinction 
is that they \till "negotiate" rather than "discuss" these items. In so 
agreeing, a,commitment is made to the legal parameters of the negotia-
tions agreement. In other words, if agreement cannot be reached about.a 
par·ticular item, then either party may initiate impasse procedures and, 
5~yosset, New York, "Professional Agreement between the Board of 
Education of Central School District No. 2, Town of Oyster Bay, Syosset, 
New York, and the Syosset Principals 1 Association, 11 1969. 
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if it i_s cnll0d for, binding arbU.::.ration •. 'i!here many boards rn.":ly be most 
v.":illirig to discuss any number of items with. an employee Group, it does 
not folloH that they will be will:Lng to inc:lude these topics in the scor;B 
clam:o. Ninety per cent of the contracts contain a scope statement. 
That which is to be j_ncluded in the scope clause may be listed 
by specific item, or it may .f,'all under a general heading such as 11\-mrking 
conditicns 11 • General practice, court decisions, and usage all seem to 
agree that nearly anything connected with employr:rent can be entitled, 
"working conditions". ~1any teacher contracts list specific items to be 
negotiated in the scope clause but do not list working conditions. 
National educational organizations such as the AASA recomn1end that this 
phrase not be placed in the scope clause.52 Based on these points, it 
is fascinating to know that all administrator contracts in this sample 
do include 11workine condUions11 in the scope cl:nJBP.. 
I~;plementation of Agreement 
Twelve per cent of the sample provide for meetings and/or a pro-
cess aimed at implementing the contract. Those contracts that provide 
for this by meetings designated the superintendent or board members as 
the source to whom problems would be presented. In some cases the meet-
ings are scheduled on a regular basis. In others an issue must be raised 
by either side before a meeting takes place. 
In most collective. bargaining agreements the grievance procedure 
serves as the method to interpret the contract. The documents that in-
elude an implementation provision may be said to have an added dimension 
52salmon, Paul B., Critical Incidents in Ne~otiation, American 
Association of School Administrators, Vlashington, n:c., 197!, p. 30. 
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to their grievance proc~;Jdttrc. In all cases a grievance may be filed if 
the in;plcmcrJtation process fails t,o solve a particular problem. 
Grievance Prncedu.re 
--
Grievance procedures are on~ of the most commonly found articles 
in t,he sarr.ple group. Eighty per cent have such a process outlined in tbe 
contract. In the overwhelming m,.'J.jorit.y of the agreements the grievance 
procedure is a long and detailed process. It is surprising to note that 
not all af the contracts have such a provision. 
The typical grievance procedure includes a series of steps to be 
followed by the party filing such a complaj.nt. Generally, these steps 
begin at the local level, proceed to the board and, finally, to some 
type of arbitration or mediation. Implied within each step is the ob-
jective of settling the difference of opinion at that level. 
The Y.Ut-:::st.J.uu o.r b.i.nding arbitration is mos11 J.mportant. Approxi-
! 
mately forty per cent of the group provide for binding arbitration. The 
arbitrators are generally selected from the American Arbitration Associ-
ation. However, an equal percentage make the board level the final 
stage for any aggrieved party. The remaining group allow for mediation 
by an outside source but still give the board the right to make final 
decisions. 
!~change of Information 
The right to and responsibility for exchanging pertinent infor-
ma~ion during negotiations is included in thirty per cent of the agree~ 
menta. In most cases this refers more to the board than to the associa-
tion since the former has available to it those kinds of data that may 
be most important in collective bargaining. Provision for this is gener-
allY i:1CCt1;r,plishod hy a simple stat,ement t.hat the parties ~1.ll exchanee 
rele•rm;t• information and/or all data unl~Sss such is privileged by law. 
Surprisinc;ly, only eigh~y-two per cent of the agreements listed 
the duration of the contract. As is true With any cont.ract, such a pro-
vision is an absolute necessity. The explanation for the absence of this 
provision in eighteen per sent of the sample is not clear. 
The duration of the contract is simply a listing of the dates 
during which the contract is in effect. In many cases the duration 
article included the dates when negotiations for a new agreement would 
begin. In a minority of the gro~o provision was made to continue the 
contract as written unless either party submitted a list of new items· 
to be negotiated. 
Contract Supercedes Board Policy 
A board of education may enter into a contractual situation but 
in so doing gives up its right to unilateral action on any·item included 
in the contract. Even though this legal inhibition.is accepted, thirty 
per cent of the contracts contained a clause that suggested that the 
agreement superceded any board policy contrary to it. 
No-Strike Clause 
New York 1s Taylor law provides for a no-strike provision in all 
public employee collective bargaining agreements. Massachusetts has 
similar legislation.· Such a clause appeared in on~ a few o£ the con-
tracts representing the other states. 
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Salary: and Fr:i.nz~ Bet:19fi.ts 
'l.'h:i::; category includes definition of the work year, the salary 
cchcdu1es ;mel methods of payment, various types of leave, insurance pro-
tection, Horkingmen 1 s compensation, and the right to the same fringe ber.t~-
fit.s as other employee groups. As might be expected, these clauses ap-
pear in larger percentages of the sample groUp than do other types. 
Wor}{ Year Defjned 
F • -c·o-• I 
Ninety-five per cent of the agreements specify the aruninistrator•s 
work year. Holidays, vacation options, and special dates are listed in 
these clauses. In some cases reference is made to the length of the work 
day for administrators. However, many simply suggest that the adminis-
trator is on duty at any time that his presence is required. 
Salnry Sch~dule 
All of the contracts have.a sala~r schedule. Three types of 
of schedules have been used. A majority of the agreements outline a 
ratio of administrator salary based on the_ existing teachers' schedule. 
In these cases differences in the ratio seem to be based on building 
size, level of the school, and the length of the work year. 
A second type at scheduleis based on steps. These gradations 
are generally made on the basis of administrator experience. In some 
cases, however~ the job description is the key factor. The third type 
of salary schedule lists either.the specific building to which an ad-
ministrator is assigned and the corresponding salary or gives the name 
of each person and the dollar amount they are.to receive for the year. 
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Porty-t:.;ro por cent of the cont,racts give administrators the same 
frir::r;~: bc:~efit,s as enjoyed by other bargaining units. In this way prin-
dp<;:ls br~ne.fit directly from the negotiation efforts of teachers. Seven-
teen per cent provide for additional fringe benefits for administrators 
as ccw'.[Y1,red to other employee groups. 
Leave 
--
}~ighty per cent of the sample outline the various types of leave 
available to administrators. These categories includ.e sick leave, per-
sonal leave, rnilitary leave, sabbatical leave, maternity leave, and 
leaves of absencee In those areas where leave is not included in the 
contract it may be assumed that it exists as a part of regular board 
policy. Appro:xir.nately thirteen per cent of. the group provides for a sick 
ltiavu baok. Tnis is simply a procedure where employees share total sick 
leave days available to all members of the bargaining unit on a need 
basis. 
Insurance· 
Nearly three-fourths of the contracts provide medical insurance 
to administrators. Two other types provided are life insurance and lia-
bility protection. Most of the medical insurance benefits include both 
hospitalization and majo.r expense protection. 
Automobile Expenses 
Twenty-six per cent of the administrator groups represented are 
given mileage payments for use of automobiles. Again, where this ia not 
listed it may very well be part of regular board policy. 
so 
'1.1ienty per cent of the sample nota workingmen 1 s compen:::a.t:ion. 
vlhY this has been included in the contracts is not clear. In stat.es 
l\rhere ~;ncb benefits are given they may not be taken away by an employer; 
ther0fore, ·!ihe inclusion of such a clause seems to be redundant. 
Three types of provisions appeared in many of the agreements di-
rectly related to state and/or federal law. The necessity :for these 
clauses is the result of state legislation in so~~ cases. In others it 
is difficult to determine why the statements appeared since there seems 
to be no legal need for their inclusion. 
!:_egis];.ative Action Provision 
tion, demands that every contract include the following statement: 
11It is agreed by and between the parties that any provision of 
this agreement requiring legislative action to permit its implementa-
tion by amendment of law or by providing the additional .funds there-
fore, shall not become effective until the appropriate legislative 
body has given approval.u53 
s.avings Clause 
Near~ one-half of the agreements do carr,y a statement referring 
to the relationship between state law and the terms and conditions of the 
contract. This has been labeled savings clause, severability, or conform-
ity to law in the various documents. Essential~, this type of clause 
.5JSpring Valley, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Educa-
tion, Ramapo Central School District No. 2 and the Principals' Associa-
tion," 1970. 
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prot,ccts all of the terms and conditions of ·t-he contract other than th~·t 
one Hhich has been adjudged to be in conflict with state law. An exmnple 
of such a st:1tement is: 
11
'l'he terms and conditions of this agreement are subject to the 
laws of ·che State of Hichigan and in the event that any provision is 
held to b:; ir1valid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Attorney 
Goneral, or by a.ny other administrative agency of the State of Hichi-
gan, such determina~ion shall not invalidat.e the remaining provisions 
of this agreement. 11 =>4 
Corrtract Subject to Stnte and/or Fedara.l Law ____ ,.., ,. ...... _ -
Forty-one per cent of the group state that the terms and con-
ditions of the agreement are subject to st..ate and/or federal law. As 
seems to be the case in a number of provisions, there is no legal neces-
sity for the inclusion of such a statement with the exception of New 
York 1s Taylor law. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
The many and varied provisions listed under this category have 
received the miscellaneous label primarilY because they appeared with 
little frequency. They represent many of the previous five categories 
but are not commonly discussed topics of negotiations. This conclusion 
in no way reflects upon their educational and/or administrative importance. 
Substitutes for secretarial or custodial staff members was guaran-
teed in ooe_New York contract withio the para~eters of budgetar,y limita-
tions.55 A requirement for principals to sUbstitute as instructors under 
54st. Clair Shores, Michigan, oe. cit., 1971 
55Plainview, New York, oE· cit., 1970. 
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SLx New Y•;;rlc u.greer;:~r;t,~; inclt<.• 1 ::d :'l Code c.f :Ethics that he:1d be-3n 
adoptEd by the NeH York State School I:\o:.::cd 1 s Assoej_8t:ion. 5'l This type 
of a_rttcle may be :i.nt,erprettOJd t;o be closely related to the academic free-
dom provisions that ::>ppeared in a sub~;tant:ia.l minority of the agreements. 
A number of the agreements made reference to the principal's ac-
tivities in and out of. school. Two New York contracts suggested that 
the principal not engage in any acti'l.rity outside of the school that 
11would diminish his effectiveness11 as an administrato~.5B Two others 
requested that the aQministrator be neat and appear in a socially accept-
able manner while on the job.59 Another document demanded that the 
principal work t~«ard positive and informative community relationships. 60 
Finally, one contract asked that the principal participate in various 
community parent groups as rep~esentative of the schoo1.61 
.Lunch hour problems were mentioned in a few of the contracts. 
One ga~e the principal a "duty free lunch bour.n 62 Two others spelled 
56Boston, Massachusetts, op. cit., 1969. 
57 Brentw~od, New York, op. cit·., 1972. 
5Blancaster, New York, op. cit., 1969. 
59ovid, Michigan, •iAgreement between the Ovid-Elsie Area Schools 
Board of Education and Ovid-Elsie Principals' Association," 1969. 
60Plainview, New York, op. ci~., 1970 
6~untington, New York, oo. cit., 1970. 
62 ' Dearborn Heights, Michigan, "Agreement between the Dearborn 
Township No. 8 Board of Education and the Dearborn Township No. 8 Ad-
ministrators' Association," 1969. 
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out t.he manner in which the lunch program would be. f::Upervised. 63 A New 
York· cont.ract provided for telephone coverage of the office area during 
the lunch period.64 
Special considerations for the principal appeared in a few 
. . 65 
agreements. In one, parking space for the principal was guaranteed. 
Another provided for private office space for the administrator.66 Six 
contracts gave the association members first choice at summer employment 
opportunities within the school district. 67 · Two of these guaranteed 
. 68 . ·. 
such employment for the members. One contract allowed the adminis-
trator to teach during the summer months at another place as long as the 
time was made up in the following year. 69 11Clean working conditions 11 
were the subject of another agreement. The negotiating teams apparently 
felt that this was a need of the association members and included it in 
the agreement. 70 
An .administrative internship program was outlined in two con-
tracts.71 The right to make educational innovations within the build-
-
63netroit, Michigan, "Agreement between the Board of Education 
of the School District of the City of Detroit and the Organization of 
School Administrators and Supervisors, 11 1970. 
6~a1dwin, New York, op. cit., 1969. 
6.5plai~~iew, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
66Lancaster, New York, op. cit., 1969. 
67 '• 1 y . 
· West Baby on, New ork, op. c1t., 1970. 
68 ' . 
Levittown, New York, "Collective Agreement between the Associ-
ation of Levittown School Administrators with the Board of Education of 
Union Free School District No. 5, Le\Fi.ttown, New York," 1970. 
69verona, New Jersey, ~· cit., 1970., ,· 
70tong Beach, New York, op. cit., 1969. 
7~edarhurst~ New York, op. cit., 1970. 
d t . . 1 i .,., y 1 d . . . t 72 p i . .f ina 't4as grante o pr:mc:tpa s . n (1t~fJ •new or-:: 4l.S'trl.c •• . rov· s:ton or 
a. fist;·ict instructional m.aterials center appeared in another agreement~ 73 
Various types of ratios concernine staff appeared infrequently 
in the sample. In four agreements clerical st.a.ff was provided on a ratio 
to building enrollment •• 74 In one contr~ct depar~ment chairmen positions 
were created in the same manner. 75 In two others an assistant princi-
pal1s position could be created on a ratio basis$ 76 
Termination ofservices and/or retirement V."as touched upon in 
nine of the agreements. However, the subst-ance of these articles demon-
strated no consistency. The method by which an administrator could re-
tire from the d:Lstrict was the subject of three contracts. 77 Bonus pay-
78 ment for various lengths of service appeared on one other. Severance 
pay was provided for in another. 79 
, .. 
·A merit pay system for adrn.inistrat.ors w~.~ d•?s~ribed ~ one =on= 
tract. 80 One agreement included a management survey provision. 81 Another 
1 -
. ~untington, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
73Rochester, New York, "Contractual Agreement between the Board of 
Education of the City School District of Rochester, New York, and the Ad-
ministrati ve Staff, u 1969. 
7~itt1e Rock, Arkansas, op. cit., 1971. 
75 . Hauppauge, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
76 Houston, Texas, op. cit., 1970. 
77Accord, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Education of 
the Roundout Valley Central Schools and the Administrators' Association," 
1969. -
78 . ' 
Boston, Massachusetts, oE• cit., 1969. 
79st. Clair Shores, Michigan, op. cit., 1971. 
00 . 
Lancaster, New York, op. cit., 1969. 
. 
8~ewlett, New York, ••Recognition and Negotiation Agreement be-
tween the Hewlett-Woodmere Public Schools and the Hewlett Woodmere Ad-
ministrators• Association," 1969. 
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de:::cri.bed emereency school closing procedures. 82 A two-year contract l·Tas 
provided fnr in one Michigan district. 83 , 
One board agreed t,o consult wit.h the administrators 1 association 
before making public any decision affecting the administrators. 8h Two 
other boards agreed to consult with the associatj:on on any in-service 
programs planned for the teaching staff. 85 ~he Philadelphia principals 
were made members of the managem~nt team by the terms of their cogtract. 86 
·JI,-
Three Massachusetts districts absolv.ed administrators of any re-
> 
sponsibility for loss of monies during the physical transfer of funds 
;mere no fault existed with them. 87 FOur school districts ~greed to pay 
state and national professional association dues for administrators. 88 
One district made the central office responsible for communication to 
the building administrators. 89 
Two contracts guaranteed an open shop for 2d~ir.istrctors.9° Four 
82 Spring Valley, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
83tivonia, Michigan, ";greement between the Livonia Board of Edu-
·cation and the Livonia Educational Administrators and Supervisors, 11 1971. 
8~iddletown, New Jersey, "Agreeme~t between the Board of Educa-
tion of Middletown Towhship and l'Iiddletown Township Administrators and 
Supervisors Association," 1970. 
· 
85areat Neck, New York, "Agreement between the Board of Educa-
tion, Union Free School District No. 7, Town of North Hempstead, Nassau 
County,.New York, with Association of Supervisors and Administrators of 
the Great Neck Educational Staff, Inc., 11 1970. 
, 
86Philadelphia, Penns,ylvania, op. cit~, 1970. 
87chelmsford, 1-lassachusetts, "Agreement between the Chelmsford 
School Committee and the Chelmsford School Administrators' Association, 11 
1969. 
88 . Ovid, Michigan, op. cit., 1969. 
89Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2E· cit., 1970. 
9Dpontiac, Michigan, op. cit., 1972. 
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others m1de reference to the continuation of federal aml/or state pro-
g1~ams where board participation v:as needed. 91 One agreement demanded 
that association members act in a "moral, legal, and ethical way in all 
dealings 11 concerning their posi·tions. 92 One outlined professional im-
provement in terms of the number of graduate hours administrators had to 
' 93 
accumulate every calendar year. 
The rationale for special education services appeared in one con-
tract.94 An incentive_program for future administrators fro~ the ranks 
of the teaching ;taff was outlined in another docum;nt. 95 District-. 
wide assignments were referred to in a New York contract.96 
/ 
. 
9l:srentwood, New York, op. cit., 1972. 
· 
9
2warren, Michigan, "Agreement between Warren Consol~dated Schools 
Board of Education and Warren Administrators 1 Association," 1970. 
93Lans~ng, Michigan, op. cit., 1971._ 
. 
9~ncaster, New York,- op·. cit., 1969. 
95Poughkeepsi.e, New York, "Agreement betw~en the Arlington Cen-
tral School District and the Arlington Administrators' Association," 1969. 
96
Youngston, New York, op. cit., 1970. 
CHAP'l'ER IV 
A WEIGH'rD,fQ AND ANALYSIS OF THE CO."JTRACTS 
The re~~lts of the process by which the contents of the contracts 
were t>Teighted resulted in three major sets of quantitative reports. The 
first of these deals with the total weightings achieved by both individual 
hypotheses and the sum of all four hypotheses (Total Weightings - All 
~y~otheses). The second set of figures gives the frequency and percentage 
of the total group in terms of the specific weightings that each propo-
sition received (Weightings of Contractual Provisions Related to the 
The third ma.ior section of this c'na.ptAr P.X::lminP.R "'~~h 
proposition and discusses its relative position compared to the other 
propositions within the total group (!he Propo~~tions Consider~~). In 
all three parts of the chapter, tables are included that report the same 
figures but are based upon contracts from individual states. Finally, 
the states' contracts are ordered in terms of highest to lowest weightirg. 
Total Weightings - All Hypotheses 
In the following thirty tables the same specific type of infor~~­
tion fs shown.. The line entitled "number of contracts" reports the fre-
quency for the group. The figure called "maximum possible weighting" is 
the product of the number of contracts times the highest possible weigt-
ing an individual contract could receive. The "actual weighting" is the 
sum of weightings that the contracts did, in fact, receive. 
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The "maximum possible range" demonstra·ces on a continuum the fe>r-
·est to most number of points a contract could receive. The "actual 
range" is that. range that emerged in the weighting process. The "mean 
weighting" and "median weighting 11 are self-explanatory. The figure 
called "mean percentage of maximum weighting" represents that percentage 
of the total that the mean of the group listed did reach. 
Table 1 reports the total weighting of all the agreements on all 
the hypotheses and propositions. In analyzing the figures a number of 
factors seem to be su~gested: (1) As a group, the agreements received 
less than half of the total weighting that was possible; (2) The range 
demonstrates that none of the agreements received the maximum possible 
points; (3) The range suggests that very large differences exist between 
the agreements; {4) ... A comparison of the actual weightings and actual 
range to th"? max.i.l'l!'.!T.S eu.ggcets th:::.t the distribution is skewed somewh&t 
to the left of the normal curve. 
Table 1 
Total Weightings of !fl Contracts 
All Hypotheses 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximuffi possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
·Actual weighting •••••••••••••••• 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting · • • • • • • 
81 
6561 
2368 
o ... 81 
0-64 
29.2 
28.3 
36.0% 
Table 2 reports the total weightjngs for all of the contracts on 
those propositions related to Hypotheses I. This hypothesis focused on 
the princi.pal' s various methods by which he could shape his professional I . 
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de:Jt;iny. Aztdn, no n;;reement r<:;coived the maximum possible weighting. 
The Kida rrw;:,e points out. a corresponding lack of similarit.y within the 
arrreerl};;nts. Although the mean percentage of maximum weighting is only 
Q 
approxir:z,tdy one-half.' of the total possible, this hypothesis did receive 
the highest figure of the four. 
Table 2 
Tot.al Weig~inJS_s of A~!_ Contracts 
Hypothesis I 
Number of contracts ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • . • • • • • •. • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
l1ean percentage of maximum weighting ...... . 
81 
3159 
1434 
0-39 
0-33 
17.7 
16.8 
45.4% 
Table 3 demonstrates the same types of dat.a reported in Table 2 
but is concerned with Hypothesis II. This hypothesis is related to. the 
direction, control, and evaluation of staff members by the principal. 
The low mean percentage of maximum weighting suggests that this form of 
contractual obligation occurs less frequently than those types listed 
under Hypothesis I. 
Table 3 
Total Weightings of All Cont~acts 
Hypo~hesis II 
Number af contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Act.ual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
M·ean weighting • • • • _ • . • • - • • • .. • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weightings • • • • • • 
81 
1458 
409 
0-18 
0-15 
5.1 
3.3 
28.3% 
1 I 
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Table 4 focuses on Hypothesis III. The propositions in this hYI=O-
thesis outline the role the principal plays in the educational programs 
of his building. The hypothesis received the lowest mean ~ercentnge of 
. rr.aY.imum vTeighting of the four in the study. Since this area is concerned 
~~th the educational program or· the school, the implications of these 
rrdnimal figures may suggest significant parameters of the principal's role. 
Table 4 
Total Weightings of All Contracts 
Hyeot~.esis III 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maxiw~ possible weighting •••••• •'• ••• 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range ••••••••••••• 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hean ?ercentap;e of maximum 'tvei~htine; 
81 
729 
144 
0-9 
0-9 
1.78 
0.8 
19.8% 
The role of organized principals in school district policy d.e-
velopment is the theme of Hypothesis IV. Table 5 outlines the weight-
ings related to. the propositipns in this hypothesis.. Again, the same "- · 
differences appear as have been noted in the first·f~r tables. 
Table 5 
Total Weightings of All Contracts 
Hypothesis IV 
Number of contracts •••••••••.•••••• 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • ~ • • • • 
Maximum possible range •••••• o •.••••• 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • . • • • • • • • .. • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
81 
1215" 
381 
0-15 
0-15 
4. 7 
3.9 
31.3% 
. ; 
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Reporting the same kinds of information as has been listed above 
by contracts from individual states allows for a number of comparisons. 
The re&'Ul ts of differ:i.og public employee bargaining legislation may be re-
fleeted in the significantly differing weighi;:ings. The history of public 
employee collective bargaining within a state may similarly be demon-
strated. The state's organization of school districts is a third possi-
bility. 
The agreements from five states have been used. The total of 
this group is less than all of the agreements used in the study because 
a number of states were represented by· so few contracts that they were 
considered negligible in terms of making comparisons. The states reported 
are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York. 
Appearing after the tables that report weightings from the states 
is another series that compares state totals. This series demonstrates 
that large differences do exist between the agreements of the various 
states. 
Table 6 
Connecticut Total Weightin~s 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
· Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
7 
567 
113 
0-81 
·4-29 
16.1 
13.5 
19.9% 
·r.· 
Table 7 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Na.-d.mum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • 
Actual we).ghting • • • • • • $ • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • ·• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • ·• • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of. maximurn "t<:eighting •••••• 
Table 8 
Connecticut. Hypothesis II 
N~mber of contracts • • • • • • • • • • ~ • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maxi~~ possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • ·• · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
. Median weighting • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • .• 
Mean percentage of maximum vreighting • • • • • • 
Tablt.:: '} 
Connecticut Hypothesis III 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • ... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting .••••••••••••••••• 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
Table 10 
Connecticut Hleothesis IV 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
7 
273 
76 
0-39 
4-19 
10.9 
10.0 
28.0% 
7 
126 
20 
0-18 
0- 9 
2.9 
2.5 
16.1% 
7 
63 
3 
0-9 
0-2 
0.43 
0.51 
4.8% 
7 
105 
14 
0-15 
0- 8 
2.0 
0.8 
13.3% 
92 
't· 
I ' 
1. 
I 
93 
As w-as the c::tse with the agreements from Connecticut., the Massa-
chuset'ts contracts uumber only seven. Because of the small number in-
volved generalities based on the co~~arisons that follow the analysis 
should be treated cautiously. 
Table 11 
Number of contracts • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
Table 12 
Massachusetts Hypothesis I 
:; ... uulh . .:.c u.£ c ou i,racts • • • • . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • _. • • • • • •. • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting ••••• •-• •••••••• 
Median wej_ghting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting •••••• 
Table 13 
Massachusetts HlPothesis II 
Number of contracts • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maxinru.m possible range • • .- • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range •· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage- of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
7 
567 
149 
0-81 
17-26 
21.3 
21.3. 
26.3% 
7 
273 
120 
0-39 
14-23 
17.1 
.15.0 
43.9% 
7 
126 
22 
0-18 
1- 7 
3.1 
3.4 
17.2% 
Table ll.s. 
~s~achusetts !L1:E?,.th-:;si~ .IX~ 
.Number of contracts • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • 
Maximu.rn possible lveighting .•. ~ • • • • • • • • • 
Actual •;.rei~hting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
:Haximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • 
Hedian weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
Table 1.5 
Massachusetts H~thesis IV 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hedian weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Nean percentage of maximum weighting •••••• 
7 
63 
3 
0-9 
0-2 
0.43 
0.64 
4.8% 
7 
10.5 
4 
0-1.5 
0- 4 
0 • .57 
0.49 
3.8% 
The eleven contracts from Michigan represent school districts 
9h 
with as few as three principals to the large Detroit school 5,Ystem. Led 
by the United Auto Workers, Hichigan has had a long history of labor col-
lective action. This history seems, in part, to be reflected in the 
state's school administrator. agreements~ 
Table 16 
Michigan Total Weighting~ 
• 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
l1ean weightinF, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • · • • • • • • • • • · • • • 
Mean percentage of maxinru.m \reighting • • . • • • • 
11 
891 
412 
0-81 
8-.56 
37.5 
39.0 
46.3% 
Table 17 
~<2~i~an HYJ?~~hesis I 
Number of contracts • • • • 6 • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Ac-tual weight.ing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • · • • 
Mean l-Teighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maxinrum l<Teighting • • • 
Table 18 
Mic~an HlPothesis II 
Number of contracts • . • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • . • • • 
Actual tveighting • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • . • 
Mean weighting • • • . . • • • . • • . 
Median weighting • • • • . • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • 
Table 19 
Michigan Hi::f>othesis III 
.. • • • • 
• • • • • 
.. • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • . 
• • • • • 
• . • • • 
Number of contracts • • • ./ • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean-percentage of maximum weighting •••••• 
Table 20 
. Michigan !,!;reothesis IV 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weigh·ting • • • •••••••• 
Actual weighting • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of ma.ximum weighting • • • • • • 
11 
429 
2h2 
0-39 
8-31 
22.0 
23.0 
56.4% 
11 
198 
76 
0-18 
0-12 
6.9 
7 .o. 
38.3% 
'11 
99 
39 
0-9 
0-9 
3.6 
3.0 
40.0% 
11 
165 
55 
0-15 
0-11 
5.0 
3.h 
33.3% 
::.: ... 
't' 
'I 
. I 
I. 
1. 
II 
II 1~1 
II 
!'!llj
1 
l 
!llliii 
tl.l 
'1·11"1' 
!l!,lli:l:l 
ill! 
l'il'l I' I 
,J•·i:l 
illl:l:ii!i 
Because of their clo::.1e proximity, it !Tk~y be possible th:1t the 
simH<Jr hreightings of both the New Jersey and the New York contracts are 
the re~ult of exchange of legislative and bargaining information bet\veen 
parties in both states. 
Table 21 
New J~rsey ~~ta~J:!!i~h~in~s 
Number of cont.racts • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Haxiinum possible weighting • • • • • • .. • • • • 
Actual weighting •.••••••••••••••• 
Maximum possible range • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • $ • • • • • • • • 
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hedian weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • 
1'1ean percentage of maximum weighting •••••• 
Table 22 
New Jersey Hypoth,.Psis I 
Number of COi!,JVl"'acts • • • • • e , • • • • • • • c 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actucl weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximwn weighting • • • • • • 
Table 23 
New Je~~e::r HyE,£t~eH~is n 
Number of contracts & • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • e • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible · range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • •. • • • • .. • 
Mea.n weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
l1edian weighting • • • .• • • • .. • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
9 
729 
235 
0-81 
6-34 
26.1 
30.5 
32.1% 
9 
351 
147 
0-39 
6-28 
16.3 
16.0 
41.8% 
9 
162 
33 
0-18 
0- 7 
3.7 
3.6 
20.5% 
Tablc-3 21~ 
New Jers:.~Jee£thesi~_III 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Max:i.nn.trn possible Heighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maxirmun possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 
.Hean wel.ghting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Median weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
Table 25 
New Jersey Hypothesis IV 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
l1aximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • $ • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
l1edian t-Teighting .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum weighting • • • • • • 
9 
81 
10 
0-9 
0-5 
1.1 
0.8 
12.2% 
9 
135 
45 
0-15 
0-13 
5.0 
1.5 
33.3% 
The largest number of agreements from one state in this study 
emanates from New York school districts. This frequency is the result 
97 
of a number of factors that include the state's history in public employee 
collective bargaining, state legislation, and the availability of these 
agreements at the offices of the National Association of Elementar,y School 
Principals. 
Table 26 
New York Total Wei~htin~ 
Number of contrac·ts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • - • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • ~ • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
' 1-iedian weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximum wei~hting • • • • • • 
39 
3159 
1174 
0-81 
1-64 
30.1 
38.0 
37 .J.% 
~l'able 27 
lieh-r :fork· H:YfH)~-hf·~sis I 
__ ,_,__ _ t-.... .--,.ffl",.._ ..... ___ _ 
Number of contracto o e • • • • ~ •••••••• 
Naxi.mum ro.ssible H8i£';hting • • ~ • • • .. • • • • 
Actu.al l>Ieighting • • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • 
Haxtmurn possible range • • • • • • • • • Q • • • 
Actual ranee • • • • • • • • • • • e • • • • • • 
:Hean weighting • • • • • • • • Q • ~ • • • • • • 
Median weighting .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of mo:xinn1m weight.:ing • • ~ • • • 
Table 28 
!_~t::..l?~YP~~ 
Number of contracts $ • e . • • • • • • 
Maxirrrum possible weigbt.ing • • • • • . Actual weighting • . .. • • • • • . .. . 
l-1aximum possible range • • • • . • • • Actual range • . .. • . • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • . • • • • • • • l1edian weight,ing • . • • • .. .. • • .. • Mean percentage of max~am weighting 
• 
New Yo_1:k Hypot~esis III 
Number of contracts • • • • • • • • • • 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• Maximum possible weighting 
• • • • • . ' . Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • Maximum possible range 
• • • • • • • • • Actual range 0 . • . • • • • • . • • • • Hean weighting • . • • • • • • • . . • • Median weighting . • • • 
" • • Mean percentage of maxinmm weighting 
• • 
Table 30 
New York HY£~the~is IV 
• • • . 
• • • 0 
• . • . 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • . 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • Q 
• • • • 
. • • • 
• • e • 
• • • • 
... • . 
• • • • 
Number of- contracts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible weighting • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Maximum possible range • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Actual range • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mean weighting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
- Hedian 1-reighting • • .. • _. • • • • ., • • • • • • 
Mean percentage of maximnm.~feighting. • ••••• 
39 
1521 
688 
0-39 
1-3.3 
17.6 
17.7 
45 .• 1% 
39 
702 
193 
0-18 
0-15 
5.0 
4.7 
27.8.% 
39 
351 
70 
0-9 
0-9 
1.8 
0.95 
20.0% 
39 
585 
223 
0-15 
0-15 
5.7 
6.8 
38.0% 
98 
~~ 
99 
As t·;as discus~;ed in the beginning of this chapter, the follot<Ting 
tables compare the s·Lates With each other and to the total group. In all 
cn.ses the total group o.f agreements is listed first follm·red by each 
c:- 8 t,ate group in the order of highest to lD'"t"lest weighting. Both the mean 
Hei6hting and the percentage of the maximum possible weighting are in-
eluded. 
Table 31 
Comoarison of State Groups on __ !otal We~f~~ting 
Stat,e 
Grouo 
...,_...._,.,. ~ i .. 
All contracts 
Michigan 
New York 
New Jersey 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut 
Co~arison 
State 
Group 
. . 
All contracts 
Michigan 
New York 
Massachusetts 
New Jersey 
Connecticut 
Mean Percentage of Maximum 
f ~:;,.f.h_t_.i_n .... g.._ __ P_. _os_s_i_b_l_~_vl_e_j.,.,..r£!._1t_i_n .... g..__ 
81 29.2 36.0 
11' 37.5 46.3 
39 30.1 37.1 
9 26.1 32.1 
7 21.3 26.3 
7 16.1 19.9 
Table 32 
of State Groups or:_ Hypothesis I 
Mean Percentage of Maximum 
f We~~ghting Possible Wei.gbting 
81 17.7 45.4 
11 22.0 56 .. 4 
39 17.6 45.1 
7 17.1 43.9 
9 16.3 41.8 
7 10~9 28.0 
Table 33 
Comparison bf State Groups ~~ypothesis II 
State 
Group 
All contracts 
Michi{;an 
New York 
New Jersey 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut 
f 
81 
11 
39 
9 
7 
7 
Mean 
WeifY,hting 
5.1 
6.9 
5.0 
3.7 
3.1 
2.9 
Percentage of Haxirrmm 
Possible Wei~hti~g _ 
28.3 
38.3 
27.8 
20.5 
17.2 
16.1 
State 
n :-;:-·nrnJ f \:tr?i£:b ' }1-0f;f)j h 1J~ ll<:it~h'Li.ny 
~-~--... ,.~-.. ,._.,.----,-·-··-~--.,.,~·-· .. ,. ---~-'·"-·~·¥:,., ....... __ ~-trr4 ... ___ .,._.,.,;.._ 
!1 ll contracts 
Hichigan 
_ Net;T York 
New Jersey 
Connectj_cut 
Hassachuset"ts 
81 
11 
39 
9 
7 
7 
1.8 
3.6 
1.8 
l.l 
0.4.3 
·0.43 
19.8 
l~o.o 
20.0 
12.2 
4.8 
4.8 
-------- ---~---------
Table 35 
State Mean Percent,age of Maximum 
QEE_u~p ______________ r __ .__~ghtln~ Possible ~1ej;e~.!E.L_ 
All contracts 81 4.7 31.3 
New York 39 5.7 38.0 
I"1ichigan 11 5.0 33.3 
New Jersey 9 5.0 33.3 
-Connecticut 7 2.0 13.3 
Massachusetts 7 0.57 3.8 
Wei~tine;s of Contractual Provisions Relat,ed to the Propositions 
The second w~jor set of tables deals with the frequency with 
10\J 
which each proposition appeared in the agreements. Although each propo-
sition has been assumed to be of equal importance, noting the frequenc~r 
of appearance allows for a more complete analysis. If a particular prop-
osition failed to be represented in the contracts at the ninety per cent 
level then it may be: concluded that organized principals have either 
failed to or don't want such a provision in their contracts. A con-
verse situation is equally plausi.ble. 
The tables reporting the occurrences of each proposition give a 
percentage figure of the total group. In some cases it may be noted that 
the sum of percentages for a particular proposition does not equal one 
lCl 
hundred~ 'I'his is the result of rounding each derived percentage to thr;; 
nearest whole number. 
Table 36 
Weiat~tings of _!!Jdi ~~Eroposi tions 
Propositi.on 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
All Contracts Hypoth~_:::2.s .I 
vleighting Weighting Heighting_ 
of 0 of 1 of 2 
1% 16% 20% 
13 25 23 
47 25 23 
52 14 11 
3 21 25 
18 0 5 
63 1 9 
93 1 0 
62 6 10 
11 37 19 
94 5 0 
38 10 6 
47 23 ·14 
Table 37 
All Contracts Hypothesis II 
65% 13% 15% 
62 13 9 
66 13 14 
21 25 24 
81 14 5 
37 29 21 
Table 38 
All. Contracts Hy2othesis TII 
6($ 
78 
69 
16% 
13 
18 
10.% 
5 
5 
f = 81. 
Vlei.ehting 
of .3 
62% 
29 
15 
23 
51 
77 
26 
5 
20 
34 
0 
42 
20 
8% 
16 
6 
29 
0 
13 
13% 
5 
6 
' 
II 
Vle.t'?:htin::~r::_'"; of Indiv:Ld.u_,Jl 'Prt)~;o:.::i~:.J.-::;nc.~ 
-·t·_,,.......,=---···"··----··"·~··---·"•' ,.,.,..,..,..., . ...._ ·~---~- .. --.,..,..~,-.,. ... ,.,_..,. 
f::;: 81 
Vletgt1tine ~'!ei£;hting l~Jeight :Lng '{:Jcir;bt.tnc~ 
!:£52£.:?!2~~2__._?\_C2__~,~----.££_]~-- ~___;;;£.._g~~·"·-·Y.:~,-.:L ··=-
23 3tl% 18% oct 35~& /I'> 2h 65 8 10 lB 25 L? 30 16 16 26 39 28 lh 19 
27 h8 29 lh 9 
---------...... -.... -
___ .. ._._ 
~ ...... ........_..,._.___....,...,.._ 
J \' ~' 
The next series of tables report the frequency h''ith 11:rhich et1ch 
propO!Jit.ion appeared grouped by state. The same group of stat.e3 is 
listed as 1rms Ut'led earlier in this chapter. lrJhere percentages uere 
used in 'the preceding four tables, the folloHing is reported by· ~;:c!Jua.l 
numbe>r~ Thts change in form has been used because of the srw:tll frequen-
cies in :wme cases. 
In the follmdng section of this chapter each proposition is con-
sidered in terms of the sample agreements from each state~ These groups 
are compared in terms of the percentages of each right that was found 
in the contracts at both the specific and implied levels of weight.ing. 
One set of percentages reported is the sum of the 2 and 3 weightings. 
This fig-ore has been used b~cause by definition a w·eighting of 2 or 3 
indicated that the subject covered by the proposition did appear as part 
of the contract and v:as not weighted on an 1riiplied basis. In some cases 
the sum of t,he implied and 2 plus 3 weightings is given 1<1bere the ftgure 
is significant. . This has occurred a number of timos because~ agreement.s 
from some of the st,ates had no specific lan;:;uage whatsoever about certai.n 
particular rights. 
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Table hO 
\<J'r:dr;ht.:trws of Individu.al Propositions 
--,._---....,ii.~--v...-...-. _ __., .,..,...,._ a 
Connecticut. Contracts 
-~-- f = 7 
!!;'!Pot~?,is I 
Prooositton 
; ..... il: 
Weighting Weighting \r.Jeighting 
of 0 of 1 of 2 
Weighting 
of 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1~ 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
0 
2 
5 
7 
1 
3 
6 
7 
6 
3 
7 
6 
5 
6 
7 
I 
7 
2 
7 
2 
1 
3 
2 
0 
l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
(j 
0 
0 
Hypothesis .II 
0 
0 
2 
0 
3 
!!zpothesis III 
7 0 
1 0 
5 2 
HyPothesis IV 
4 2 
7 0 5 . 0 
4 2 
5 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
" v 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
6 
6 
0 
0 
5 
4 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
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Hv.ssachu:-:etts Con't.racts f=7 
!tYP.£..~hps~s I 
iieightir:g Weighting vleighting .Weighting 
I''T·cpo~~it:l.cn of 0 of 1 o.f 2 of 3 -····"-··-·-·~·· _,,_...;.;;;:. ______ _..;..;...,._;;..,_ _ ~.....;;;..--__;;.;;;._:;.__ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
lli 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
0 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
3 
1 
7 
0 
6 
0 
3 
5 
5 
5 
0 
7 
4 
5 
1 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
1 
0 
3 
Hypothesis II 
2 
0 
2 
4 
0 
2 
HYPothesis TII 
5 0 
7 0 
7 0 
·5 
7 
6 
5 
5 
Hypothesis IV 
2 
0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
() 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
2 
0 
7 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
7 
1 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table 42 
~,!gh~inr~s of Individual ~repositions 
~g~~ Contracts f = 11 
!!lE~~he~!~ •. I 
Weighting We1ghting \<lei,ghting Weighting 
~~'!£:.9Etion of 0 of 1 of 2 of 3 
1 0 1 2 8 
2 2 2 1 6 
3 3 2 4 3 4 1 1 2 7 
5 0 4 0 7 6 0 0 0 11 
7 5 0 2 4 8 10 1 0 0 
9 3 2 2 4 10 1 1 1 8 
11 9 2 0 0 
12 3 0 0 8 
13 8 1 1 1 
Hypothesis II 
14 c 2 3 1 .; l!:> 3 1 1 6 
16 6, 2 2 1 
17 3 3 2 3 18 7 3 1 0 
19 5 1 5 0 
..,_ 
HlEothesis III 
''( 
20 3 3 2 3 21 , 4 2 3 2 
22 3 5 1 2 
Hleothesis IV 
23 3 0 0 8 
24 8 0 2 1 
25 6 2 2 1 
26 6 1 3 1 
27 6 2 2 1 
Table h3 
rleight.in s of Individur;l Proposttions 
.-.-:·~-- .... Wlo • • 
f:::: 9 
Hypothesis !_ 
Weighting Heighting 't<leighting . Weighting 
Proposi tio,!) of 0 of 1 of 2 of 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
,,, 
-· 15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
2~ 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
1 
1 
6 
8 
0 
0 
8 
9 
6 
1 
9 
3 
3 
0 , 
9 
9 
2 
5 
1 
0 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
4 
Hzyothesis I! 
c 
0 
0 
0 
2 
3 
Hypothesis III 
7 2 
9 0 
9 0 
·3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Hypothesis IV 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
0 
0 
6 
3 
0 
0 
2 
5 
0 
3 
2 
1"\ 
v 
0 
0 
4 
2 
3 
0 
0 
0 
2 
4 
3 
2 
3 
5 
2 
0 
0 
3 
6 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1"\ 
v 
0 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
·4 
3 
2 
3 
2 
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Table 4h. 
~~(;;qt.ines of ~.v;fdu.a.~_fropositions 
Ne1-r York Contracts £ = 39 
--
!k._ve_o'l:,hesis • .! 
Weighting Weighting vTei.ghting Weighting Pronosition of 0 o:f 1 of 2 o:f 3 _, 
--
'1 0 6 9 24 2 4 12 10 13 3 16 12 4 7 4 21 7 4 7 5 1 5 9 24 6 10 0 1 28 7 24 0 3 12 8 35 0 0 4 9 23 3 4 9 10 4 17 6 12 11 38 1 0 0 12 15 8 2 14 13 14 10 7 8 
Hypothesis n 
14 .... '"' , f. 'l G..? . 
... 15 25 6 4 4-16 25 5 7 '•2 17 9 10 8 12 18 33 5 1 0 19 15 13 4 .7 
'· Hl£Othesis nr 
'f 
20 22 8 3 6 21 31 7 0 2 22 27 6 2 3 
Hypo~hesis IV 
23 12 10 4 13 24 23 . 5 2 9 25 16 11 4 8 26 11 15 3 10 27 16 15 4 4 
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The first thirteen propositions are rt'3lated to HypothesiG :r:. 
These propositions have been reported in the order of those that had the 
highest weighting first (Propositions 1 and 6). 'l'he next group are those 
that had the lowest weighting (Propositions 11 and 8). The remaining 
propositions ~re then discussed based on the degree to which the weight-
ing tended toward the center or the range of weightings for that po.rticu-
lar set of propositions (Propositions 2, 10, 12, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, and 15). 
Proposition 1 - The principal may communicate with the board of education 
without the approval of an intermediary. 
Eighty-two per cent of the total sample contained a clause 
weighted to the 2 plus 3 level that gave organized principals the power 
to cow~nicate with the board of education without the permission of some 
officer such as the superintendent. In these cases the board was obli-
gat.ed legally to respond to this communication.· The sign5.ficcmce of 
this right seems to reside in the association's power to circumvent the 
superintendent's control of input to the board from administrative staff 
below that office. It has been assumed that most line and staff organiza-
tional charts control the channels of communication so that personnel at 
one level cannot bypass the level above them. This hierarchy seems to 
help each level monitor the groups below. 
Eighty-six per cent of the Connecticut agreements provided this 
right to that state's organized principals. In Massachusetts only twen~­
nine per cent of the contracts mentioned this right. Michigan agreements 
contained the right at the ninety-one per cent level. Eighty-nine per 
cent of the New Jersey group had negotiated the communication power into 
their agreements. The New York ag~eements had this contractual language 
in eighty-five per .cent. of .the sample. 
"l, • 
10? 
proposition 6 - The principal has a. grievance procedure agreed to by his 
association and the board of educat.ion -r:ith wrhtch be ca.n 
solve his professional problems. 
A grievance procedure included in the contract was represented in 
eighty-tw·o per cent of the sample. It is important to note that the 
grievance procedures to which. this refers are for ad~inistrators and are 
not the exclusive tools of teachers. A grievance procedure allrr,-s the 
employee at one level to challenge the actions and/or decisions of supe-
riors on matters related to the negotiated agreement. 
Only fiftY:-seven per cent of the Connecticut group contained a 
grievance procedure. One hundred per cent of the Masachusetts contracts 
included grievance language. Michigan and New Jersey, also, reached the 
total maxirm.un of one hundred per cent. Seventy-five per cent of the New 
York contracts had a grievance procedure. 
\ 
Propositum .L.i. - The principal is consulted about evaluation procedures 
concerning his position and effectiveness. 
Proposition 11 focused on the organized principals' right to be 
consulted about evaluation procedures for his position. Although this 
provision was implied in five per cent or the group, the remainder made 
no mention of such a right. Apparently, boards of education have not 
given up or even slightly abridged their management prerogatives on one 
very basic issue. 
The Connecticut ~nd New Jersey agreements made no mention or im-
plication of the right to be consulted about evaluation procedures in any 
way. Implie<Lrights were discovered in the Massachusetts, Michigan, and 
New York contracts. Michigan had the highest percentage of an implied 
right (eighteen per cent) of all the states represented. 
J::.c 
proposition 8 - The principal has acad0:nic freedor:l~ 
Proposition 8 centered on the right to aca.d.emtc freednm. Thb 
right appeared in only five per cent of the total onreple bas2d on ·~·reighi:-· 
ing The remainder had no clause in th:is area. In J.lc;v- York academic ~· 
freedom seems to have been an issue based on its appearance in the sample, 
h'hy this issue had not been expressed as a need by.principals in other 
states may be another comment on role expectation. 
The Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey agreements had no 
contractual language about academic freedom. One Michigan contract im-
plied this right. _In New York approximately eleven per cent of the agree-
ments had a specific clause about academic freedom. 
Proposition 2 - The principal contributes to any modification of his job 
description. 
A total of five of the thirteen proposition::; rnlating/to Hypothe-
sis I received approximately fifty per cent weightings at the 2 or 3 
level. In addition to the three mentioned earlier, the agreements showed 
that sixty-two per cent of the sample had claus~s that referred to the 
principal's right to contribute to any modification of his job descrip-
tion. Only thirteen per cent of the sample had either no ciause or no· 
implication of such a right included within the contract. On a quantita.;. 
tive basis the right to be involved with the school board in modifying 
the principal job description may be considered com.."llon ·for organized 
principals. Most organized principals have the legal right to direct 
input about their work parameters. 
Specific contractual lenguage in the agreements concerning job 
modification ranged by state as follows: Connecticut (twenty-nine per 
cent), New York (fifty-nine per cent), Michigan (sixty-three per cent), 
JJ.l 
NeH· Jersey (sixty-seven per cent), and Has sachu . .s.:;d:;!is ( eighty··Bix per ccx~ t.) • 
. Language in the contracts that implied thia rir:;ht was commonl.y surfaced. 
Nassachusetts agreements reached the fourteen per cent level. New Jer::cy 
andNew York were twenty-tlm per cent and thirty per cent, respectivel:r. 
Finally, Connecticut reported forty-three per cent. 
Proposition 10 - The principal has the right to hold outside em_oloymr;;r;t 
that does not interfere with school district duties. 
Just over half of the agreements stated in one way or another 
that the principal did have the right to be employed in some other job 
area with the stipulation tl1at such activities would not interfere witb 
duties and obligations to the school district. Does this suggest that 
principals do not consider their role to be a total commitment? Does 
this mean that principals have demonstrated a felt need for job protec-
tion? Or~ is the provision an example of' a ~ttm,st.ton whP:r~ e!llpJ "Y""<?!'I 
have seen that the contract's definition of rights and responsibilities 
has necessitated that they have the legal right not to be tied totally 
to the district? 
The lowest.percentage of appearance of the outside. employment 
right in the agreements by state was found in the Connecticut group that 
reached only fourteen per cent. Forty-three per cent of the agreements, 
however, from this state did imply the right. In the Michigan gro-q.p the 
• 
right was specifically listed in eighty-one per cent of the contracts. 
Nine per cent implied the right. Massachusetts, Naw Jersey, and New York 
had similar percentages concerning this right. They. were, in the same 
order, .forty-three per cent, fifty-six per cent, and forty-eight per 
cent. Fifty-seven per. cent of the Massachusetts contracts implied the 
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ri.r~ht,. '.Ch(~ Ne1,:r Jersey and Nev-r York groups implied the right· at the thirty-
ttrr:cu [Y:r cent and forty-two r.~~n~ cent levels. 
rrop0:::Hion 12 - The principal has the right to attend conferences, work-
shops, and other meetings designed to improve his educa-
tional abilities. 
Nearly one-half of the samp~e agreements included the right out-
li.ned by Proposit.ion 12. Attendance at professional association meetings 
hns been a common part of the administrators' role. Therefore, it is 
not significant that the right should appear in the organized principals' 
contracts. ~owever, the influence of state and national associations 
upon local ad.'llinistrative f"Ole expectations has the potential t"o in-
crease because of the use of the negotiation process by principals. 
The range bErtween the various state contracts represented in the 
sample was quite wide.. Only fourteen per cent of the Connecticut con ... 
t:-.::.~t::; ~:;;:t~ii.~od thu :i.:·ight i.u a.:.tewiauce at conventJ.ons and nther meet-
.. 
ings.. .-On the other end of the continuum one hundred per cent o£ the 
Massachusetts agreements did have this right. New York, New Jersey, and 
Michigan were in the center reporting forty-one per cent, sixty-seven 
per cent, and seventy-three per cent, respectively. 
Proposition 3 - The principal consults with the board of education on pro-
cedures for the dismissal or promotion of his peers. 
Twenty-eight per cent of the ~ample represented principais who 
have the contractual right to be consulted about the dismissal or promo-
tion of their colleagues within the district: In anoth~r twenty-five 
per cent o£ the group this right was implied. In other words, a'majority 
of the principals represented have managed to obtain such a clause or 
implication of this right in.their contracts. 
~. . 
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Again, the state from which a particular contract was negoti.at~d 
seemed to play an in;>ortant role in the inclusion of the right to consult 
on dinmissal and promotion policies for administrators. None of the 
agreements from Connecticut or New Jersey had any specific language_ on 
this subject. The right was. in;>lieq., however, at the· tw-renty-seven per 
cent level in Connecticut contracts and at the thirty-three per cent 
level in the New Jersey ~reements. Sixty-four per cent of the Michigan 
agreements did list this administrative right. It was implied in another 
eighteen per cent.' Fourteen per. cent of the Massachusetts group and 
twenty-eight per cent of the New York sample listed the right~ In the 
former the right was implied in twenty-seven per cent and in the latter, 
thirty-one per cent. 
Proposition 4 - The principal has the first opportunity to apply for 
nmd.y open adrr.inistra~i<:c position::; w.'ithin the c!istricf.. 
~ ' ~- Proposition 4 is closely related to Proposition 3. The right 
gives the "inside" employees an advantage over applicants who are not 
members of the district's staff. Thirty-four per cent Of the sample 
had contractual _language at the 2 or 3 weighted level giving current 
employees this advantage. Finding an item of this nature in negotiated 
agreements r~ises the question of why? Is it a common practice for 
boards to search for administrative candidates ·outside of the district? 
Are administrative assoqiations demonstrating a protection and advan-
tage for local members by negotiating this opportunity for the member-
ship? These questions represent two possibilities and clearly shaw that 
bargaining by administrators is a subject in.need of more and detailed 
study than it has received.in the past. 
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Eight;y-one per cent of the J·1ichigan administrative associations 
had negotiated this right into their agreements. On the other end of tr~ 
continuum based on state location of the agreement neither Connecticut 
nor ur~w Jersey had any lenguage focused on this right. Seventy-one per 
cent of the Massachusetts agreements contained the right while only 
tH·Emty-eight per cent of the New York group did. The right was implied 
in the .t.Uchigan (nine per cent), New Jersey (eleven per cent), and New 
York (eighteen per cent) agreements. In the Connecticut and Massachusetts 
sample no imp.lication was located. 
Proposition 7 - The principal is provided with legal counsel and all 
necessary assistance resulting from charges of libel, 
slander, and/or negligence incurred while performing 
his administrative duties. 
Thirty-five per cent of the sample agreements.contained language 
! 
right to protection from legal action may represent a felt need for job 
security. It appears to imply an increased use of the courts by the 
public in dealing with the school. Finally, the question of judicial 
review of administrative action seems to be implied if it is assumed 
that the right to legal protection has emanated from a perceived need. 
Massachusetts agreements led the states with a fifty-eight per 
cent report. Fifty-five per cent of the Michigan contracts included the 
right to legal help. Interestingly, none of the New Jersey documents 
made any specific re£erence to this right. Thirty-eight pel:' cent of the 
New York group had the right while only fourteen percent of the Connecti-
cut sample contained th:J.s protection. 
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propo~·itim'l 9 - The principal may use school facilities, equipment~, and 
time to conduct the business of his association. 
AlthCIUgh more than three-~fourths of the agreements stated t.hD:t 
principals 'b..ad the right to deal coll~ctively ld th their problems :wd 
employers, only thirty per cent of the maxlmu .. rn possible weighting was 
attained concerning association use of district facilities and/or prin-
cipal time. None of the Massachusetts contracts stated this right or 
implied it in any way. On the other hand, the Michigan group had fifty-
five per cent stating the right specifically and another eighteen per 
cent implying'it. Connecticut (fourteen per cent), New Jersey (thirty-
three per cent), and New York {thirty-three per cent) all had some con-
tracts that focused on this right. 
Proposition 1.3 - The principal receives all the rights and opportunities 
given to the teachers through their contract and these 
are not abridged b:v his ~osition or bare;a:in'ine; ~grA!P-
,-ment. · 
One-third of ·.the organized principals had their benefits and 
rights attached to teachers by contractual.provision. Considering indi-
vidual states the range was as follows: Massachusetts (fourteen per 
cent), Connecticut (twenty-three per cent), Michigan (eighteen per cent), 
New Jersey (tt~nty-two per cent), and New York (thirty-eight per cent). 
In the·Connecticut sample none of the agreements implied this right 
while forty-four per cent b£ the New Jersey group did have the implica-
tion. 
Proposition 5 - The principal may deal with his problems collectively 
without the approval of higher authorities and without 
fear of personal reprisal. 
Every state's set at contracts reported a high percentage of ap-
pearance concerning this right. New Jersey was highest with every con-
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tract giving the.protectioo to administrators. Mic;higan was the lowest 
reporting sixty-three per cent. Both Connecticut and J.iassachusetts had 
the right included at·the seventy-two per cent level. Eighty-four per 
cent of the New York contracts contained the topic as a right. for organ= 
ized principals. 
Considering all of the agreements and the total weightings for 
all contractual rights, it must be concluded that organized principals 
do not harre sufficient power to be in control of their professional 
destinies. Many of the agr~ements contained few rights other than the 
power to deal collectitrelyMith the board of educatione With the excep-
tion of the Micbi.gan sample, none of the other states represented con-
tained sufficient amaung of language to raach the fifty per cent weight-
> ing level. Theref6re, Hypotnasis I is rejected. 
_~The second hypothesis attempted to determine to what degree organized 
principals did have assignment and transfer rights or power over teach-
ers. As a corollary to this, one of the propositions dealt With the 
organized principals' legal authority to be consulted about the modifi-
cation or elimination of any position within his attendance center. In 
conjtinction with these powers the right to be consulted about building 
use or modification was another proposition .. 
Proposition 17 - The principal takes part in the modification or elimina-
~ion of any-job description of positions within his 
building. 
Of the six propositions related to Hypothesis II the right to 
take part in the modification or elimination of job descriptions appeared 
most frequently in the sample. On~ twenty-one per cent of the total 
"L . 
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group of cont,racts d.'"ld not contain a cL~USB in tihis area or implic:-~tion 
of the right expressed through general languttge. Contracts .:from the fivs 
st.ates represented in t.l'1<3 study reported very similar percentages. Con-
sidering spaci.:fic language, New Jerney 1s group reached the seventy-eight 
per cent level while Connecticut lv"a.S lowest at forty-three P.er cent. 
Hen-rever, if both specific language and implied rights are totaled the 
range was as .:follows: Hassachusetts (one hundred per cent), New Jersey 
(seventy-eight per ,cent), !letv York (seventy;...sfr per cent), }iichigan 
(seventy-two per cent), and Connecticut (seventy-two_per cent) • 
. I 
Proposition 18 - The principal approves the use of his building•s facili-
t~es by outside groups. 
This right received the least attention on a quantitative basis 
of anv related to Hypothesis II in the sample. Only i'ive per cent o£' _ 
.J .. 
Both Connecticut and Massachusetts had no language or implication of the 
· right in any of their agreements. Twenty-two per cent of the New Jersey 
contracts gave the right to principals while the New York and Michigan 
samples recorded only three per cent and nine per cent, respectively. In 
terms of an implied right, Michigan led the states with twenty-eight pe:-
cent, New Jersey's sample reached the twenty-two per cent level, and New 
York's group thirteen per cent. 
Proposition 19 - The principal is consulted about an,y modification o£' 
his building. 
The right to consult with the board about modifications of the 
building was the second most occurring power of those related to Hypoth-
esis II. Examining the sum of specific and implied rights in this area, 
all but one of the states 1 contracta had such lt1nguage above the fifty 
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clW~'::l this r:Lght .c1s the sum. of spce:l..?ie and implied language. The other 
siX [A'-r cent), H:i.c~ligan (f.:i.ft.y-four per cent), and Massachusetts (forty-
two por cent)~ 
Prop<x-::it.ion 15 - The prin.c:Lpal a.ssigr:•:J per::>onnel to speei.fic positions 
Yithin his building. 
I 
Propositions 14, 15, and 16 all deal with teacher assignment and 
transfer questions. The amount of contractual language and'concurrent 
right3 for principals in these areas was nearly equal in terms of the 
three propositions. Twenty-five per cent of the total sample contained. 
specific language giving the right to assign personnel within the build-
ing to the principal. However, the range on this proposition in terms 
of individual state agreements ~as quits wide. Neither Connecticut nor 
New Jersey had any provisions for this right in their agree~ents. On 
the other hand, sixty-four per cent of the Michigan contracts contained 
specific language. New York and Massachusetts docu.'llents were twenty-one 
per cent and twenty-nine per cent. The Naw Jersey and Connecticut 
samples had no language on this topic. At the opposite end of the con-
tinuum the Michigan contracts had the most specific and implied language 
recording the right at the seventy-three per cent level • 
• 
Proposition 14 - The principal ~nterv.iews and approves of personnel for 
·his building. ', 
Twenty-two per cent of the total sample contained language giving 
principals rights in the interview-approval of personnel area. Again, 
the range between individual states was quite large. New Jersey organ-
ized principals had no such_ .. r:ights on either a specific or an implied 
The hich end of this range war> represented by Hlehigan where 
.fifty-four per cent of the administrat;ors had negotiated this right into 
t.hoir contractse No I>!assachuse·tits agreement specified this right, but it 
was i1nplied at; the twenty-nine per cent level. Twent:y-three per cent of · 
the Nm~ York sample contained specific language while another twelve per 
cent had t.hf~ right implied. Finally, fourteen per cent of the C onnecti-
cut organi~ed principals had the specific right. 
Proposition 16 - The principal approves of transfers of personnel from . 
his building to another in the district. 
One out of five co~yracts in the total sample g~ve the right to 
approve transfers of teachers to principals. Those states represented 
by the fm~est agreements in this stu~~ had the least contractual power 
for principals while those that h~d the highest number of contracts 
also ha.d the right to approve teacher transfers at the highest level. 
Twenty~seven per cent of the Michigan group gave the transfer approval 
right to organized principals. Twenty-thrde per cent of the New York 
I 
set had similar language. At the low end of the group it was noted that 
no specific language about thLs right could be located in the Connecti-
cut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts agreements. The right was implied in 
twenty-nine per cent of the Massachusetts sample. Both Connecticut and 
New Jersey contracts had no - implication o£ the right. The sum of im-
plied. and specific language about this right reached the forty-five per 
cent level in_ the Michigan set. 
Comparison of data from the various states points to large dif-
ferences based on locality. For example, none o£ the New Jersey agree-
menta bad any language focused on the interviewing, approval, assignment, 
and transfer of personnel. The Michigan organized principals represented 
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an opposite to the New Jersey group. Nearly three-fourths of the formor 
had the right to assign personnel ~Tithi.n the building and approxinm.b;ly 
one-half could both interview and approve o:f teachers i'or the build:L~1g. 
The approval of trans:fers based on teacher request was also at the fift,y 
per cent level. New York administrators were also weli represented in 
the pers::mnel assignment area. More than one-third of' these principals 
had ner;otiated implied or specific r:ights in the area. 
Some Massachusetts principals (twent.y-nine per cent) could assign 
. ·teachers l-.'i.thin the building. Interestingly, these same principals had 
no specific right to approve/ either personnel for the building or trans-
fers of those already assigned to the school. Connecticut organiz~d 
principals had few rights in the assignment o:f personnel based upon their 
contracts. Fourteen per cent were involved with the interviewing a;1d 
~r!"l,...mr;:;l n'f t.P::tchAr!=: for the buildine ~ but. none had specific or imolied 
rights to assign teachers or approve of transfers· from the building. 
Of the six propositions comprising Hypothesis II, the Michigan 
organized principals had the most rights at the highest percentages of 
the five states considered. In five of the six areas examined these ad-
ministrators had the rights under consideration at the fifty per cent 
level or higher. The New York administrators were well represented, 
there being no area where at least one-third of the group did not have 
the right expressed in the propositions. 
Hypothesis III was tested with only three propositions. The· area 
under investigation was the organized principals' power in the legal sense 
to play the role ot educational leader. The areas o£ curriculum develop-
ment, research, innovation, and instructional methods have been the topics 
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proposition 20 - Th8 pr:lncip.'11 c;:'ntributcz ar.·d app:;.•oifes of curr:i.cnlum 
dev-(;lC{}!iwnt i<Y::Lthin his b't!ild:i.ng. 
Two states' s,:;.~,,ple agre~r:::nnts were 0~-;;:ceptiono.l because of the ab .. 
sence or any language, spec;ific or iffiplicd_., about curriculum and instruc-
tirm. Both 'the Connectieut and Ne;,; Jersey contracts were void on these 
topics. Forty-five per cent of the l-1ichigan contracts contained speci£ic 
language relating to Proposition 20 and another twenty-seven per cent im-
plied a right to cootribut_e"to and control curriculum development. Thts 
total of seventy-two pel' cent 'V."ff.s by far the h:i.ghest of any of the sta·~es7· 
New York was second reporting twenty-three per cent at the specific level 
and twenty per cent implie~. Finally, the Massachusetts agreements reached 
( 
outlined no specific right for principals in curriculum development, the 
authority was implied in twenty-two per cent of that set. 
Proposition 21 - The principal may innovate. within his b1rl.lding. 
Three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and ~ew Jersey, con-
• 
tain~4 no language, specific or implied, that woul~ suggest that these 
organized principals had any rights in the area or innovation. Innovation 
is a label with many definitions but one that could use the support of a 
bargained contract. Principals with this legal support might be able to 
.,_ 
face reactionar,y opinion more effectively where they have tried to in-
novate. Only five per cent or the New York agreements focused specific 
language on this right and another eighteen per cent implied that the 
building administrator had the power. Michigan was exceptional, by com-
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p<lrL:~on, thc:ro being forty-five per cent of the st.l:.rte 1s contracts o~.ltlin» 
ir:g the specH'ic right nnd another eight,een per cent implying it& This 
t.otal of slxt.y-three per cent gave the }iichi.gan organizod principaln "'n 
averc.:ge cont·ract that. had a dimension not av.:tilable to principals from 
the other si•ates represented. 
prc•positicn 22 - The principal is free to do research in curriculum nnd 
instructional methods within his building. 
Although the Connecticut group did have implied language at the 
twent;y-eight per cent level concerning the right to do research, tqis 
state plus Massachusetts and New Jersey were devoid of specific language 
on the topic. This was the same sit.uation as was discovered concerning 
Proposition 21. Michigan agreements, again, had the highest percezrtage 
indicating that the organized principals from that state were signifi-
cantly different in terms a.f their negctiated agreernent.s., Twent:v-seven 
/ 
·' . 
per cent of the Michigan contracts had specific language· on the .subject 
) 
and forty-five per cent implied the right. The New York sample reached 
thirteen per cent at the specific level and fifteen per cent based on 
implication. 
Hypothesis IV tested the degree .to which organized principals 
contribute to,policy development. The right and responsibility to con-
sult with the board and/or superintendent about calendar, budget, and 
' 
the development of n'ew f.;tcilities all were included under this hypothesis 
as propositions. rn addition to these topics the degree to which organ-
ized principals took part in negotiations between the board and other 
employee groups was examined. Another ri~t investigated was the princi-
pals' access to board minutes, financial data, and other pertinent infov-
mation about the school district. 
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23 ... 'rhe princ:i.pal has acee::w to agenda and minutss of board 
meetinp;s, trea&"U.rers 1 re::>orts, census data, and other 
pertinent d<{ta about the school district. 
Of tl'1e propositd.on~ that made U;:> Hypothesis IV this topic re-
cei the heaviest weighting amounting to forty-four per cent of the 
ma1:i::.ii1'1.~ Exam.:tning the statcs_1 sets about the percentagei o.f each group's 
contr-::v.::ts that had language on the topi.c of agenda. and board meeting 
mit1't~.tcs, the }1ichigan collection was highest with seventy-two per cent. 
si.xt.y-.. si x per cent of the New Jersey agreerr.ents gave this specific right 
to orgcnized principals while the New York group registl?red only forty-
three per cent. Fourteen per cent of the Connecticut contracts had 
specific language on this right. The Massachusetts set was void of 
any specific provisions and/or clauses relating to the rights expressed 
in Proposition 2). This lack of contractual authority on polic.y develop-
.-
ree~t vm~ very con::;istent 1v"ithir4 the 1·1&ssachusetta set as none o£ the 
prepositions were represente~ at a 2 or 3 weighting level in any of 
that state's agreements. 
Although the Michigan and New York groups had the highest per-
centage o£ agreements containing specific contractual language none was 
implied in any of those documents. These were the only two states that 
demonstrated this characteristic. .Apparently, either the topic was 
negotiated and included as a provision or the right to access to board 
• 
materials was not within the scope clause.. Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and New York agreements all had more tpan twenty per cent of the sample 
' 
agreements with implied rights in this area. 
f·J:oponi.ti.c·~l ~6 - 'l'he princ:lpul t::::·kes part in i;be development of the 
t·whool calenda:c. 
Tho organized principals 1 agrGements 1srere weighted as a total 
group at· thirt,y-six per cent~ of the possible ma..~imu.me In terms of the 
J 
percentage of agreements from a particular st.ate containing language on 
the right to input on calendar New Jersey principals had the ma.xirrrJ.m 
score at fifty-five per cent. Another tt-renty-two per cent of these 
contracts had the right ~aggested in some ~)lied form. Michigan and 
Ne~1 York agreements were next in order at thirt.y-six alld thirty-three 
I 
per cent, respectively. 1'he Connecticut group ,had only fourteen per . 
~ : ' 
cent represented on the right listed in Proposition_ 26. Again, Hassa-
chusetts contracts had no specific language whatsoever giving organized 
principals from tr.at state the right to consult on development of the 
district calendar$ However, approximately twenty-eight per cent of the 
Massachusetts agreements did imply the power in a general way. All o~ 
the other states' agreements had implied language rangi.ng .from nine to 
thirty-eight per cent of the group. See Tables 40 to 44 for the specific 
number of contracts represented. 
Proposition 25 - The principal takes part in the development of the school 
district budget. 
Thirty-two per cent of the maximum possible weighting was achieved 
by the organized princ~pals 1 agreements on the right to help develop the 
district budget~ The New Jersey sample had fifty-five per cent of its 
contracts containing this specific right. This state's sample was quite 
consistent in te1~s of policy-making rights for organized principals. A 
second comment on consistency evolves from the fact that the New York anC. 
Michigan rights were represented on Proposition 25 at almost the same level 
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as t,hey vJ€!re on Proposition 26. Thirty-one per cent of the Nerr York 
agreements included this right ar.ld 'b.renty-seven per cent surfaced from 
the Hichigan set.. Connecticut had twenty-eight per cent. Massachusetts, 
again, included no specific langu.age on this topic in any o.f i.ts agrse-
ments.. T!>;enty-eight per cent of the New Yot~<: collection had the right 
implied. The other states were rated as follows: New Jersey (twenty-
two per cent), Michigan (eighteen per cent), Massachusett,s (fourteen per 
cent}, and Connecticut (zero per cent). 
Proposition 24 - The principal takes part in negotiations between sub-
ordinates and the board of education~ 
In both the Connecticut and Massachusetts contracts the right 
and ~esponsibility to take part in negotiations between teachers and the 
board was not specifically given or implied for any of the organized 
principals. The situat.ion was Quite t;he opposite in the New Jersey sam!JlF!. 
Sixty-six per cent of these agreements had the right included as a spe-
cific provision. The New York and Michigan group were twenty-eight and 
twenty-seven per cent. No rights were implied in the New Jersey and 
' 
Michigan samples. Thirteen per cent were implied in the New York con-
tracts. 
Proposition 27 - The principal takes part in the planning and development 
of new school facilities in the district. 
The total sample. was weighted at only one-fourth of the amount 
poss~ble. Two states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, contributed signi-
ficantly to this low weighting. No Massachusetts contract had this right 
included in any agreement at the specifi.c level.. Only fourteen per cent 
of the Con·necticut cont.racts mentioned it in a. provision or clause. 
Seventy-t-l'lo per c~nt. of the Michigan contracts did give this right in a 
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specific n;..::unncr to tho organized principals from that state. Si:cty ... s:Lx 
per cent of the New Jersey organized principals had the right :L'1 their 
contracts <:md forty-·bhree per cent of the New York collection had specific 
l.r:nguage on the topic. 
The state from which a particular contract originated had a signi-
fiGant impact upon the percentage of contractual language that was focused 
on any one of the propositions. The specific percentage by proposition 
for each state was reported above. The next section reports the mean per-
centages on the total number of propositions related to each hypothesis 
for each state. I 
Izypothesis I - Organized principals have the pmier to shape their cwn 
professional destinies. 
,. 
Table 45 
Related to HypotheEis I bl State 
Michigan 
Massachusetts 
New York 
New.Jersey 
Connecticut 
56.4% 
45.1 
43.0 
41.0 
24.8 
Propositions 1 to 13 were related to Hypothesis I. Michigan 
agreements led the states represented on the mean percentage of language 
contained for all of the thirteen propositions. Fifty-six and four-tenths 
per cent was the mean percentage figure for the Michigan contracts. 
Stated indifferent terms this means that slight~ more than one-half of 
the Michigan contracts had specific language focused on the thirteen 
propositions under Hypothesis I on an average basis. The state group 
with the lowest average percentage was Connecticut with twenty-four and 
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NeH York (forty-three per co!lt), and New ,Jersey (forty-one per cent.) were 
in tl>:; center of the continuum and quite silrdlar on the average basis. 
· Slightly more than one-half of the Michigan organized principals 
had the contr~ctun.l pfJ"rlc::r to clnim that .they could control their profes-
sional destinies. L-ess than one-fourth cf the Connecticut organized 
principals <?Ould make that claim. As a total group, the organized prin-
cipals represent.ed in this study could not cL'lim that they had control 
by means of a nego~~_i.ated contract over their professional destinies. 
I' 
Hypothesis II - Organized p1~ncipals have the power to direct and evalu-
ate personnel rrlthin their attendance centers. 
Table 46 
Mean Percentages of All Propositions 
Related to Hypothesis II by Stat.~ 
,.. l.fichigan 
New Jersey 
New York 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut 
37.0% 
25.8 
24.8 
14.3 
ll.B 
.The Michigan organized principals achieved the highest mean per-
centage or language on propositions related to Hypothesis II at thirty-
seven per cent. Again, the Connecticut group was lowest with eleven and 
eight-tenths per cent. As stated in Table 46 above, the other three 
states were New Jersey (twenty-five and eight-tenths per cent), New York 
' ' (twenty-four and eight-tenths per cent), and Massachusetts (fourteen and 
three-tenths per cent). No group of organized principals from any of the 
states represented could- claim to have the power to direct and evaluate 
personnel within their attendance centers. 
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~:~5.~3 III - Orc.~~n1~:f)d rJr:i.~·~·.:d.c~;.1ls 11<-t<t;e ·t!Je pot¥er t:rJ r.)J~t-i.Y a rr~'ljor ro1.e 
in educ~:~t.tc;·;.£1 progrn<''!.> of th-?ir buildingr:., 
Hc.9.n Percentar<e~~ of All Prop0::::i.tions 
---.--.......,.......~ .. .,., . .;:,.·.~·-·----.... _..~,~~-·· .... --...no 
Hi chi:;; an 
New York 
:t1assnctrusetts 
Neu Jer:'3ey 
C onnectic-llt 
39.0% 
13.6 
9o) 
o.o 
o.o 
Only three propositions were developed to test Hypothesis III. 
At thirty-nine per cent, the Michigan organized principals were, again, 
the group with the largest amount of contractual language focused on the 
propositions. Two states had no language of any type that gave organized 
principals any of the rights related to Hypothesis III: New Jersey and 
per cent average figtxre while those from Massachusetts had only nine and 
three-tenths per cent. 
It is diffi~~lt to see how any of the organized principals could 
play a major role as educational leaders within their buildings based. 
on the contractual ~uthority they have negotiated. This area received 
the least attention of all those considered in this study. 
Hypothesis IV 
- Organized principals have the power to contribute to 
school district p.olicy development. 
Table 48 
Mean Percentages of All Pro~ositi~n~ 
R~la~d to HlEothesis IV by State 
.. 
New Jersey 
Michigan 
New York 
Connecticut 
Massachusetts 
59.4% 
37.8 
31.2 
14.0 
o.o 
I'hre prcposit;icns were included 11t1d•::or Hypnthesi.s IY.. 'l'rw range 
of a vorage percent.ages on contractual l~ns"Uage was greatest under the 
last hypothesis. The range was fj_fty ... nine and four~tenbhs per cent of 
the New Jersey contracts as compared to zero average percentage for tbe 
Nassachusetts group. The liichigan contracts had been the'. group that 
achi.eved the highest average percentage figure on Hypotheses I, II, and 
III.. On Hypothesis IV. the Mic:higan figure r.ras thirty-seven and eight-
tenths per cent. 
Table 49 
Mean Percenta<?es of All Prooositions 
. ~ -- ~~ ... Ill - ... 
Related to Al~ses by State 
Michigan 
New York 
·New Jersey 
J-.1assachusetts 
C c:1nc=::ticu t 
46.9% 
33•5 
32.8 
25 .. 9 
17 cl 
The list of averages by state for all four hypotheses and the 
twenty-seven propositions making up this study is reported above in 
Table 49. The Michigan agreements led all of the other states. The 
mean for Michigan was forty-six and nine-tenths per cent. This is nearly 
. one-hall' and suggt:tsts that the Michigan organized principals have bar-
gained.'a series Cit contracts that almost gives them the powers listed 
under the four hypotheses-. The Michigan group led all the states con-
cerning Hypot.heses I, II, and III. 
The Connecticut group had the lowest overall average percentage. 
Seventeen and one-tenth per cent was the total derived. The Connecticut 
contracts, therefore, were significantly low and contributed greatly to 
the rejection of the hypotheses. 
,; 
CHAPTER V 
CONCWSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The right of public employees to deal collectively with an elected 
board is the primary underlying assumption of this entire study. The sig-
nificance or this right probably cannot be over-emphasized. In New York 
the right of administrators and supervisors to use this means has not been 
decided in aQY ultimate sense and the controversy continues.1 New York 
boards or education have consistently and regularly argued that adminis-
trators do not fall ~der the parameters of the Taylor law and, therefore, 
pect that board petitions to PERB will continue to support this position. 
The importance of the right to collective action seems, in part, 
to emanate from the areas or protection, job security, and the power de-
rived from unified action. Protection of administrators is not a new 
topic to administra~ive associations. The Illinois Elementary and Second-
ary School Principals' Association statement outlines this concern: 
"Our educational arena is filled with conflict, but we are never-
theless expected to function effectively. In the course of this 
functioning it is conceivable that a principal might find himself 
in a situation of distress and in need of resources unavailable to a 
single individual. There have been sitttations when members have be€n 
treated unfairly. On such occasions the individual member has a 
lslotkin, Aaron N., "Are School Adm:inistrators Management?" 
Sasoc News, School Administrators and Supervisors Organizing Committee, 
AFL-cro, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October, 1973), p. l. 
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right to expect immediate and rigorous support from his professional 
association. The significance of the problem ~ extend to other 
principals •••• u2 
Principals, as have many other groups in American society, have concluded 
that they must stand together to fulfill this need for protection. And, . 
collective action seems to be one of the most effective ways to meet this 
need. 
A negotiated contract represents the legal, formal power or a 
particular trade or professional association. The unionization of pro-
fessional employees is not . the contradiction it appears to be based on 
what has happened-in the last twenty-five years.3 A master contract 
gives power and simultaneously obligates members of the group in a for-
mal, legal manner. The interpretation of questions arising from this 
structure may reach an ultimate settlement at a state board and/or court 
level. Therefore~ a second assumotion of this studv is that collective 
bargaining agreements and the process that produces them tend to inhibit 
arbitrary board action. That which is agreed to in a contract cannot be 
changed unilaterally by either party. 
Within the negotiation process it is quite common to observe that 
agreement must be reached on a mutual basis by the parties involved. One 
effect of this mutual agreement requiremen~ at the bargaining table is 
that one side can take a position that amounts to veto power over the 
~proposals of the other.· It is because of this pragmatic level veto power 
2:Framke, Richard, and others, "Report on Professional Rights and 
.Responsibilities Commission," Illinois Elementar.r School Pr:i.ncipals • 
Association, (May, 1972), p. 1. 
3Lefkowitz, Jerome, "Professional Employees and Collective Bar-
gaining," Public Employees Relations Board - State of New York, (Septem-
ber, 1973), p. 32. 
·~-
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inherent in the negotiation process that the scope of what is to be nego-
tiated is so highly significant. In fact, at least one noted authority 
in the field or collective bargaining between boards and professional 
' associations suggests that this situation is the most important power 
that employees derive from collective action.4 Where principals have 
· achieved a negotiated contract they have reached a status where they do 
have some veto power over their employers. Only the scope of what is 
actua~ negotiated limits this status. 
It the right to collective action and negotiation privileges are 
important underlying assumptions in this study, then the evolution of 
master contracts within the private and public sectors of the economy 
is equally significant. Master contracts tend to grow. Perhaps, the 
question of why was answered most succinctly by Samual Gompers when asked 
\o-h<it it "c.s tr4at his union wanted. The reply was. 1'More.n "whether or 
not this is a verbatim report of his words, it is a commonly held view 
of union activity and contract evolution in the United States. Master 
contract in both the private and public sectors of the economy have 
tended to gr~ in direct proportion to the number of years that collec-
tive bargaining has been employed in a given industry·. 
There is no reason to assume that collective action by educational 
administrators will take a different tack. Large city school district 
'teacher contracts have already become huge documents encompassing a mul-
titude of topics. Demands have regularly exceeded what was achieved or 
even, perhaps, expected. Examination of union or association strategy 
4A conversation with Fred R. Lifton, school labor relations attor-
ney, (May, 1973). 
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clearlY demonstrates that these,groups ask for much more than they expect 
to receive. As the negotiation process is repeated over many contract 
periods, it becomes increasingly obvious why master contracts tend to 
grow both in scope and in depth. Based on this history it seems reason-
able to assume that·administrator agreements will follow a similar pat-
· tern. 
In collective bargaining there is no rule against asking for 
"more". For example, the Chicago Federation of Teachers has asked that 
members receive full salary sabbaticals as a part of their 1974 contract. 
Who could have predicted fifteen years ago that the Illinois Education 
Association would recommend that "teacher evaluation committees develop 
a comprehensive program, including recommended process to be •negoti-
ated'••••"$ From the te~chers 1 side of the table it appears that the 
scope of ne:gotiatious includes anything and evAryth:i l"le t.h~t happ~~~ i~ · 
the school. Administrators were teachers. WQy should they behave any 
differently? 
If only twenty per cent of the agreements in this study deal 
With a specific topic, the above series of assumptions and observations 
~gests that this perc9ntage will grow with the passage of time. In 
other words, those subjects that have already reached the scope of nego--
tiations level will become more commonly included~ Secondly, those items 
• 
that have been mentioned in no agreement may tend to make an appearance 
in the future. 
511IEA. Panels Explore Professional Concerns, 11 The Advocate -
Illinois Education Association, Springfield, Illinois, Vol. 8, No. 2 
1october, 1973), p. 5. 
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The right to bargain collectively, the legal, formal power of a 
master contract, and the historical evolution of union demands and gains 
represent the three major underlying assumptions of this study. Although 
it is impossible to interpolate the influence of these factors to any 
quantitative system, they must be considered in terms of any conclusions 
· emerging from this study. If they, in fact, do influence institutions 
as has been suggested, then they will be an important series of factors 
in the future or organized principals. 
The role of the principal has been, is, and increasingly appears 
to be moving toward an ambiguous posture. This judgment is supported by 
both observers of the school and the role incumbents. 6 This ambiguity 
seems to have evolved from a number of factors that include the histori-
cal development of the American public school, the movement of teachers 
toward coll~ctive bargaining, the o~anization of public schools. and 
the growth of education into a major industry. The sum of these trends 
bas resulted in a set of conflicting responsibilities and authority for 
the principal. 
The ambiguous nature of the principal's role is a fourth major 
underlying assumption. Every proposition and hypothesis in this stu~ 
has been related in some way to role. The degree ·to which the contractual 
language tends to eliminate role ambiguity is an ~oortant part of this 
, study.-
6
aoldhammer, Keith, and others, Elementary School Principals and 
Their Schools: Beacons of Brilliance and.PCit":'noles of' ?cstilence, Center 
ror the Advanced StudY of Educational Administration, University of. 
Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 1971, p. 4. · 
·~· 
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Hypothesis I - Conclusions 
Hypothesis I stated the theor.y that organized principals have 
the power to shape their own professional destinies. This refers to the 
latitude available to the principal and/or the association represents-
tive that allows him to affect the role he plays as a school administra-
tor. To test the hypothesis, a series of propositions were formulated 
that dealt with the nomothetic dimension of the principalship. 
Hypothesis I is rejected. Viewed as a total group, organized 
p~ncipals have not gained a majority of the rights necessary to conclude 
. 
that they have the contractual power to determine the role they will play 
as administrators. 
The propositions employed in the study have been assumed to carry 
equal weight. If all of the agreements in the sample had contained pro-
areas described, the hypothesis would have been valid. However, the 
arithmetic mean far this group was only thirty-one.and eight-tenths per 
cent of a possible one hundred per cent. This is significantly less 
than even a simple majority, clearly demonstrating that the hypothesis 
is invalid. 
Considering the particular rights outlined by the propositions, 
it is significant that none of the associations of administrators had 
,gained the explicit right to be involved in the formulation of the evalu-
ation system by which a member's work would be assessed. This demon-
strates that boqrds and/or superintendents in a large number of school 
districts have not been ready to negotiate on an important management 
right. 
I 
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In terms of tenure and dismissal some of the associations did 
_have the legal authority to be involved in the process. However, in 
none of the contractual provisions was the burden of proof shifted from 
the individual administrator to the board of education. As long as the 
presumption of guilt rests with·the individual in a dismissal case, the 
practical effect remains that boards can act arbitrarily and t~e adminis-
trator involved has little or no chance of proving otherwise. 
Some of the administrator groups had gained rights in areas such 
as free legal counsel, use of the district's .facilities for association 
business, and equity in terms of teacher association gains.. These ad-
ministrators, however, represented a minority of the sample. This in-
formation provides additional weight for rejecting the hypothesis. 
Two rights did appear at the explicit level in· a significant 
m!ljori":y ~~ t~c cc~t:::-~~::;. A grievance procedure wa.::. commonly found in 
the sample documents. _The high frequency of appearance loses its sig-
nificance when examined because a grievance procedure is nearly always 
I 
an automatically included pr~vision in any collective bargaining docu-
ment. Being the agreed to process b,y which contractual interpretation. 
is coqducted, it is a necessar.y factor. Boards can easily negotiate and 
include this right in the contract because its application is limited to 
those areas that have been negotiated. In practical terms this means 
,that if the scope· of negotiable items within a contract is limited to 
salary and yearly calendar these are the only areas open to a grievance 
review. 
The right to communicate with the board without the permission 
I and/or presence of the superintendent was the other clause that appeared I in a largo number of contracts, This, too, loses its i~ortance when tba 
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bargaining process is considere~. To negotiate it is necessary that the 
employee group have the right to communicate with their employers. Gener-
al~, the employee group may exercise this option at their discretion. 
The common~ found inhibiting factors in this process revolve around 
questions of time and. location. The superintendent is not the employer 
of the building administrators and is not necessari~ included in the 
process because bargaining takes place between employers and employees. 
It may be suggested that the right to conununicate with the board, where 
collective bargaining is used, is somewhat of a redundant right. 
The rights represented in the agreements focus on the expecta-
tiona of the role incumbents. Although these options may be the ex-
pectations of the institution, or of particular institutions, they are 
designed to help and/or protect those who fulfill the role of adminis-
trat.or. A.s they become included :in th,. h::arg;aininc p!'oce~s t~eee :-i;;ht::: 
change in status from personal role expectations to institutional expec-
tations. For example, the right to be involved in the modification of 
the job description under which an administrator works was initiated by 
association bargaining teams. Boards may or may not have desired to ex- ·t· 
pect this of the ad~istrative staff. Once, however, ·the topic becomes 
a part of the contract administrators are then expected to take part in 
the process of discussing job modifications. The right has become an 
institutional expectation. Therefore, it has become a part of the nomo-
thetic dimension of role. This allows the conclusion to surface that 
the bargaining process has the capacity to change the status of role ex-
pectations from the idiographic to the nomothetic. 
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Hypothesis I - Implications 
The power to communicate directly with the board of education 
suggests a number of implications for both principals and superintendents. 
For example, in many districts principals do not communicate directly 
with the school board. The principals' collective and/or individual 
opinions are brought to the board's attention by the superintendent. 
This allows the mperintendent to exerc~se some control over the process. 
It doesn't seem unrealistic to suggest that what one side hears under 
this process is not exactly the same either in substance or form as what 
the other side intended. It takes few changes in construction or vocal 
inflection to alter the int.ended objective of one person 1 s statement 
when an intermediary communicates it to a third party. Superintendents 
have been known to do this consciously as a part of their operational 
_ .. _ ... .._ __ .. 
...., ....... ~·'-"t:..~. 
Where principals can and do go directly to the schoo1 board it 
appears that this may reduce the superintendent's opportunities to color 
the principals' position and/or action(s) to his advantage. Where a 
superintendent may have been able to describe the building. administrator's ·it 
group in terms that would be positive or negative to the board, under a 
contract the board members would have the opportunity to make this judg-
ment for themselves based en first-hand perceptions. · This may make it 
more difficult for superintendents to shift blame or praise for specific 
actions or inactions to the principal group •. 
To the degree that this right changes superintendent behavior 
with the board the implication emerges that the chief school officer 
will have to deal with the middle management group ~n a more opan, less 
autocratic and/or arbitraty manner to protect his own professional posi-
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tion. This suggests that the superintendent role could become less hier-
arclu.cal than has been represented by the commonly ·defined line and staff 
organization found in school districts. The superintendent may tend to 
share his positions, .. decisions, rationales, and other such factors with 
principals in a more complete manner. 
If superintendents are placed in a position, as described above, 
and react as has been suggested, then it appears that a change in the 
principal role rnay be possible. Meeting with the board will allow prin-
cipals to make their collective position more apparent if nothing else. 
How this may tend to influence board action is not readily apparent. The 
situation, however, does imply two important possibilities. Principals 
with the right to direct communicati~, with the school board will'have 
an opportunity to alter the board decision-making process. Secondly, 
entire school district and, therefore, may tend to focus on issues in a 
more global manner than would individual building administrators. 
Suppose a board begins to become involved in administrative mat-
ters Within a district. The superintendent may be completely against 
this move but be in .a four-to-three situation in terms· of board member 
support. Where principals have the right to communicate directly with 
the board they can reinforce his position to the extent that board mem-
~bers will have a second professional group to hear. Secondly, the princi-
pals represent a group to which they (i.e., the board) will have to justi-
fy their position in some way. lVhether or not their collective position 
changes board action seems less important than the fact that these prin-
cipals will be concerned about and dealing with an issue that has gene~ 
ally been the province of the superintendent. 't\bere principals begin to 
I 
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deal with issues that were once exclusively the concerns of only the 
super~ntendent, and if one agrees that an environment has direct influ-
ence on how people behave, then the implication surfaces that principals 
will fulfill a role expectation that is more similar to that of the super-
intendant than had been true in the past. 
In the study entitled, The Normative World of the Elementary 
School Principal, one major conclusion dealt with the role expectations 
board members, superintendents, and teachers had for principals. As 
might have been expected, the board-superintendent group had signifi-
cantly different expectations for prin~ipals than did the teacher group. 7 
The right to communicate with the board raises the possibility that prin-
cipals will through their direct meetings with elected officials be able 
to change the perceptions of these community leaders. The change implied 
is that bOar"\1 membt1i~ will have additional inout from a oortion of the 
. ' ' 
administrative staff that may reflect the kinds of local concerns that 
teachers often have. To the degree that this may take place, principals 
have the opportunity to enlarge the idiographic dimension of their role 
at least in terms of board member perceptions. 
As was suggested above, the right to communicate with the board 
may create a set of conditions where principals begin to look at district 
issues in a more global manner than those administrators who focus essen-
. 
,tially on their own building problems. There is no question, even where 
a master contract exists, that boards make final decisions. However, 
principals working in a professional environment that allows for communi-
7Foskett, John M., The Normative World of the Elementary School 
Principal, The Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 1967, p. 71. · 
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cation to the board may adopt a district wide or-global viewpoint. This 
global type of perspective has been described as one of the major dif-
8 ferences bstween principal and superintendent role dimensions. This 
implies a role change for the principal. 
What are the implications of principals having a grievance pro-
cedure available to them? This right allows the administrator to question 
the interpretation of the contract and in some cases, board policy, by a 
superintendent in a formal and sometimes, binding manner. Perhaps, prin-
cipals will employ this right as teachers have during the recent past. 
Briefly, application of the grievance procedure has allowed 
· teachers to create much additional work for administrators and boards. 
It·has also resulted in placing administration and the board in a po-
sition where actions have to be uniform within a given district. It 
. h&s eli~~nat&d options, particularlY in tbose cases where principals 
could and did treat certain staff members differently than others. In 
these cases the reference is to both positive and negative action. 
Will middle management personnel apply the grievance procedure 
in a similar manner? This study was not directed toward answering this 
question. However, on~ important fact suggests that principals may not 
ope.rate as teachers, have in terms of grievance. That fact is summarized 
by the word tenure. 
- Where tenure exists it falls upon the board to carry the burden 
of proof in terms of removing a teacher. In an overwhelming number of 
cases boards have been unsuccessful in eliminating tenured teachers ex-
cept for gross violations of the law. In terms of poor and/or ineffectual 
8!£id., p. 72. 
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professional work boards have, general~, not been able to remove tenured 
teachers from their payrolls. 
Most administrators, however, do not enjoy the job security that 
results from a tenure act. It a board wants to relieve an administrator 
of his position it falls upon the employee to prove that the board acted 
on·reasons other than those given to him. The burden of proof lies on 
the employee's shoulders in terms of proving that rights were violated 
or that the board acted upon hidden agenda. 
The job security manifested by tenure rights may be the major 
reason why teachers have been able to use the grievance procedure effec-
. . 
tively in terms of altering administrative procedure and increasing the 
scope of negotiations. Without tenure, principals may be quite reluctant 
to apply the grievance procedure in their contracts. If principals 
!"toil to exercise this opticm, then t.he imolications of admini~tr8t·i v~ 
grievance rights will probably be cosmetic rather than substantive. 
On the other hand it may be reasonable to assume that central 
office· administration will not. want to be involved in the cumbersome 
process of grievance any more than is necessary. If this is true, then -~-
the result may be more sharing with principals when decisions are ·made. 
This implies two results: sharing will involve principals more frequent-
lY in district wide issues and, secondly, the administrative team concept 
,may appear to be an attractive vehicle to implement increased consulta-
tion between central office and building administration. 
The right to deal with employment conditions collectively implies 
possible changes in the principals' role. Any collective bargaining 
agreement tends to define, in part, the nomothetic dimension of role. 
However, the institution's expectations for the incumbents is derived, 
r 
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not only by referent group opinion, but by an adversary process usually 
entitled negotiating. This gives the role incumbents direct and legally 
binding input concerning role definition. It also gives the incumbents 
a kind of veto power over any topic that is nsgotiated.9 Normally, the 
institution's expectations for incumbents emerge through other processes 
that do not include the binding input represented by a contract. There-
fore, the master contracts held by organized principals imply that they 
have made direct and binding contributions to the nomothetic dimension 
of their role. 
Perhaps, the significance of the right to deal collectively can 
be described by relatirig the recent history of NEA action in Illinois. 
In the early seventies the NEA made it a major objective to gain collec-
tive bargaining rights for teachers in Illinois. Added staff and economic 
'~"C"',_,,.,.,..,..,., ,....,..,.,.,.,~ 4 ~~ .... ~'"'~ ... +.,~, ~ ... - ""h.:;s "'U~"'se 10 Th-"' -rner.;can Scho·"'l 
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Boards' Association became aware of this plan and reacted vigorously 
through its journa1.11 Boards made it quite clear that collective bar-
gaining rights for teachers was a legislative development with which 
they took issue. In their argument against granting such rights the 
ASBA stressed that (1) school boards would lose some of their power if 
bargaining bec?me the means by which teachers defined their working con-
ditions, and (2) the real issue was control of the schools.12 This po-
9 Lifton, op. cit. · 
10 Koerner, Thomas F., and Parker, Clyde, "Bargaining for Begin-
ners - III; How to Play for Keeps at the Bargaining Table, 11 American 
School Board Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January-February, 1972), p. 14. 
1~bid., p. 15. 
12Ibid., p. 15. 
I 
sition was supported by at least two school negotiations practitioners.13 
Finally, the ASBA publication noted that in granting bargaining rights to 
teachers the situation could surface where principals would demand such 
rights. It was suggested that this new dimension would be disastrous 
from a school board's point of View.l4 It would seem that this argument 
and its predictions can be considered at least partially valid in terms 
of what has happened in the area of board-teacher negotiations during the 
last two years. 
Based on the ISBA written statemebts, it is fair to suggest that 
Illinois school board members do not want their principals to have and 
exercise collective bargaining rights. This position seems to support 
the implications for change in the principal role that board members 
might consider to be negative. For example, if boards fear a loss of 
pvioier wht:n teachers negotiate, then they appareutlv fear the same in 
terms of principal negotiation. Stated another way, the grounds for 
board members' concern about principal collective bargaining seem to sug-
gest a change in the parameters that describe the principal role. One 
implication of this is apparently that principals who negotiate do have 
a significant effec~ on the. board decision-making process and the 
hierarchy of the school district. 
The right to be consulted about the evaluation process by which I 
~ , the principals' work is assessed surfaced infrequently in this study. 
I 
L 
However, since the right was implied in a minority of the agreements it 
deserves attention. If administrator contracts evolve in scope as other 
13~., p. 15. 
14Ibid., p. 16. 
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employee groups' agreements have, then this will become an increasingly 
important issue. Where this provision does exist it supports another 
avenue by which principals can further define their role, it allows for 
increased participation in a district issue, and it may result in a re-
duction in the ambiguity surrounding the principals' role. 
Academic freedom, a right found in New York administrative con-
tracts, is important by its absence in agreements from other states. 
This ~ imply that a need for such freedom does not exist for most 
principals. If this is so, then one possible explanation is that prin-
cipals are not expected to deal with situations where academic freedom 
is a pre~equisite. Based on this premise, a further implication is ·that 
principals are not deeply involved in such decisions. Another is that 
no significant curricular or instructional divergence occurs in the 
nation's ~ublic school~-
A majority of the organized principals represented in this study 
have the right to consult about modifications of their job description. 
·As a p~licy statement, job description is the basis for the nomothetic 
definition or role within an institution. More importantly, this kind 
of provision seems to focus specifically on the serious concerns of many 
elementary school principals as reported by two extensive studies. 
The Normative World of the Elementa!l School Principal concludes 
~ that tbe position of elementary school principal is interstitial in tha~ 
it exists between two other positions, that of teacher and that of cen-
tral administrator.15 11As a consequence, it tends to be associated in 
part with each or the adjacent positions but not completely with either.rr16 
l5Foskett, John M., op. cit., p. 73. 
16 
L 
~., p. 74. 
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Implications emerge from the question of how this consultation about job 
modification might change the conclusion of the Foskett stu~. 
Boards and/or superintendents will have to meet with principals 
to discuss the bQtlding administrator's role, priorities, responsibili-
ties, and other pertinent questions. Principals will deal with these 
issues collectively and will have direct input. Agreement, as defined 
in the bargaining process, will be mutual and, therefor~, suggests that 
each side will be knowledgeable about the other's position. It seems 
that this sharing of ideas through bargaining and tlie consultation pro-
cess may allow for mutual understanding of role dimensions. If this 
takes p~a~e, then principals and boards may develop a more common under-. 
standing of what the former are to do in their professional activities. 
This may result in organized principals moving away from the previously 
reported interstitial ~osition. 
Since the resulting contract will be a public document, this 
will allow teachers and the public to gain understanding of the princi-
pals' role. An~ther possibility is that principals may find it easier 
to deal with teacher and/or lay groups who have expectations for building 
administrators that are in opposition to what have been agreed to between 
the association and the board. 
Therefore, the bargaining process may contribute to the reduction 
'Of ambiguity that currently is reported to be associated with the prin-
cipal role. 
Expanding this exposition more, another study reports that: 
'Perhaps the most critical problem facod by the elementary school 
principal today is the general ambiguity of his position in the 
educational community. There is no viable, systematic rationale 
-~- . 
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for the elementary school principalship to determine expectations 
·for performance; no criteria exist through which performance can 
be measured.ul7 
It seems that principals who have the right to be involved in the modi-
fication of their job descriptions will be able to share and determine, 
in part, expectations with their superiors. Such principals will not 
be able to claim that their superiors in the central office have no under-
standing of the demands made upon principals at the building level be-
cause these will be the topics of the discussions. At the same time 
central office administration ~ gain appreciation for the principals' 
problems and local expectations that are in tune with the realities of 
building operation. 
A minority of the organized principals negotiated the right to 
consult with the board about the promotion or the dismissal of their 
peers. This seems to r~inforce the possibility of org~~i~ed princi-
pals having an avenue to satisfy some of their personal role expectations. 
Should a majority of principals within an association desire to see that 
a building administrator's ability to innovate or promote new and better 
instructional programs be one measure of fulfilling promotion require-
menta~ then it appears they have exercised a right that may allow them 
to broaden the idiographic dimension of their role. Combined with the 
rights to consultation on evaluation procedures and job modification, 
,organized principals with the right to input on all of these subjects 
have, in fact, everything but the legal right to make the final decision 
about important aspects of their role. Do principals who labor without 
such contractual rights have this potential? Implications surfacing from 
17Goldhammer, Keith, and others, qe. cit., p. 5. 
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many studies is that they do not and may be treated in a manner that re-
fleets this. 
The right to protection from legal action may represent a felt 
need for job securit~. It appears to imply an increased use of the courts 
by the public in dealing with schools. Finally, the question of judicial 
review of administrative action seems to be implied if it is assumed that 
the right to legal protection has emanated from a perceived need. 
Although more than three-fourths of the agreements stated that 
principals had the right to deal collectively with their problems and 
employers, onlY thirty per cent of the sample contracts allowed associa-
' 
tions use of district facilities and/or principal tL~e for these activi-
ties. Perhaps, the districts that·haven't included this second pro-
vision automaticallY allow administrative associations such latitude. 
livwevt:r, if the assumption is made that th:iR :is nn't t.h~ C'!~se, t:hen the 
differential suggests that boards do not view principal bargaining quite 
as positively as the contracts might indicate. To the degree that this 
is accurate the implication evolves that any predictions about board-
principal consultations is inhibited to that point and in direct pro-
portion. A board niay have to consult with a principal group, but the 
contract does not bind them to aQYthing more. 
One-third of the p~incipals had their benefits and rights at-
~tached to teacher benefits by contractual provision. Whatever rights 
the board gives to the teachers' group will be automatically shared by 
the building administrators. This may be a minor point in considering 
how principals view their role. If they think of themselves as head-
masters, one can speculate that organized principals still identify with 
the teacher and building role more than with the central administration. 
r 149 
On the other hand, it is an effective and practical strategy, at least 
during the last few years, to be tied somehow to teacher economic gains. 
Hypothesis II - Conclusions 
The second hypothesis in this study stated that "organized prin-
cipals have the power to direct and evaluate personnel within their atten-
dance centers." To test the hypothesis, six propositions were formulated 
that centered around the organizE:d principals' right to interview and ap-
prove personnel for the building, assign teachers within the attendance 
center, and approve of transfers from that center. The propositions 
also focused on the principals' involvement with the modification or 
elimination of job descriptions within the school, use of those facili-
ties, and consultation rights on building modification. 
Hyput.hesis II is re.iected. This conclusion is based nr:l.m~rjJv 
. . 
on the low percentages of contractual rights that gave organized princi-
pals the powers outlined by the propositions. The total sample received 
less than thirty per cent of the maximum possible weighting. This leads 
to the conclusion that most of the contracts had little or no language ··-~· \ 
focused on the rights that were a part of Hypothesis II. The maximu, 
possible range. of weighting was not reached by any one agreement. 
The "degree to which the principal can affect his own building 
-staff and program in an autonomous rr~nner" states the basis for Hypothesis 
II. If more than two-thirds of the organized principals do not have the 
contractual rights to direct and affect program in an autonomous manner, 
then the conclusion must evolve that the hypothesis is not valid. This 
was the case based on the analysis of the data and, therefore, Hypothesis 
II is rejected. 
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However, the analysis also demonstrated that large differences 
exist between the contracts of organized principals from the states re-
presented. If the Michigan principals comprised the total sample in this 
stuqy it would then be possible to consider the hypothesis valid. A ma-
jority of the Michigan organized principals had every right considered 
by the propositions under Hypothesis II. When more than half, a numeri-
cal majority, have gained the legal right to interview, approve, and as-
sign personnel, this strongly suggests that these organized principals 
have the legal potential to affect their building's educational program 
in an autonomous manne'r. Therefore, the conclusion emerges that the 
state in which the administrator bargains has significant influence on 
the contents of the contract that is negotiated. For example, none of 
the New Jersey principals had any contractual rights to interview, approve, 
gan the situation was generally the opposite. 
Although the hypothesis was not valid, two of the propositions 
were found to be contractual' rights for a majority of all organized 
principals. The right to consult on questions about job modification or 
positi:On elimination, as related to particular attendance centers, was 
.. held by a large majority of the organized principals. Considering both 
implied and specific rights, the Connecticut administrators had the lowest 
'percentage based on the weightings and their group reached nearly the 
three-fourths level. All of the Massachusetts administrators had this 
right. The remainder of the group was weighted at least at the seventy-
five per cent level. This suggests the conclusion that boards and/or or-
ganized principals agree that the building administrator should be involved 
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in the process by which building positions are defined, changed, and 
eliminated. 
Consultation rights on building modification were also generally 
available by contract to the organized principals. Although thes~ rights 
did not appear at as high a percentage as did those focused on job modi-
fication, they were represented above the fifty per cent level in near~ 
all of the sample agreements. If a simple majority represents signifi-
cance, then this leads to the conclusion that boards and organized prin-
cipals agree that the building administrator should be involved with 
planning the physical changes for an attendance center. 
Hypothesis II - Implications 
The propositions that define Hypothesis II are different from 
those of Hypothesis I in one i~ortant. way. 'l'hARP. !'l:ropo~d.tinn~ ~'='n'='r~ ]_1_y 
concern the assignment and transfer rights .of teachers. These are impor-
tant issues to teacher associations. The propositions of Hypothesis I 
are important, primarily, to-· administrators and touch very little upon 
' ~. I 
teacher concerns as demonstrated by teacher association activities and -'1- \ 
bargaining. 
As compared to the items under Hypothesis I, those of the second 
appeared with less frequency. This raises the question of why? It is 
Vfell documented that teachers began to use bargaining before administra-
tors. Secondly, it may be that principals have tended to identify with 
the board and felt no need to use bargaining. Managers have not been 
expected to come together in collective groups to gain something from the 
owners (i.e., board). This role is reserved for labor. Also, the so-
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called professional white collar work force has been reluctant until re-
cent times to use the bargaining process. 
Secondly, through the medium of board policy, it had been normal 
for principals to have and exercise a great deal of authority within indi-
vidual schools. In fact, the bargaining process can demonstrate that one 
of its major effects on school organization has been the removal of some 
of a principal's prerogatives and authority. Certainly, national princi- · 
pal associations have taken this position frequently. If this be the 
case, then collective bargaining by principals was not needed until 
teachers began to use it to change the principals' authority. 
It these two points are valid, then principals have moved to- · 
ward bargaining as a reaction and not an action. Considering Hypothesis 
II, these topics are issues that probably have already been dealt with 
principals have been in a bargaining situation where they were attempt-
ing to define and gain rights on a series of topics that were already 
partially within the province of the teachers' contract. It may be 
that whether or not a board wanted to include principals in the areas 
of transfer and assignment rights it wasn't possible because teachers 
had already gained power in the area. Therefore, the low level of inci-
dence of these topics in administrator contracts may be an expected con-
~clusi.on of the histor.y of collective bargaining in the public schools. 
Considering Hypothesis II and based on what did appear, the 
situation can be suggestive of different implications. Those organized 
principals who did have contractual rights on most of the propositions 
under consideration could be defined as having partial control over the 
personnel within their buildings. These principals could monitor staff 
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selection to some degree. They could make assignments in terms of levels 
and/or-subjects within the framework of certification. They could set 
responsibilities for staff. members. They could limit the rights of a 
teacher to transfer. They could maintain some control over the types of 
_ job descriptions of positions within their buildings. This suggests that 
those organized principals who do have provisions relating to these areas 
in their contracts are viewed b.Y their boards as having, not only a super-
visory function, but as being part of the management group. Like the 
superintendent, these principals are to be involved with the development 
of recommendations t~~t go to the board. 
Where a group of organized principals controls staff assignments 
as suggested by the topics that make up Hypothesis II, it seems to imply 
that any ambiguity surrounding their role in this area will tend to be 
eliminated. If t.Etachers know that th~ p:-i!';cipa.l t.a.s control over trans-
fer requests and must apply this power in a uniform manner as defined by 
the district, it seems probable that instructional staff members will 
feel that principals are agents of the board more than _they are leaders 
of a particular building 1 s staff • 
. Hypothesis II stated that organized principals would have the 
power to direct and evaluate personnel within their attendance centers. 
The weighting process indicated that this is a valid statement for a 
~nority of those principals represented by the sample agreements. How-
ever, a majority of the represented administrators do not have such 
powers through their contracts. The analysis suggests that the reasons 
for this significant difference are most important. 
It was discussed above that the issues pertinent to Hypothesis 
II are of great importance to teachers and particularly their bargaining 
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representatives. This fact combined with the histor,y of teacher bargain-
ing in terms of lengt~, as corrt>ared. to principals, seems to be a reason-
able set of conditions that explains the differences between Hypothesis I 
and II. The plausibility of this explanation can be further supported by 
consideration of another series ·of issues. 
The propositions related to Hypothesis I revolve around subjects 
many of which could be described as working conditions and/or job security 
topics. The rights to be involved in alteration of one's job description, 
in the development of the evaluation process for one's work, and the free-
dom to use certain times as one sees fit all contribute to job securi-
ty. Conversely, the propositions in Hypothesis II, although they would 
be of professional importance, do not focus on security whatsoever. 
Therefore, the differences in frequency of occurrence and total weight-
ing ba~.....-;:;6<. t!1a twc st=:ts of propositions may be the result of a differ-
ence in priorities on the part of principals. 
It seems reasonable to assume that one of the primar.y reasons_for 
collective action by any set of employees is to shift the balance of 
power between the group and the employer. In fact, one might suggest 
that this was the major reason for the beginning and continuation of 
the labor movement. If one follows this conclusion through the factors 
stated above, then it would seem that Hypothesis II is represented less 
-frequent~ in administrator contracts because it represents issues that 
are of minor importance compared to those that principals are attempting 
to gain through the collective bargaining process. 
Another consideration that may contribute to the complete explana-
tion for the differences in frequency between the two hypotheses is 
school board policy. If policy allows principals the powers that exist 
r 155 in a given district and, if the administrative group is of sufficient 
positive morale to be trusting of the board, then there would be little 
,.,.:, 
reason for them to attempt to upset relationships by trying to have 
policy changed into contractual language. In simple terms, the suggestion 
is that once job security needs are met, and under conditions where local 
history has not created dissension among the administrative group, there 
would be no reason to bargain for rights that give principals control 
over staff. B.y way of analogy it seems that wives who feel that they 
have a satisfying and growing relationship with their husbands have felt 
no need to support some of the changes in the marriage contract that are 
highly touted by leaders of the women's movement. 
In terms of role implications the contractual language appears 
to add weight to those changes that were outlined under Hypothesis I 
:implications. A l~=>ss 2!1lbi6l'!.'-'US !'Ol~ :..:::: :.~lied. ~niformity cf defini-
tion and implementation on a district-wide basis will put principals 
in a position where boards, superintendents, teachers, and building 
administrators themselves may tend to view the job as being related more 
to the district than to an individual school. The result of this could 
be a reduction in the interstitial characteristic of the role. Finally, 
the principal ~ill be expected to and will work on district-wide issues 
so that his perspective on developing rationales may tend to become more 
_global or superintendent-.like. 
Considering the implication of a developing principal role that 
resembles that of the superintendent, the following discussion develops 
the idea. Consultations about job modification may be categorized as a 
district-wide issue. It is difficult to conceive a district where staff-
ing patterns are significant,ly different between schools. Therefore, 
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organized principals who have the right to consult on this issue will 
collectively be dealing with a topi.c that had generally been an exclusive 
board and/or superintendent item. 
For example, suppose that within a given district of twenty ele-
mentary schools a position entitled librarian has been filled in each 
building. Board policy does not outline in any specific sense the job 
description for this position. The topic is not included within the 
scope of negotiations between the board and teachers' association. Under 
these conditions it can be expected that various principals would use the 
person in this position in a variety of ways. Some administrators may be 
operating an extremely traditional library while those at the other end 
of the innovation continuum will be organized into an open-ended learning 
resource center. This means that although each librarian will have the 
5aliie titl6, the typeb of i.a8ks, tueasures of accountabilitv: and other 
such parameters will be quite different from one building to another. 
Consider the imposition upon this setting of a teachers' bargain-
ing team arguing that their members (i.e., librarians) are being treated 
inconsistently and, therefore, unfairly with the district's schools. The 
charge: of inconsistent treatment by administration of people who have 
. 
the same title is a frequent accusation at the bargaining table. If it 
is assumed that the board wants to 11buy off" on this issue, then t.hey 
• 
-will have to take steps to change the variety of organizations that exist 
within the variouS schools. The board will have to develop parameters 
for the position that are essentially the same. From this acti.on the 
result will be a uniform job description for librari::ms. 
In this hypothetical situation the principals will be assumed to 
have the right by contract to be involved in the modification of job de-
r 
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scriptions. Now the situation will be one where central aruninistration 
will have to work with the building principals, as a collective group, 
' 
and find a definition for the position with which all involved can live. 
·Under this hypothetical setting the following implications emerge: 
1. Idiographic role expectations will be reduced or limited. Princi-
pals will deal with this district-wide issue and have to consider 
it not just from the viewpoint of their own buildings but within 
the context of their membership in the association that represents 
them. Agreement will be on a consensus basis and this type of 
action tends to reduce individual variance. 
2. The principal will have the nomothetic role expectation that the 
incumbents deal with an issue from the point of view of the en-
tire district rather than from individual building needs exclu-
sively. Principals will have to temper their ideas on the li-
brarian position so that all points of view can be at least 
minimally satisfied. 
3. Principals and teachers may tend to identify the former's role 
with the central administration. The result of central adminis-
tration-building principal consultations will be a uniform job 
description for librarians. Principals will have to implement 
this in ~ ~!':~::-:: ::.~:-:n~r. '!'hc~t ~.:en' t ba able to significantly 
alt.er: it lJl the interests of- 'their parr.icular building needs. 
This seems to create a situation where teachers will tend to 
identify principals with the central administration. 
These three points add weight to the argument that organized principals 
will tend to find themselves in a less ambiguous and interstitial po-
sition than their colleagues who are not working under a collective bar- '\:· : 
gaining agreement. 
In districts where the local teachers' association does have 
staffing patterns and teacher assignments within the scope of negotia-
tions the situation seems as if it will be more extreme. Suppose that 
principals in these districts also have the contractual right to be in-
volved in the same area. This presents a school board with a situation 
where two employee groups have legally binding input on the same issue. 
I 
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It doesn't seem unreasonable to assume that these two groups may have dif-
ferent points of view on the subject. ·. 
Will this type of situation tend to force the board and building 
administrators into a closer relationship? If boards need the principals 
to supervise and/or implement any contractual obligations ~ntered into by 
the members and teachers, then board members may tend to look upon the 
principals as directly connected to the central administration. If 
boards do this and the expectation is communicated to teachers, then the 
principal role will tend to lose some of its interstitial characteristics. 
Another implication ~ evolve as a result of bargaining between 
boards and administrators. When collective negotiation is employed 
various job descriptions and/or positions are explicitly defined to be 
in or not in a particular bargaining unit. Overlap cannot occur. vfuere 
~t cr,e tiwe G.&partment heads irl high schools could ~lay ;l cin.::~l rol"" t'! 
that they taught, supervised colleagues, and gave input on teacher evalu-
ation, thi-s kind of organization has quickly disappeared where teachers 
have used collective bargaining. The essential reason for this is that 
the strict definitions found in a contract leave no room for a person to ''t· 
play a: dual role. If one supervises and evaluates, then the job is ad-
ministrative. The opposite is also true. Therefore, this implies that 
bargaining by both teachers and principals will tend to define both roles 
-in increasi.ngly separate or different ways. This implication adds weight 
to the unproven conclusion that organized principals will play a role 
that is less interstitial than their non-bargaini.ng colleagues. 
Hypothesis II focused on the interviewing, approval, assignment, 
and transfer powers of the building administrator over personnel. Gener-
ally, at least one-fifth of the organized principals had these right.s. 
r 
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This suggests that many boards conceive an administrative role for prin-
cipals that gives the latter significant input on these management con-
cerns. Of course, all of these rights, when exercised by individual 
· principals, are subject to ultimate board approval. 
As a part of the contract, it will not be easy for aQy board to 
remove the rights of principals in the area of teacher assignment. These 
rights imply a principal role where the building administrators collective-· 
~ help to establish the board procedures and regulations for a distric~ 
' 
Principals, therefo1~, not only supervise the implementation of regula-
tions but are involved in the actuai development of the parameters or 
board policy. As a part of the contract, this role is a legally binding 
part of the district's decision-making process. 
Because it is a part of the contract, principals will have to 
implication emerges that principals will have to operate in the same 
way in a given district. This uniformity of administration may tent to 
reduce the ambiguity in the principal role. 
As principals take part in the process that results in bargain- ,. 
ing on:assignment procedures,. teachers may tend to see building adminis-
trators as agents of the board. The principals will have to respond 
according to the district posture. This board-oriented response may 
tend to reinforce teacher perceptions of a principal role that is far 
removed from that of the instructor. On the other hand, principals will 
tend to identify their position more with the entire district and less 
with their indivi~~al buildings. If they do not, then it would seem that 
they will be in a frustrating and, perhaps, untenable position at the 
least. 
I 
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The contract of those principals who have the authority to inter-
view and approve of personnel reflects a magerial role dimension. In the 
cases of those principals who did have this contractual authority the im-
plication is that the institution does expect them to'have significant 
control over staff. 
Another question that surfaces about staff selection and assign-
ment rights centers on the degree to which administrative associations 
have tried but failed to have the selection of personnel included in the 
· agreements. If principals represented in this study have attempted to 
gain this authority, then the impl~cation is that they have generally 
failed. From this failure an implication can be inferred. This unproven 
conclusion is that the institution does not have expectations in teacher 
assignment as a right for building administrators. 
, f~'U~'----""",.,.0 
...,... . ~ (;,;, .,_.-- '-> -....-
to Hypothesis II appears to add weight to those implied changes in the 
principal role discussed under Hypothesis I. Uniformity of definition 
and implementation of procedures on a district-wide basis will put prin-
cipals into a position where boards, superintendents, teachers, and the 
building administr.ators themselves may tend to view the role as being 
more related to the 'district than to an individual school. The result 
of this could be a reduction in the interstitial characteristic of the 
role. Finally, the principal will be expected to and will work with is-
sues on a district-wide basis so that his perspective on development of 
rationales may tend to become more global or superintendent-like. Cer-
tainly, bargaining suggests that the potenti.al for this exists. 
r 
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H:yeothe~:~!~-=...9~-::~~l~~sions 
Do organized principals have the power to play a major role in 
the educational programs in their buildings? l~othesi~ III examined 
this theory. Based on the appe:.irance of contractual language focused on 
curriculum and instruction, it would be difficult to argue the pro side 
of this question. Three propositions made up the basis of this section. 
The clauses relating to them were found in only a small minority of the 
agreements. The vast majority of the contracts made no reference to 
these curricular areas either direct~ or by implication. Less than 
twenty per cent of the maximum possible t-tcighting was achieved under 
Hypothesis III. Hypothesis III is rejected. 
One sub-group of contra.cts representing the Michigan organized 
principals did, however, contai.n significr~nt amounts of language about 
pear to have the power to play a major role in the educational programs 
within their buildings. New York administrators, although to a lesser 
degree, did have rights in the areas defined by the propositions. Organ-
ized principals from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey had no 
rights whatsoever. These data support the conclusion discussed under 
Hypothesis II .that the state from which a contract. originates greatly 
influences its contents. Stated in another n~nner, the conclusion is 
-that organized principals have significantl~l different contractual ;rights 
and responsibilities based upon the state in which they work. 
!fxeothesi~. III - Implications 
0n<3 benchmark that may be used to determine an educator's in-
volvement with curriculum revolves around tho innovations he brings to a 
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program. In tho last few years, changes in curriculum design and in-
structional methods have become commonplace. Principals have frequently 
touted their interest in curriculum development through their various 
associations and publications. If these observations are valid, then it 
becomes confusing why only ten per·cent of the sample agreements had a 
portion devoted to curriculum and/or curricular innoVation. 
The large and consistent absence of contractual lenguage focused 
on curriculum implies significant role dimensions. The absence may have 
something to do with the institution's expectancies for the role incum-
bents. These expectancies generate from many sources. One of these 
sources is the teaching staff.18 Educational literature supports the 
contention that the role of the principal is being modified from two 
sources- superordinate and subordinate. 19 The commonly used procedure 
lack of contractual authority in the curricular areas. If boards have 
already given to teachers contractual input on curriculum, and done it 
in advance of any administrator agreements, it may be that they cannot 
give the principals a conflicting right.. Therefore, one possible answer 
is that teachers already control curriculum keeping principals from bar-
gaining succes~ully on the topic. 
Curriculum is the total set of experiences that a school system 
attempts to provide for its clients, the students. The classroom experi-
ences a child receives seem to be controlled by one factor more than any 
18Klein, Donald D., '~erceived Job Responsibilities of Illinois 
Elementary School Staff Members, 11 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola 
University, Chicago, 1969), p. 91. 
19~., p. 92. 
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other. This factor is, of course, the teacher. If one assumes that cur-
riculUm is controlled by instructors, then the assumption suggests that 
principals may have collectively found it non-productive to attempt to 
gain these kinds of rights in their contracts. 
The question of community control raises another factor in this 
discussion. Even if one assumes that at the pragmatic level teachers 
do control curriculum, it remains di.fficult to argue that that which is 
to be taught cnn be decj.ded upon by any particular group over the final 
authority of the community. It is the collective b~ called the com-
munity that has the right, constitutionally, to decide what experiences 
its children will receive in school. No individual teacher or teachers 
can expect to have the luxury of making this kind of final decision. Of 
course, the entire issue of what is negotiable frequently moves to the 
I control over at least part of this question while communities and state 
I -
! } 
\ 
board associations take the opposite position. In terms of book selec-
tion and certain specialized programs such as sex education, communities 
have demonstrated the power to be the final arbitrators on these ques-
tions.: If the above is valid, then one more reason can be added to 
an5"Wer why princ:i.pals have no·t negotiated any significant ·language on 
curricular topics in their contracts. 
It may be possible that curricular issues are not important to 
principals either as negotiating topics or as idiographic role expectan~ 
cies. If bargaining was initiated primarily to protect positions and 
change the balance of power between employer and employee, it seems to 
follow that curricular ism1es would· probably tend to be absent in the 
contracts. 
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Considering the persons who are the principals represented by 
the contracts in this study, the question of their backgrounds becomes 
significant. For example, if a majority of these administrators were 
teachers in areas such as physical education and/or music it may be that 
their collective experience has had an effect on their bargaining goals. 
Secondly, it may be suggested that administrators, as a group, $re not 
noted for their leadership in the world of new ideas, innovations and, 
particularly, change. The ver.y nature of the administrative position 
seems to tend to select people who will help the system to continue 
rather than evolve into something new. If these assumptions are valid, 
and in direct proportion to their validity, the implication follows that 
principals would have little need for curricular topics to be a part of 
their c·ontracts. This in:plies that principals are not faced with a nomo-
thet.ic role expectation to deal vith curriculum ;~t')('l in11ov::~t.i.,~. 
A final factor that may contribute to explaining why there was 
a lack of language focusing on curriculum is the growing influence of 
state and national legislative activity on the school. At the state 
level there have been increasing attempts to have schools operate spe-
cific programs of on~ type or another using a direct financial subsidy 
as the motivating force. The growth of special education services is 
one of the most prevalent examples of this trend. In many cases, the 
-initiation of such a program is a district decision. However, after this 
stage, control of the service reverts back to the state. For example, 
many times a district cRnnot eliminate the program once it has been 
started. Local considarations and conditions tend to play a smaller role 
and, therefore, the state begins, in fact, to dictate curriculum. This 
't· 
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influence may be reflected in part by the organized principals' apparent 
lack of interest in curriculum issues as bargaining topics. 
T'he weighting and analysis of the data suggest on face value tha:t 
principals do not have personal role expectancies in the curricular area. 
A future study may find that. principals have attempted to gain contractual 
authority in curricular areas but were unsuccessful. If this were demon-
strated, then one cv~s argue that the idiographic dimension of the prio-
cipalship does have or contains a dimension focused on the educational 
leader role. However, based on the results of this analysis, there does 
not seem to be any reason to suggest that organized principals want to 
be educational leaders in any significant way. 
Considering the nomothetic dimension of role, the discussion of 
expectancies seems as if it should consider curriculum as a boqy of know-
ledge that influences the institution rath'='r t.h~T'J th"::' oth~r ~fl.y G!'t''.!-'1.:!.. 
In other words, the ~uestions of how a set of experiences called cur-
riculum has developed, what has influenced its evolvement, and how sensi-
tive it is to change, all have a part in the definition of the principals• 
role. For example, how can a principal expect to alter or change those 
experi~nces we entitle curriculum? Certainly it would.not be expected 
that an ind:Lvidual or grrup of administrators would be able to alter the 
influence of t.he national media. Yet, these forms of communication seem 
~o play an linportant part in children's learning. Can administrators ex-
pect to significantly change the products of national publishers? Are 
the learning experiences presented to children in terms of continuity 
and sequence varied in any appreciable way throughout a state or even the 
M.tion? The::;e questions suggest that a principal or administrative asso-
ciation may be virtually helpless to alter tho learning experiences that 
·. 
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children receive. If organized principals have accepted this as a real-
istic appraisal of their potency in the area, then the implication is 
that they would not be very involved with curriculum, particularly as a 
· bargaining topic. 
If principals cannot alter the curriculum, then should one assume 
that a school district can? In exceptional cases, boards of education 
have banned particular texts or other published materials. Within regions 
school systems have used materials that ignored entire populations on a 
racial basis. However, these materials were used consistently through-
out the region and if a district attempted to operate with significantly 
different materials, it seems that eit.her such actions have received 
little publicity or they haven't taken place. If an individual school 
district has little latitude to influence curriculum, then it would seem 
to do what it cannot accomplish. 
Hypothesis IV - Conclusions 
Hypothesis IV tested the theory that organized principals had 
the power to contribute to a district's policy-making process. Five 
propositions were formulated for this purpose. Inclllded in this group 
were t.he organized princi.pa~s 1 rights to board information and data, 
participation in the development of budget, calendar, and new facilities, 
and their role as agents of the board in negotiatj.ng contracts with 
other employee groups. Approximately thirty-one per cent of the total 
possible weighting was assigned to the sample as a result of the weight-
ing process. Bei.ng less than one-third of the rnaximum, it is necessary 
to conclude that the organized principals represented in this study do 
' ~. 'l·· I. 
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not have the legal power to contribute to a district's policy-making pro-
cess. Hypothesis IV is rejected. 
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that this one-third 
figure represents the amount of authority and responsibility vested in 
every district's group of organized principals. In terms of individual 
school districts, the range of weightings spanned the entire continuum. 
Some organized principals had none of the contractual rights represented 
in the propositions while others had achieved ever,y one. 
The organized principals' contracts from New Jersey achieved a 
mean percentage of weighting on the total group of propositions of over 
fifty-nine per cent. Considering the sum of both specific and implied 
rights, the range on individual propositions for the New Jersey adminis-
trators was sixty-six per cent, as a low, to seventy-seven per cent. 
':~:!..~ :!..::;.::.~:::: to t~c ~ oncl1.4S:!.cn that !:ew Jersay o::..·ganized principals have 
bargained a series of contracts that do give them the power to contri-
bute to the policy-making process within their districts. New Jersey 
organized principals are expected to take part in policy development. 
Policy development is a part of the principal role in the New Jersey 
distr~cts represented. 
The Hassachusetts organized principals did not have any con-
tractual language in their agreements that gave them any of the powers 
-outlined in the propositions. In two cases the documents implied such 
rights, but none were found on a specific basis in any instance. This 
leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the 1-'f..assachusetts organized prin-
cipals have no power to contribute to the policy-maki.ng process withtn 
their districts. The development of policy is not a part of the Hassa-
chusetts organized principals' nomothetic role expectations. 
... 
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The wide range of differences in contractual power represented by 
the New Jersey and Massachusetts organized principals' contracts supports 
the conclusion drawin in the discussion of Hypothesis III. The state in 
which a contract is negotiated has a significant effect upon the contents 
or scope of that agreement. Further support for this conclusion resides 
in the fact that within a given state the range of differences in con-
tracts was minimal as contrasted with the differences found in agreements 
between states. 
In the analysis of three of the four areas represented by Hypo-
theses II, III, and IV the conclusion surfaced that the state origin of 
a contract was onP. significant predictor of its scope and, therefore, 
power. This deduction must be followed with the conclusion that the ex-
pectations for organized principals differs from one state to another. 
than clear. ~~at is obvious is that the role parameters for organized 
principals differ depending upon the state in which they work. 
Hypothesis IV - Implications 
Talcott Parsons views an organization as a composite of three 
distinct levels: the institutional, the managerial, and the technical. 20 
He suggests th~t the manaeerial level which is concerned with 11 the di-
• 
-rection, coordination, evaluation, and planning of procedure for maintain-
ing .the organization" is a responsibility of the superintendency. 21 Con-
versely, the principal "serves as a link between the managerial and tech-
20Goldharmner, Keith, and others, ,?,P• cit., p. 17. 
21 ~., p. 18. 
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nical levels of the organization. 1122 This level is concerned with and 
performs the basic work or service for which-the organization has been 
formed. He suggests that principals are not generally concerned with the 
· legislative, allocative, and policy-making functions of the superintendent. 
The contents of the contracts used as the sample for this study 
suggest a differing role for the principal than that described by Par-
sons. Many of the topics included in the agreements are directed totally 
toward allocative and/or policy-making tasks. Many organized principals 
take part in the development of the -school district's budget. These ad-
ministrators are inv·olved as members of policy-making bodies within the. 
district. Organized principals help to develop calendar, changes in 
their job descriptions that may surface, and other such superintendent-
like activities. To state that o~ganized principals are serving "as a 
is not compatible with their duties as out~ined by the contracts used in 
this study. If the Parson vieW of an organization is used as the struc-
ture within which a role is determined, then the implication emerges 
that the organized principals' role is as much managerial as it is tech-
nical.' 
Probably because role definition is other than a quantifiable 
process, many contributions. have evolved in this study about tqe organ-
'ized principals' role. Considering the management function, a recent 
case heard by the New York Public Employees Relations Board (PffiB) t.ffiose 
decision was supported by that state's courts surfaced a major contra-
diction in the legal interpretation of the principals' role. Although 
22Ibid., p. 18. 
•, 
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many principals have negotiated contracts in New York, this is not true 
of every school district. In one district where the association requested 
that the board negotiate with administrat.ors the request was denied based 
on a board position that principals had served on the board negotiating 
team when .teacher contracts were forma~ized for many years. They argued 
that this activity defined their role as management and, therefore, made 
the provisions of the Taylor Act (New York's public employee bargaining 
law) non-applicable to the administrators. Both PERB and the courts 
agreed with this position and, consequently, the administrators were de-
, nied the opportunity to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. 23 
The major contradiction in this situation is that many New York 
school districts have and continue to bargain with administrative associ-
ations. These principals in most cases did not or do not take part in 
.. 
and continue to serve the board as representatives of management during 
bargB:ining sessions. ,Therefore, within one state and from one district 
to another the principals' legally defined role is or is not that of 
management. This situation serves as well as any to demonstrate the am-
biguity surrounding the principals' role. 
One implication of this situation is that the contradictory use 
of principals demonstrates their role is different depending upon what 
.district and/or area is investigated. The siguificant differences in 
the contracts of the organized principals from the states represented 
demonstrated this. In New York the legal role definition seems to depend 
2311CSA Answers Times Editorial Favoring Hanagerial Status for Pri;1-
cipals, 11 CSA Newslett.er, Brooklyn, New York, Vol. 6, No. 9 (April, 1973), 
p. 5. -
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on the time at which boards and administrators began collective negotia-
tions. 
The New York situation raises a major question about the. princi-
pals' role! Does this legal interpretation of the state's public employee 
bargaining legislation define the nomothetic dimension of role? Since 
the nomothetic dimension of role reflects what the institution expects 
of its incumbents the question in another form is: does the court de-
cision correlate positively to the institution's expectancies? Does 
the court's definition summarize these parameters or is it i.n conflict 
with some, many, or all of the various expectancies that exist for the 
position of principal? 
If the court has reflected a narrow opinion based primarily on 
public employee bargaining legislation, then it may be that its position 
' ' 
have for the principalship •. If a group of principals find themselves 
in a position where the board or superintendent make decisions without 
consideration of the building administrators' opinions, then it suggests 
that these principals are not part of the management team. On the other 
hand, with a contract that demands that they take· part on a consultive 
basis in the d~velopment of budget and calen~r, then the role has defi-
nite management expectancies. 
· Considering the role of the organized principal based upon the· 
contents of the sample agreements that were investigated in terms of 
Hypothesis IV, the implication is a move toward a management role for the 
principalship that is closer to that of the superintendent than to the 
master teacher. Principals who have access to district information and 
take part in the formulation of budget, calendar, and other district 
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I topics are in a position to act somewhat like a superintendent. They 
I 
I 
will collectively recommend actions and policy that may affect the entire 
district but most cettainly will be developed along such lines. They 
will have to consider questions from the perspective of the entire dis-
trict rather than from their own individual school position. The con-
tract will force them to interpret staff requests in a uniform manner. 
Therefore, they will appear to be representing the superintendent and 
the board more than t.he needs of individuals within their own schools. 
The sum of these factors suggests strongly that organized principals 
will tend to be viewed more as management than their colleagues who do 
not have collective bargaining agreements. Finally, boards will consult 
with organized principals regularly because of the master contract. 
Using involvement with budget development, for example, the 
vidual opinions to the collective position adopted by their association 
when consulting ~~th the board. This means that individual principals 
will argue for monetary actions that may represent only part of their 
individual school's posi.tion, if at all. As this process is repeated 
over a period of years, it may be reasonable to expect.that teachers will 
see that principals support a district position on financial policy de-
velopment. Teachers may begin to feel that building administrators are 
.more committed to the district needs than to that of.an individual build-
ing. This will tend to reduce the master teacher role dimension of the. 
principalship. Another implication is t•hat the interstitial characteris-
tic of the principalship will be less appnTent. The process may also 
tend to reduce role ambiguity. 
·. 
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Collective Bargaining Implications 
Certain broad implications emanate when collective bargaining is 
used by any employee group. One given is that fact that a negotiated 
agreem~nt deals with jobs or positions and not with the individuals who 
fill them. The bargaining process employed to define some aspects of 
these jobs in terms of rights and responsibilities focuses on averages or 
centers. Individual needs, particularly those that tend to be much dif-
ferent than most others, usually are ignored in the negotiating process. 
Therefore, the implication emerges that individual needs, or more accu-
rately, the idiographic dimension of role expectations may become less 
important or more difficult to fulfill than has been the case in dis-
tricts m1ere bargaining is not used. The contract creates a set of con-
ditions w~ere great variance from its provisions by any individual for 
.. 
As options are removed and all receive the same, equity becomes 
an important result of .the collective bargaining .process. Equity demands 
that all receive the same~ This may be good or bad depending upon w~o 
is being considered and/or h~N much of what is to be received. Where 
teachers have worked without a collective agreement it .was not unusual 
for administrators to treat them in a manner that reflected their pro-
fessional and/or personal differences from his point of view. Equity 
does no1i allow for this latitude. Where under board policy' and adminis-
trative regulation a principal may have been able to allow a given teacher 
to leave an in-service meeting, for example, because of some problem and 
based on the fact that the teacher in question main~1ined a vigorous work 
schedule, under a contract the prin.cipal would lose this option. No mat-
ter who asked and without any consideration of why, the administrator 
·. 
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dealine w~th a negotiated agreement must necessarily say no or assume the 
consequences of bring open to the filing of a grievance. 
If the result at the administrative level is the same it will mean 
that equity will reduce and/or eliminate the latitude that a superintend-
ent will have in working with principals. It seems that this means the 
opportunity to fulfill personal needs through role expectancies will be 
reduced. Carrying the implication to a logical conclusion, it appears 
that collective bargaining by principals may result in a district role 
.that is highly standardized, as compared to places where no bargaining 
agreement exists. The opportunity to have personal needs met through 
role expectations will be lowered in direct proportion to the degree 
that these needs vary from whatever kind of average exists within a given 
district. 
0&1t: .~.·~::asvu lhd i.. t!<..~Uity bt:comes a major imolication of any master 
contract is definition. Under an agreement various parts of one's job 
are defined in terms of rights and responsibilities. These definitions 
are open to interpretation through a process called grievance. If it 
' . 
can ~e reasonably assumed that it is difficult to write any definition 
that will receive a uniform interpretation from any given group of people, 
then it follows that the application of contractual provisions will be 
done in as unifonn a m:<nner as possible by any superintendent who is 
' interested in reducing the pot~ntial for conflict~ A uniform type of 
operation will tend to reduce options for both the principal and the 
school board. 
Organized principals, too, will have fewer options. The use of 
11 personal days" is an example of an·area where options may be reduced. 
This type of provision is commonly contained within organized principals' 
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contracts. Suppose the provision will allot-r for the use of three personal 
days but absolutely no more than this number. Suppose a given administra-
tor finds himself in a position where a need for more than the agreed-to 
number of days presents itself. The contract may eliminate the superin-
tendent 1 s option to grant the sp.ecial request even if the chief officer 
feels that the need is genuine and should be made available. 
The examples above suggest the possibility of a reduction in the 
idiographic dimension o~ the principals' role'where' a master contract 
defines employer-employee relations. If this implication is true, then 
it follows that the nomothetic d.i.mension of role will increase in inverse 
proportion. The process called negotiating will result in a do~~ment 
that represents a series of compromises to a VaXJ~ng degree on the parts 
.of both the employer and the employee. 
:Fm~.:c ~actors pl,l.rr:.. t.o·war·d th(;.l possiuilit,y o.i' increased influence 
on the principals' role by state and/or national administrator associa-
tions. Representatives of state associations may be more capable in 
bargaining techniques and/or perceived to be by local association mem-
bers. If this prediction is accurate, then it is likely that state 
association personnel will play an important role in local district bar-
gaining sessions. This has been the case in the area of teacher-board 
negotiations. State association personnel ~~y direct and even take part 
-in the bargoJ.ning sessions at any number of local settings~ If and when 
they do this, it seems likely that they will bring similar objectives 
for scope clause content and contractual language to different localities. 
State associations may publish and have their field representa-
tives present specific bargaining proposals and contractual language to 
local groups. If this practice becomes commonplace, then the resultant 
f 
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negotiated agreements will tend to become sim:i.lar. This has happened 
with teachers under the direct leadership of the Illinois Education Associ-
ation. As the process is repeated, contractual role expectancies for ad-
ministrators will tend to become the same throughout a state. One result 
may be a monolithic contract for all principals within a state. If the. 
principals of a given state have contracts that tend to be the same it 
is difficult to conceive their role as ambiguo~s. 
A question of contractual interpretation that cannot be resolved 
at the local district level may, through the vehicle of bargaining legis-
lation, end up at some state agency or board. New York's Public Employee's 
Relations Board is an example of such a bureau. When cases of this type 
reach the state level, it may not be unlikely that representatives of 
the state administrative association will play some role in the resolu-
parent association involvement in administrative role definition. Again, 
a potential lessening of role ambituity based upon the state's legisla-
tion and parent.association activities seems quite likely. 
Another factor that suggests increased growth and influence on 
the organized principals' role emanates from the nature of professional 
groups. Associations, in their need to survive, tend to do things that 
help the association grOiv. 'This appears to be related to the number of 
_people whose employment depends on the growt.h of the association rather 
than on what services the unit gives to its individual members. Unions 
demonstrate this self-perpetuating characteristic regularly. 
Administrator associations may actively encourage the settlement 
of administrative rights questions.at the state level where legislation 
allows for resolution. '£his will allow the state association to demon-
r 
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strate how well it helps the membership. Associations may tend to en-
courage grievances and/or strategies that force local boards to bring 
principal role questio~s to .the state. If the·state principals' associ-
. ' 
ation.s do this, one obvious implication is that the parent· group 1-Till 
tend to have greater influence upon their membership than may have been 
true in the past. 
A final factor that seems to imply that the state and national 
professional groups will play an increased role in local district prob-
lems and, therefore, in helping to define the principalship is the re-
sources available at the parent association level. Local associations 
in most cases do not have the quantity of membership to be able to af-
ford sophisticated personnel. With exceptions noted such as the large 
urban areas like Chicago, local administrative groups irl.ll probably not 
have a lawyer or team of legal experts on retainer. · State as~('IC51'ltj nps 
may have these kinds of experts available. If the associations provide 
resources in personnel, expertise, and/or money that are beyond the 
means of the local groups it seems reasonable to expect that the local 
groups will turn more frequently to the parent organization. This im-
plies ~hat state level administrative association influence will become 
greater than it has been in the past. 
Recommendations 
Collective bargaining is a normally applied process in the pri-
vate sector of the economy. However, the situation in publi.c agencies 
tends to find negotiations to be a relatively nelf method of defining 
the relationship between employer a11d employee. School administrators 
have used it in only a very small minority of districts. If bargaining 
·. 
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by prind.pals and supervi.sors remains a normal process for only a minority 
of school administrators, then its effects will not be significant. If, 
however, it can be demonstrated that the process is -being used increas-
ingly by principals, then the implications of this study will become im-
portant. A future study that could have an impact in the field would 
emerge from an attempt. to determine to what degree administrators are 
increasing in the use of the negotiations process. Is the employment of 
negotiations becoming a typical method for administrators? Is the pro-
cess being used less or more depending upon particular circumstances? 
These questions suggest the direction such research might take. 
' Closely related to the growth of administrator bargaining is the 
question of why this process has been e~~loyed by so-called professional 
or m~nagement personnel at all. This study has included many sugges-
tic~: :.~ to tt~ pocciblc rc~;;;cns that hq vc leG. prin6i.peils ~~o -'J:1E: bar-
gaining tabie. However, these factors will remain as possibilities 
until the causes and contributing factors are studied through research. 
A second recommended study focuses, therefore, on the reasons and situa-
tions that have brought administrators to the collective bargaining table. 
: The issue of local control has received regular and wide-spread 
visibility in recent times. Hany different kinds of changes in the pub-
lie schools have contributed to the controversy surrounding this topic. 
-Collectivism seems to have played an important role in t.his question, 
particularly in terms of stat.e and national teacher associati.on objec-
tives. A future study aimed at the effects on local control from ad-
ministrative collectivism may help to clarify a portion of thls picture. 
This study could conceivably be related to the effects of teacher bar-
gaining on the same quest1on. There does not seem to be much doubt thnt 
•, 
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control of schools is an objective of teacher associations. Is the same 
true for administrators? What part does power play in the negotiations 
process? These questions demand the attention of the profession because 
the issue of local versus national control is crucial. 
There is little doubt that state and national associations play 
some part in an administrator's professional life. The question of what 
and how great a role these associations have played in the area of ad-
ministrative bargaining is not known. Have principals formulated their 
need to negotiate based to any extent on the directions of the parent 
groups? Have the professional associations grown in power as more prin-
cipals bargained? Have principals applied negotiating tactics and ob-
jectives that reflect state and national association priorities rather 
than local concerns? It is recommended that this series of questions be 
~-f:,_,rl_:i_ed i~ the i!1t.e!'ests 
termine if, when, and how they might apply the techniques of negotiating. 
If generalizations about collective bargaining in the public 
schools are to attain any validity, then there is a definite and pre-
requisite need for an investigation of state public employee bargaining 
legislation. Individual state laws seem to var,y considerably on this 
topic. Some states allow teachers to strike under specific conditions. 
Most do not. The scope of negoti~tions or what is negotiable ranges on 
--a long continuum. This question os still belng debated in' states that 
do have public employee bargaining legislation. The role defi.nitions 
and/or job descriptions of which employees may legally form bargaining 
units and act as exclusive representatives for a district's group indi-
cates a similar type of variability. The role of the local school board 
in collective bargaining and the creation o:f a state labor relations 
I' I 
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board for public employees are two other areas that are different from 
state to state. Slnce bargaining is becoming the normal method to define 
the vorking conditions- for most school employees (i.e., teachers), a com-
parison of states• bargaining legislation is important and relevant. 
A serious and unanswered question that has emerged since the ad-
vent of collective bargaining by teachers is related to the sanctity of 
contr~ets, principle versus public policy. Some school boards have 
entered into agreements with teachers• associations that include, for 
example, the negotiation of pupil-teacher ratios. This 'topic is, ac-
cord:i.ng to Illinois state- law, an area in which the board has the exclu-
sive m;_t.hority to make final decisions. 'h'hen, however, it is included 
in the master contract a situation may arise \-There the board and teachers 1 
association cannot settle on a mutually agreed-to basis about these 
settlement of this issue was subject to binding arbitration, then the 
board '1-!0Uld be giving up its right to make the final decision to some 
representative of an arbitration association. This would mean that the 
master contract had, in fact, circumvented state law •. It also demon-
strates the means by l-Thich associations have a type of- veto power over 
a school board. 
On the other hand, when questions arise about specific contracts 
_,-;hose provisions ma.y in part or completely be in opposition to state law 
the publj.c policy prevails. 24 However, as of this point in time, a ques-
tion evolving from a public employees' contract with an elected board has 
not been settled in the courts. One noted attorney has remarked, "it, 1 s a 
24unver:?.agt, George, Cbi.ef Justice, Circuit Court of DuPage County, 
\ffieaton, Illinois. Related dur:ing a conversation (April, 1975). 
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very fuzzy area. 11 It is recommended that this question and its legal 
implications be investigated in a future study. 
Directly related to this study, but not answered by it, are a 
number of questions that may serve as the basis for additional research. 
It appears important to determin·e if the perceptions of board members 
and administrators differ in areas where bargaining is used as compared 
to those of districts where administrators do not employ the method. The 
tact of this research could be similar to Thompson's work reported in 
Chapter II. Bell's study is also a possible source for the design of 
this research. 
Within districts where principals have bargained and do consult 
with the board it would add to the literature in a positive manner to 
note what kinds of and how much consulting actually takes place. This 
of those involved, the changes such consultation seems to have made on 
district poli~ development, if any, and the growth of consultation 
rights within the contract. Finally, a comparison of organized princi-
pals 1 consultation rights and perceptio,ns about the subject could be 
made to those administrators who do not negotiate with-their boards. 
It appears that administrators have mrgained only where teachers 
have and after the latter began the process. It would add clarification 
-to the entire picture if the res"'Ultant contracts of the two employee 
groups Here compared. Do princi.pals have a smaller or broader scope of 
negotiable topics as compared to teachers? At what frequency do the vari-
ous items appear? Do principals bargain for management. rights that do not 
appear in teachers' contracts? 
2
.5Lifton, Fred, op. cit. 
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Teachers and administrators have negotiated with the same board. 
What conflicts have occurred as a result of opposing positions held by 
these two employee groups? How have school boards dealt with situations 
of this type? \fuich employee group has won the battle of conflicting 
interests? Data centered on these questions could help those interested 
in understanding the effects of collective bargaining on educational ad-
ministration. 
In terms of practical application, it is recommended that work-
ing building administrators explore the feasibility of using the bargain-
ing process within their o~m districts. Although the hypotheses were 
proven to be invalid, a minority of the sample agreements did give a por-
tion of the principals represented the power to maintain their leadership 
status. Where legislative parameters allow for collective action by 
that the administrators' latitude in dealing with school problems is 
being reduced by any number or combination of forces, it is recommended 
that collective bargaining be considered as one viable option available 
to. principals. 
Because public employee bargaining is a relatively new meand of 
defining work relationships, the number of studies that could be focused 
on this area is overwhelming. This study has demonstrated that the po-
tential for change in the principals' role is significant where collec-
tive bargaining has been used by administrators. However, organized 
principals represented in this study have not gained a sufficient number 
of rights based on means and quantity to profit by this. potentl.al. Wheth-
er or not they vrill is an unanswered question. However, the analysis of 
the contracts has demonstrated the significance of the topic for educa-
•. 
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tional administration. Collectivism is upon the educational scene and 
will have to be dealt with more frequently by increased numbers of school 
board members and administrators. 
' 
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' APPENDIX A 
SUMMAHY OF THE WEIGHTING VA LillA TION PR0Cl?.SS 
The negotiated agreements from the following school districts 
were used in the validation process: 
l. Agreement between the Brandford Board of Education and the Brand-
ford Administrators Organization. Brandford, C~1necticut. 
{Brandi'ord) 
2. Contract Agreement between the Brenhmod Public Schools, Union 
Free School District No. 12 and the Brentwood Pri.ncipals and 
and Supervisors Organization. Brentwood, New York. (Brentwood) 
3. Agreement between the Livonia Board of Education and the Livonia 
Educational Administrators and Supervisors. Livonia, Michigan. 
(Livonia) 
4. Agreement between the Board of Education of the Township of South 
Brunswick, County of Middlesex, New Jersey and the South Bruns-
wick School Administrators Association. South Brunswick, New 
Jersey. {South Brunswick) 
;>. ColLective Hargaining Agreement bet;~oreen the Board of Education, 
Lake Shore Public Schools and the Lake Shore Association of 
School Administrators.. St •. Clair Shores, Michigan. (St. Clair 
Shores) 
The following administrators used the weighting system described 
in Chapter I and rated the contracts listed above: 
1. Dr. Daniel Cunnif, Principal, Melzer School, East Maine School 
District 63, Niles, Illinois. 
2.- .Mr~ Frank Dagne, Superintendent, East Hain School District 63, 
Niles, Illinois. 
3. -Mr. Barry' Ekman, Principal, Ballard School, East Main School 
District 63, Niles, Illinois. 
4. Dr. Richard Hetke, Principal, Stevenson School, East Main School 
District 63, Niles, Illj_nois. 
The results of the validation process are listed bdow by hypo-
thesj.s. The weightings given by the administrators are listed bclo'l'r the 
name of each person. The difference in average weighting of the four 
18.5 
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participants compared to the author's weighting is listed in the last 
column on the right. 
H;reothesis I 
Weighted by: Difference 
Contract Cunnif Dagne Ekman Hetke Liechti (Percentage) 
Brand.ford 3 4 3 3 4 - 19% 
Brentwood 30 37 38 29 33 + 1 
Li.von:La 31 19 24 27 25 + 1 
South Brunswick 10 9 15 12 16 - 28 
St. Clair Shores 25 30 31 35 28 + 8 
Hypothesis II 
Brandford 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Brentwood 17 21 19 23 15 + 33 
Livon:l.a 5 8 7 9 7 + 3 
. South Brunswick 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Clair Shores 6 8 8 6 7 0 
Hypothesi.s nr 
Brandford 0 0 0 0 0 OJ; 
Rro:>n+.t.rrwrl (I )_ 3 2 ') ~ 50 
"" Livonia 0 0 1 1 0 + 50 
South Brunswick 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Clair Shores 4 6 3 4 4 + '6 
Hypothesis IV 
Brandford 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
" 
Brentwood 10 15 14 9 13 
-
8 ·~· I 
Livonia 2 2 6 1 3 
-
9 
South Brunswick 4 9 10 5 7 0 
St. Clair Shores 0 0 1 1 3 -600 
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APPDIDIX B 
CO!'ITRACT ANALYSIS FORM 
District Name ____________ Community State __ _ 
Pupil Enrollment _____________ Number of Teachers Number of Buildings ____ 
Number of Administrators Percentage in Association 
---------------- --------
Per Pupil Expenditure __________________ Age of Association ________________ __ 
Year of First Contract Length of Contract 
--------------- --------------------
Proposition 1 "right to communicate with board of education" 
Weighting - 0 1 
Determining clause{s~ 
2_3 __ 
Proposition 2 "contributes to modification of job description" 
Weighting - 0 l«r-_ 2 __ 3 __ 
Determining clause{s). 
Proposi'tion 3 "consults with board about. dismissal or promotion of peers 11 
Weighting - 0 1....--- 2_· __ 3 __ 
Determining ciause{s). 
Proposition 4 "preferred treatment in job vacancies" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 
Determining criuse(s,..).-.-
3 __ 
Proposition 5 "deal vrith problems collectively-no reprisal" 
Weighting - 0 1...--- 2 
Determining clause(sj. 
3 __ 
Proeosition 6 "agreed to grievance procedure" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 __ 
Determining claUSe(s~ 
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E,;oeosition 7 "protected from charges of libel, slander, negligence" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining ciai'i'Se(sy:-- --
Proposition 8 "granted academic freedom" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining c !a use ( s y:-- --
Proposition 9 "use of school facilities and time for association bus." 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining clause(s~ -----
Proposj_tion 10 "is consulted about evaluation procedures of position" 
Weighting - 0 1~- 2 ~ 3 __ 
Determining clause(s). -----
Proposition 11 "right to hold outside employment" 
Weiehtin~ - 0 l 2 
'1"\-.&.-----~--~ ";:::--u,:,w•\1 L..--J'• -..;;;.;:~ ..... -~ .. - ............. 5 --- _._ t.l 
3 
--
Proposition 12 "right to attend conferences, meetings" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining clause(s}:-- -- --
Proposition 13 "has same rights as the teachers" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determin~ng c!ause(s.,-:-- --
p_ronosition 14 "interview and approve personnel for building11 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining clause ( s y:-- --
Proposition 1.5 "assigns personnel in building 11 
r 190 
Proposition 16 "approves transfers of personnel from buildingrt 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining clause( sr-:- --
Proposition 17 "takes part in modification of job descriptlons of build-
ing personnel" 
Weighting - 0 1 2 · 3 __ 
Determining clause(s). 
Proposition 18 "approves use of building facilities by outside groups" 
Weighting - 0 i 2 3 
Determining ciause(s~ -----
Proposition 19 "consulted about modifications of bu:i.ldingr: 
Weighting - 0 1 2' 3 __ 
Proposition 20 "contributes to curriculum development in building" 
Weighting - o __ 1 __ 2 3 __ 
Proposition 21 11 is free to innovate within building" 
Weighting - o __ 1 2 3 
---
Proposition 22 "free to do research in curriculum and instructional 
methods in building 11 
Weighting - 0 1 2 3 
Determining ciause(sr:--- ---
Propo~ltion 23 "has access to board minutes, information, records" 
We1.ghting- o __ 1 2_ 3 __ 
~etermining clause(s~ 
Prop~sttion 24 11 takes part in negotiations between subordinates and bd." 
Weighting - 0 1 
Determ:i.ning c!a"use( sr.-
2 3 __ 
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Proposit.j.:.c:n 25 11 tnkes part in development o:f district budget" 
Weighting - 0 l 2 3 
Determining clause( sJ:·- --
!':ropositi~ 26 "takes part in development o:f school calendar" 
Weighting- 0 __ 1_ 2 __ 3 __ 
Propo[dtion 27 "takes part in planning of new school :facilities" 
Weighting - 0 l 2 3 
Determining clause(s-y:-- --
• 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATOR INTERVIEWS 
A dmlnistrat or Interviewed Position District State 
Edward Abrahamson Principal Huntington New York 
Anthony Cirillo Principal Plainview New York 
Leo C. Clark Principal Ypsilanti Michigan 
William P. Counts Principal Pontiac Michigan 
Peter R. DiChiara Ass 1t Principal Glen CoV'e New York 
Peter DiMento Principal Brentwood New York 
Louis F. Ferrara Admin. Ass It to 
Supt. Plainview New York 
Arthur Horler Principal Warren Michiean 
Phillip Hutchins Principal Warren Michigan 
Burton Jones Principal Mt. Morris Michigan 
George Karcher Principal · Lev-ittown New York 
John ,J. Kalish _Admin. Ass 1t to 
Supt. Syosset New York 
Wilbur.Olmstead Principal New Hyde Park New York 
Vincent PaRlato Ass 1 t Principal .Bethpage New York 
History oi' "&he Administrat.ivA lfnit in c:nn::>r.t.ivP ~_,,..,_,;1'"1;,.,,..,. 
1. Total. years unit has been organized. 
Ra.nge - 2 to 11 years. Average - slightly more than 5 years. 
2. Total years that unit has had a negotiated contract. 
Range - 1 .to 7 years. Average - slightly less than 4 years. 
3. Number of administrators in the unit. 
4. 
Range - 9 to 53. Average - 43. 
What factors led to the creation of the administrative unit and col-
lective bargaining by your group? 
a. Teacher militancy (most frequent response). 
b. Movement from a socially oriented group to bargainig. 
c. Negative relationship lvith the school board. 
d.; Change in state leglslation. 
e. Loss of autonomy and/or administrative prerogatives. 
f. Felt need to be able to deal with the school board from a positi.on 
of strencth. 
g. Not sure of the reason. 
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Contract Application 
1. In your opinion has the board of education ever found it expedient 
to circumvent any of the provisions of the contract? 
Yes - 1; No - 13. 
2. If yes, please give the reason for the board's action, as you under-
stand it. 
A question of contract interpretation involving the placement of a 
new principal on the current salary ech.edule. 
3. How many grievances have been filed by your administrative unit con-
cerning contract interpretation? 
None of the respondents' units had formally filed a grievance. 
h. Has the board or any member carried out any personal reprisal toward 
an administrator because of the unit and collective bargaining? 
Generally, the answers were negative. However, in three cases the 
respondents suspected hidden agenda in certain board actions during 
the first few years of bargaining by the ad•rdn:i.strative group. 
5. If you've worked as an administrator both with and without a col-
locti\•c btirgc.inir.g a.gl·t:.::mE:tJt coulu you outline the differencP.R von 
see be-cween the two sets oi' conditions? 
a. More st.ruct.ure or definition. 
b. More objective framework for administrators. 
c. The "in writing 11 situation makes the work easier. 
d. More alternatives available to the administrator. 
e. Administrator has more power with the contract. 
f. One opposing opinion - contract is needed because the principal 
is defenseless without it. The contract pressures force a type 
of regimentation that is stifling. 
6. Given the 9hoice, which sj.tuation would you prefer? 
~vi th contract - 13 
Without contract - 1 
1. In your opinion what is your board's attitude toward the aruninistra-
tive unit? 
Generally, and noting the except.ions listed under question l.J., the 
respondents felt that the board accepted the existence of both the 
bargaining unit and the contract. 
B. What has bPen the atmosphere of your negotiating sessions with the 
board? 
Generally, the maj ori.ty reported that the meetings were agreeable and 
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producth'e. They noted that differences did exist but in almost every 
case were Horked out to the mutual satisfaction of both sides and 
without serious threats by either group toward the other. 
9. Some general comments: 
.• 
a. The contract has added new dimensions to the principals' role. 
b. Less autonomy in terms of relationships with teaching staff be-
cause of collective bargaining. 
c. Taylor law has tended to erode the power principals had over 
teachers. 
d. Legal fees are becoming a significant part of an administrator's 
business expense. 
e. Collective bargaining has brought the principals of the district 
closer together. Reported in 6 cases. 
f. Administrators are gaining on teachers with the use of bargain-
ing in terms of power. 
g~ The board has demonstrated increased respect for the administra-
tive group since bargaining has been used. 
h. Some principals very much in favor of the closed shop situation. 
r 
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